常见问题

Generally it is impossible to have perfect anonymity, even with Tor. Though there are some things you can practice to improve your anonymity while using Tor and offline.

Use Tor Browser and software specifically configured for Tor.

Tor does not protect all of your computer's Internet traffic when you run it. Tor only protects applications that are properly configured to send their Internet traffic through Tor.

Web browsing:

File sharing:

Control what information you provide through web forms.

If you visit a website using Tor Browser, they don't know who you are or your true location. Unfortunately many sites ask for more personal information than they need through web forms. If you sign in to that website, they still don't know your location but they know who you are. Further, if you provide: name, email, address, phone number, or any other personal information, you are no longer anonymous to that website. The best defense is to be vigilant and extremely cautious when filling out web forms.

Don't torrent over Tor

Torrent file-sharing applications have been observed to ignore proxy settings and make direct connections even when they are told to use Tor. Even if your torrent application connects only through Tor, you will often send out your real IP address in the tracker GET request, because that's how torrents work. Not only do you deanonymize your torrent traffic and your other simultaneous Tor web traffic this way, you also slow down the entire Tor network for everyone else.

Don't enable or install browser plugins

Tor Browser will block browser plugins such as Flash, RealPlayer, Quicktime, and others: they can be manipulated into revealing your IP address. Similarly, we do not recommend installing additional addons or plugins into Tor Browser, as these may bypass Tor or otherwise harm your anonymity and privacy.

Use HTTPS versions of websites

Tor will encrypt your traffic to and within the Tor network, but the encryption of your traffic to the final destination website depends upon on that website. To help ensure private encryption to websites, Tor Browser includes HTTPS Everywhere to force the use of HTTPS encryption with major websites that support it. However, you should still watch the browser URL bar to ensure that websites you provide sensitive information to display a padlock or onion icon in the address bar, include https:// in the URL, and display the proper expected name for the website. Also see EFF's interactive graphic explaining how Tor and HTTPS relate.

Don't open documents downloaded through Tor while online

Tor Browser will warn you before automatically opening documents that are handled by external applications. DO NOT IGNORE THIS WARNING. You should be very careful when downloading documents via Tor (especially DOC and PDF files, unless you use the PDF viewer that's built into Tor Browser) as these documents can contain Internet resources that will be downloaded outside of Tor by the application that opens them. This will reveal your non-Tor IP address. If you must work with files downloaded via Tor, we strongly recommend either using a disconnected computer, or using dangerzone to create safe PDF files that you can open. Under no circumstances is it safe to use BitTorrent and Tor together, however.

Use bridges and/or find company

Tor tries to prevent attackers from learning what destination websites you connect to. However, by default, it does not prevent somebody watching your Internet traffic from learning that you're using Tor. If this matters to you, you can reduce this risk by configuring Tor to use a bridge rather than connecting directly to the Tor network. Ultimately the best protection is a social approach: the more Tor users there are near you and the more diverse their interests, the less dangerous it will be that you are one of them. Convince other people to use Tor, too!

Be smart and learn more. Understand what Tor does and does not offer. This list of pitfalls isn't complete, and we need your help identifying and documenting all the issues.

通常情况下,除非你知道如何把 VPN 和 Tor 在不侵犯你的隐私的情况下一起配置,我们不建议将这两者配合使用。

您可以在我们的 Wiki 上找到更多有关 Tor 与 VPN 一起使用时的信息。

Tor 浏览器目前在Windows, LinuxmacOS 上可用。

这里是 Tor 浏览器的安卓版本,The Guardian Project 也提供了 Orbot app,以在您的设备上通过 Tor 的网络路由其他应用。

Tor 还没有官方的 iOS 版本,但是我们推荐Onion Browser

强烈建议不要在 Tor 浏览器上安装新的附加组件,因为这可能会损害你的隐私和安全。

安装新的拓展可能会意外影响 Tor 浏览器,并使得您的 Tor 浏览器的浏览器指纹变得独一无二。 如果您的 Tor 浏览器副本拥有独特标记,您的浏览活动可以被反匿名并被追踪,即使您正在使用 Tor 浏览器。

简单来说,所有浏览器的设置与特性都会创造一个叫“浏览器指纹”的东西。 大多数浏览器不经意间为每一个用户创建独一无二的浏览器指纹,那可以被用来在全网追踪该用户。 Tor 浏览器经过专门设计,使其用户之间的指纹几乎相同(我们并不完美!)。 这意味着每一个 Tor 浏览器用户看起来都跟其他 Tor 浏览器用户一样,使得追踪一个单独的用户变得困难。

新的插件也有可能增加Tor 浏览器遭到攻击的几率。 这可能会允许敏感信息被泄露或允许攻击者感染 Tor 浏览器。 插件本身可能就被恶意设计用于监控您。

Tor 浏览器已经预先安装了两个拓展插件——HTTPS EverywhereNoScript——并且安装其他插件可能使您失去匿名状态。

想要了解更多关于浏览痕迹的信息?在 Tor 的博客里有一篇文章介绍了有关它的全部信息。

Tor 浏览器可以帮助人们访问所在地区被封锁的网站。 大多数时候,只需下载 Tor 浏览器,您就可以使用它去访问被屏蔽的网站。 在被严重监视的地区,我们提供许多规避监管的选项,譬如 可插拔传输

参阅 Tor 浏览器用户手册 关于 审查 的章节获得更多信息。

Tor 浏览器防止人们获知您访问过的网站。 有些机构,例如您的互联网服务提供商,也许会知道您正在使用 Tor 。不过他们将不会知晓您正在使用 Tor 做些什么。

关于 Tor

“Tor”这一名称可用于多个不同的组件。

Tor是一个您能运行在您的电脑上,保护您在互联网上安全的程序。 它会将您的通信在一个由多个中继站组成的分散网络内不断传递,这些中继站被来自世界各地的志愿者们运营,并以此来保护您:这阻止了某些人通过您访问了哪些网址来得知您的网络链接,也防止了您访问的网站获取您的地理位置。 这些由志愿者搭建的中继被成为 Tor 网络。

大多数人通过 Tor 浏览器使用 Tor。Tor 浏览器基于火狐浏览器开发,并修复了许多隐私问题。 您可以在我们的关于页面了解更多信息。

Tor 项目是一个非盈利性(慈善)组织,它维护和开发 Tor 软件。

Tor 的全称是洋葱路由网络。 当我们在2001-2002年开始新的下一代洋葱路由的设计与实践时,我们会告诉人们我们正在搭建洋葱路由,然后他们会说“酷!哪一个洋葱路由?” 即使洋葱路由已经成为了一个标准的家庭条款,Tor 诞生于实际的由 Naval 研究实验室运行的洋葱路由项目之外。

(它还有优秀的德语和土耳其语翻译版本。)

注意:尽管它原本来源于一个缩写,Tor 不能被拼写成“TOR”。 只有首字母时大写的。 实际上,我们常常会发现一些没有读过我们网站的人(而是从新闻报道中了解了他们对 Tor 的一切知识)正在使用我们的服务,因为他们将其拼写错误。

不,它不会。 你需要使用另一个程序去理解你的应用和协议并且了解如何清除或者"擦除"它发送的数据。 Tor 浏览器尽力确保应用层数据,例如用户代理的字符串,对于所有用户都是一致的。 但是,Tor 浏览器无法对您输入到表单中的文本做任何更改。

一个传统的代理提供商会在互联网的某处搭建一台服务器并允许您使用它来中继您的流量。 这构建一个简单的,容易维护的架构。 所有用户都通过同一台服务器来通讯。 提供者可以对代理的使用进行收费,或者通过服务器上的广告来支付其成本。 通过最简单的配置,您不需要安装任何东西。 您只需要将您的浏览器指向他们的代理服务器。 如果您不希望在线保护自己的隐私和匿名性,并且您相信提供者不会做坏事,那么简单的代理提供者就是很好的解决方案。 一些简单的代理提供程序使用SSL来保护您与它们之间的连接,从而保护您免受本地窃听者的侵害,例如在带有免费wifi上网的咖啡馆中。

简易的代理服务商也可能会造成单点故障。 供应商知道您是谁,也知道您在互联网上正浏览什么。 在您的流量经过他们的服务器时,他们可以看见您的流量。 在某些情况下,当他们使你的加密流量依赖于银行网点或者电商商店,他们甚至可以看到你其中的加密流量。 您不得不信任您的供应商不监控您的流量,注入他们自己的广告或者记录您的个人信息。

在您的流量抵达目的地前,Tor将它传递通过至少三台不同服务器。 因为这三层中的每一层都附加了互相独立的加密,监视您的的网络连接的人将无法修改或读取你发送给 Tor 网络的信息。 您的流量在 Tor 客户端(在您的计算机上)与世界其他地方弹出的站点之间进行了加密。

第一台服务器不知道我是谁吗?

有可能。 三台服务器中的第一台服务器里的不良服务器可能会看到来自计算机的加密 Tor 流量。 它仍然不知道您是谁,也不知道您正在使用 Tor 做什么。 它仅仅能看到“这个 IP 地址正在使用 Tor”。 仍然可以保护您免受此节点的影响,因为它既无法确定您的身份,也无法确定您在 Internet 上的去向。

第三台服务器看不见我的流量吗?

有可能。 一个恶意的末端服务器可以看到三分之一的你发送给 Tor 的流量。 它不会知道是谁发送的数据。 如果您正在使用加密(例如HTTPS协议),它仅能知道目标地点。 查看关于Tor与HTTPS的可视化内容来理解Tor是如何与HTTPS交互的。

可以。

Tor 软件是免费软件。 这意味着我们给予您权力来再次分发 Tor 软件,无论是修改或未修改的版本,无论是收费或免费。 您不需要向我们要特殊许可。

但是,如果您想要分发 Tor 软件,您必须遵守我们的许可。 特别地,这意味着无论您要发行 Tor 软件哪个部分的发行版,您都需要把我们的[许可]文件和这个该发行版放在一起。

然而问我们这个问题的大多数人不仅仅想为 Tor 软件做出贡献。 他们想分发 Tor 浏览器。 这包括火狐拓展支持,NoScript和HTTPS-Everywhere拓展。 你将需要遵守这些程序的许可。 这些分发的火狐拓展都 [GNU 基本公共证书] (https://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html),而火狐企业版的发行则必须有火狐公共证书。 遵从他们的许可证的最简单方式就是把源代码包含进这些程序里面,只要你打包了这些软件。

同时,你应该确保不让你的读者对这些问题迷惑:什么是 Tor?是谁做的?它能提供什么功能?(以及不提供什么?) 查看我们的商标常见问题来获取详细信息。

还有很多其他应用程序能与 Tor 搭配使用,但我们还没能彻底地研究这些应用的应用层面匿名性问题,因此我们无法推荐一个较为安全的配置方法。 我们的 Wiki 包含社区维护的 [Torify 特定应用程序]说明列表(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWTO)。 请补充这个名单,帮助我们保持它的准确性!

很多人使用Tor 浏览器,因为使用Tor来浏览网页能够保证一切安全。 将 Tor 和其他浏览器一起使用是危险且不推荐的

Tor 中完全没有后门。

我们知道一些聪明的律师,他们说在我们的司法权生效的地方(美国),不太可能有人让我们添加后门。 如果他们的确让我们这样做,我们会和他们抗争,(律师说)我们可能会赢。

我们永远不会在 Tor 中植入后门。 我们认为,在 Tor 中使用后门程序对我们的用户将是极为不负责任的,对于一般的安全软件而言,这是一个不好的先例。 如果我们故意在我们的安全软件中设置了后门程序,那会使我们的专业名誉受损。 没有人会有充分的理由再次信任我们的软件。

但是,尽管如此,人们仍然可以尝试进行攻击。 可能有人冒充我们,或破解我们的计算机,或类似的事情。 Tor 是开源项目,您应当总是检查源代码(或至少此版本和上个发行版的源代码之间的差异),以确认没有可疑的迹象。 如果我们(或者 Tor 的经销商)拒绝向您提供源代码的获取方式,那么这其中肯定有蹊跷。 您同样应当检查发行版的 PGP 签名,以确保无人对发行网站动了手脚。

同时,Tor 中也可能会有意外性漏洞并影响您的匿名性。 我们定期发现并修复匿名性相关的漏洞,所以请确保您的 Tor 是最新版本。

Tor 浏览器

警告: 千万不要遵循任何让你手动编辑你的 torrc 文件的建议/教程!!! 这样做会使攻击者通过对 torrc 的恶意配置来破坏您的安全性和匿名性。

Tor使用一个叫做“torrc”的文本文件来存储有关于Tor的设置。 默认设置应该能在大多数的Tor用户那里正常工作(因此出现以上警告)。

请按照下方对应您的操作系统的指示找到您的 Tor 浏览器的torrc。

运行于 Windows 或 Linux:

  • torrc在您的 Tor 浏览器目录里的“Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor”目录中可以找到。

运行于macOS:

  • torrc在“~/Library/Application Support/TorBrowser-Data/Tor”目录里可以找到。
  • 注意库文件夹在新版的macOS中是被隐藏的。在访达中访问这个文件夹,需要选择”前往“菜单中的”前往文件夹...“。
  • 然后在窗口中输入“~/Library/Application Support/”并点击确定。

在修改您的torrc之前关闭Tor 浏览器,否则Tor 浏览器可能会擦除您的修改。 当命令模式选项启动 Tor 时,Tor 浏览器会覆盖掉一些其他选项。

请查看 torrc 示例文件来获取关于常用配置的建议。 想了解其他可供您使用的配置选项,请看 Tor 操作指南页。 记住,在torrc中所有以“#”开头的行都会被视为注释并且不会影响Tor的配置。

它们的名字很具有误导性,但“隐身模式”(或隐私模式)无法让你在互联网上匿名化。 它们在你关闭浏览器后删除你计算机上所有与你的浏览会话相关的信息,但是它们在隐匿你的网络痕迹方面毫无作为。 这表示一个窃听者可以和任何普通浏览器一样获取你的网络通信流量。

Tor 浏览器不仅提供了所有被遗忘的私人标签的特点,同时还隐藏了所有可以被用来观察网络活动轨迹的源 IP、浏览偏好和设备细节,给用户提供了一个真正的全过程隐蔽的私密浏览体验。

想要了解更多有关匿名模式和私人标签的局限性,请查阅 Mozilla 关于私密浏览常见的谣言一文。

我们强烈不推荐把 Tor 和 Tor 浏览器以外的浏览器搭配使用。 在其它浏览器中使用 Tor 可能会使你置于没有 Tor 浏览器提供的隐私保护的风险中。

Tor 浏览器可以帮助人们访问所在地区被封锁的网站。 大多数时候,只需下载 Tor 浏览器,您就可以使用它去访问被屏蔽的网站。 在被严重监视的地区,我们提供许多规避监管的选项,譬如 可插拔传输

参阅 Tor 浏览器用户手册 关于 审查 的章节获得更多信息。

有些网站因为他们无法分辨出普通 Tor 用户和机器人的区别而屏蔽了 Tor 用户的访问。 我们能让网站解封 Tor 用户的最成功的手段是让用户直接联系网站管理员。 这么做也许能解决你的问题:

“嗨!我正在使用 Tor 浏览器访问 xyz.com ,不过似乎你们并没有允许 Tor 用户访问。 我建议您重新考虑这个决定;Tor 被世界各地的人用来保护隐私和对抗审查。 封锁 Tor 用户意味着也可能封锁了希望在专制国家自由的浏览互联网的用户,希望隐藏自己避免被发现的研究人员、记者、举报人和社会活动家,或只是希望不被第三方跟踪的普通人。 请采取强硬立场支持数字隐私和互联网自由,以及允许 Tor 用户访问 xyz.com,谢谢。”

另外,银行等比较敏感的网站经常进行地区范围的屏蔽(例如如果你平时只在某个特定的国家使用他们的服务,从其他国家进行访问时你的账号可能就会被冻结)。

如果您不能连接到洋葱服务器,请查阅我不能连接到 X.onion 了!

你当然可以在使用 Tor 浏览器时使用其它的浏览器。 不过你应该清楚其他浏览器不能提供和 Tor 浏览器一样的隐私保护。 不过在切换浏览器时要多加小心,你也许会不小心在普通浏览器里执行要在 Tor 浏览器中执行的操作。

您可以在Tor 浏览器的网络设置 里设置代理IP地址、端口和认证信息。如果您使用其他方式使用Tor 的话,请查阅操作指南页 里的HTTP代理和HTTPS代理,并相应地修改您的torrc文件。您会需要一个HTTP代理服务器来执行GET请求,以获取Tor 的名录。您还会需要一个HTTPS代理服务器来执行CONNECT请求,以获得Tor 的中继。( 如果您使用的是同一个代理服务器也没关系 )。Tor 还支持Socks4代理服务器和Socks5代理服务器的torrc选项。

此外,如果您的代理服务器需要auth的话,请查看 HTTP 代理服务器认证器和 HTTPS 代理服务器认证器选项。我们目前只支持基础的auth,但如果您需要 NTLM 认证,您会觉得档案里的这篇文章很有帮助。

如果您的代理服务器只允许您接入特定的端口,请查看被防火墙阻挡的客户,获悉如何限制您的 Tor 浏览器接入的端口。

有时,当您在 Tor 浏览器上使用 Gmail 时,谷歌会弹出一个提示窗口,提醒您您的账户有可能被盗用了。 这个提示窗口列出了一系列近期在世界范围内被用于登录您的账户的 IP 地址和地点

总的来说,这是一个错误的警报:由于您使用了 Tor 的服务,谷歌会看见多个来自不同地点的登录,所以它希望确认是真正的账号持有者在登录这个账户。

虽然这可能是使用 Tor 的服务带来的意外影响,但这并不意味着您可以彻底忽视这些警告。 这有可能是一个误报,也有可能是真的有人盗取了您的谷歌cookie,从而获取了您的账户。

通过直接操控您的计算机,或者监视您的网络通讯,都可以盗取您的cookie。 理论上来说,只有直接在您的电脑上操作,才有可能使您的系统陷入危险,因为毕竟 Gmail 和类似的服务应该只会通过 SSL 协议来传送cookie。 在现实中,唉,其实要远比这个来的复杂得多

而且如果有人真的盗取了您的谷歌cookie,他们也可能在一些奇怪的地方登录(当然也有可能不是)。所以总而言之,既然您在使用 Tor 浏览器,那么谷歌的安全措施就对您不是那么有用了,因为它经常误报。您不得不使用其他的方式来保障账户安全,比如看看您的账户是否出现异常,或者您是否的确在时间戳显示的时间里登入了您的帐户。

最近,Gmail 的用户可以在他们的账户上开 两步验证来增添一层安全保障。

这是一个已知的间歇性问题。 这并不意味着Google认为Tor是间谍软件。

当您使用 Tor 的时候,您正和其他数千名用户共同使用着出口中继。Tor 的用户会在当许多人短时间内同时使用谷歌搜索时看见这条提示。当谷歌看见一个 IP 地址(就是您恰好正在使用的这个出口中继)有大量通信流量时,会认为是有人在试图“爬取”他们的网站,于是会把这个 IP 地址的访问速度暂时地放慢。

您可以尝试“更改这个网站使用的链路”来从另一个 IP 地址访问该网站。

另一个可能的解释是,谷歌试图检测某些向它发送异常查询的间谍软件或病毒。它记录那些发出异常询问的 IP 地址(但并没有意识到它们是 Tor 的出口中继),然后对任何来自那些 IP 地址的网络链接发出警告,声称它最近的查询记录是病毒感染的结果。

我们认为,谷歌没有特意地针对 Tor 的使用进行删除或拦截。那些声称计算机被病毒感染的错误信息应该在短时间内会消失。

谷歌用地理定位来确定您现在身处何处,以便给您提供更好的个性化体验。这包括了提供它认为您正在使用的语言,以及根据您的搜索呈现不同的结果。

如果您真的想看英文版的 Google,你可以点击提供此内容的链接。不过我们认为这是 Tor 的一项特性,而不是漏洞——互联网并非处处相同,实际上,根据您所在的位置,它看上去确实有所不同。 此功能使人们想起了这一事实。

注意:谷歌搜索的URL会有参数名+值的参数,其中一个名称就是“hl”。如果您把“hl”和“en”连在一起,那么谷歌会自动返回英文的搜索结果,不管您是被发往谷歌哪一个服务器。像一个这样的查询:

https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=online%20anonymity&hl=en

另一个方法是直接使用您的国家代码来访问谷歌。这可以是google.be,google.de,google.us等等。

Tor 浏览器使用Firefox ESR搭建, 所以属于火狐的问题可能会出现。 请确认你只有一个 Tor 浏览器在运行并且你的 Tor 浏览器安装在一个有正确权限的文件夹里。 如果您的电脑正在运行杀毒软件,请参阅我的杀毒/反恶意软件保护程序正阻止我使用 Tor 浏览器,这通常是导致此类问题的主要原因。

Tor 浏览器6.0.6及之后版本使用 DuckDuckGo 作为内置搜索引擎。 我们之前在 Tor 浏览器上使用的 Disconnect 现在暂时没有获取谷歌搜索结果的权限。 因为 Disconnect 更像是一个允许用户在不同搜索引擎间来回切换的元搜索引擎,它转而提供了 Bing 的搜索结果,但 Bing 的搜索结果质量往往并不理想。

Tor 浏览器中,每一个新的羽毛会分配到一条独立的链路。 Tor 浏览器的设计与应用文档更深入地解释了这项设计背后的思考。

Tor 浏览器是为和 Tor 一起使用而定制的 Firefox 。 Tor 浏览器做了很多工作,例如加入强化隐私和安全的补丁。 虽然你可以同时使用 Tor 浏览器和其他的浏览器,但是同时使用其他浏览器会暴露你的身份信息。我们强烈建议您不要使用其他浏览器。 了解更多有关Tor 浏览器的设计.

有时重度依赖 JavaScript 的网站无法在 Tor 浏览器中正确运作, 最简单的解决办法就是点击安全图标 ( 屏幕右上角那个小小的灰色盾牌 ),然后双击 “ 高级安全设置... ”。 把安全等级设置为“标准”。

使用 Tor 浏览器时,没人能看见你在浏览的网站。 不过你的网络提供商或网络管理员也许可以发现你在使用 Tor,但他们无法知道你浏览的具体网站。

我们希望所有人都可以用上母语版本的 Tor 浏览器。Tor 浏览器现在已经支持30种不同语言,而且这个数字还在持续增加。想要帮助我们翻译吗?快成为一个 Tor 翻译者吧!

你还可以安装并试用 Tor 浏览器 Alpha 测试版,来帮助我们测试即将正式发布的新语言版本。

我们不建议运行多个 Tor 浏览器实例,在很多平台中这样做可能会导致运行不正常。

十分不幸,有些网站要求 Tor 用户填写验证码,我们对此无能为力。 最有效的方法往往是联系网站管理员,告诉他们验证码给像你一样的用户带来的不便。

因为禁用 JavaScript 会让很多网站无法工作, Tor 浏览器内置的 NoScript 默认允许 JavaScript。 默认禁用 JavaScript 造成的不便过于严重,也许会让大多数用户直接放弃使用 Tor 。 原则上来说,我们不仅想让 Tor 浏览器尽可能安全,还想让大多数人都可以使用。所以按照目前状态, Tor 浏览器会继续默认启用 JavaScript。

对于想要在所有的 HTTP 网站上默认关闭 Javascript 的用户,我们坚已您更改 Tor 浏览器中“安全等级“的选项。 这可以通过找到安全图标(屏幕右上角那个小小的灰色盾牌)并点击“高级安全设置...”来实现。 ”标准“等级允许JavaScript,但是”安全“与”最安全“等级都将阻止HTTP网站上的JavaScript。

运行 Tor 浏览器不会使你成为网络中的一个中继节点。 这意味着你的电脑不会用于中继其他人的流量。 如果您想搭建一个中继,请查阅我们的 Tor 中继指南

There are methods for setting Tor Browser as your default browser, but those methods may not work always or in every operating system. Tor 浏览器做了大量工作使它和你的操作系统的其他部分相互隔离,以及设置为默认浏览器的过程并不可靠。 这意味着一个网站有时会在 Tor 浏览器里加载,有时却会在其他浏览器里加载。这种操作十分危险而且可能暴露您的身份。

Tor 浏览器目前在Windows, LinuxmacOS 上可用。

这里是 Tor 浏览器的安卓版本,The Guardian Project 也提供了 Orbot app,以在您的设备上通过 Tor 的网络路由其他应用。

Tor 还没有官方的 iOS 版本,但是我们推荐Onion Browser

Tor 浏览器会让你的网络活动看起来像是来自于世界各个不同地区的网络连接。 有时候某些像是银行或电子邮件服务的网站会认为您的帐号被他人盗用了,因此自动将您的帐号锁定。

要解决此情况的唯一方式是利用网站服务提供的帐号恢复功能,或直接向该网站服务的提供业者说明您的情况。

如果你所使用服务的提供商支持比基于 IP 的验证更安全的双因素认证选项的话,你也许能规避这种场景。 联系你的服务提供商询问它们有没有支持双因素验证。

Tor 浏览器防止人们获知您访问过的网站。 有些机构,例如您的互联网服务提供商,也许会知道您正在使用 Tor 。不过他们将不会知晓您正在使用 Tor 做些什么。

Tor 浏览器有两种方法改变你的中继线路 —— “新身份”和“为该站点使用新 Tor 线路”。 两个选项都在“汉堡包菜单”里。 你也可以通过 URL 栏里的网站信息菜单找到“新链路”选项,还可以点击屏幕右上角那个欢脱的小扫帚图标来选择“新身份”选项。

新身份

这个选项在你不想让你接下来的浏览活动和以前的关联时会很有用。

运行此功能将会关闭所有已经打开的浏览器窗口及标签页,清除所有的浏览器 Cookie 与历史记录等个人信息,并且为后续所有的网络连接创建新的洋葱路由回路。

Tor 浏览器会提示你所有的活动和下载会被终止,在你点击“新身份”时考虑这一点。

Tor 浏览器菜单

为此站点使用新 Tor 线路

这个选项在出口节点无法访问你请求的网站或显示不正常时会有用。 选择它会在新的 Tor 线路上加载当前标签页。

在其它标签或窗口打开的相同的网站会在重新加载后使用新的线路。

这个选项不会清除任何私密信息或者取消关联你的活动,也不会影响你当前与其它网站的连接。

该站点的新线路

请查阅 HTTPS Everywhere 常见问题. 如果您认为这是 Tor 浏览器的问题,请向我们的漏洞追踪器汇报。

请查阅 NoScript 常见问题. 如果您认为这是 Tor 浏览器的问题,请向我们的漏洞追踪器汇报。

请查阅 DuckDuckGo 支持门户。 如果您认为这是 Tor 浏览器的问题,请向我们的漏洞追踪器汇报。

DuckDuckGo 是 Tor 浏览器的默认搜索引擎。 DuckDuckGo 既不追踪用户,也不存储用户的任何搜索信息。了解更多关于 DuckDuckGo 隐私政策

使用 Tor 浏览器有时会比其他浏览器慢。 Tor 的网络每日有超过一百万的用户浏览,但只有6000多个中继站来路由所有的通信,所以服务器有时会因过载造成延迟。此外,根据我们的设计,您的通信是在世界各地的志愿者服务器上不断传输的,所以一些堵塞和网络延迟总是不可避免的会出现。 您可以通过[运行您自己的中继](https://community.torproject.org/relay/)或鼓励他人这样做来帮助提高网络速度。 想要获取更多深入的回答,请参阅 Roger 的话题博客文章Tor 的公开研究专题:2018年版关于网络性能的部分。 也就是说, Tor 比以前快的多了,你未必会注意到和其它浏览器相比的速度变化。

当你打开 Tor 浏览器时,你可以找到“汉堡包菜单”(就在浏览器界面的右上角,URL 栏旁边),然后点击“偏好”,最后在边栏里点击“Tor”。 在此页面的底部,“查看 Tor 日志”字样旁边,点击“查看日志”按钮。 你能看见一个把日志拷贝到剪切板的选项,然后你就可以将其粘贴到文字编辑器或邮件客户端。

造成 Tor 浏览器连接失败的最常见的问题之一是系统时间设置错误。 请确认你的时钟,日期和时区设置正确。 如果这个问题还没有被解决,请查看位于 Tor 浏览器用户手册 的故障排查界面。

这是 Tor 的正常操作。 你连接的中继回路中的第一个节点通常被称为“入口节点”或是“中转节点"。 它是一个快速且稳定的节点,并且将会在您的中继回路中维持两到三个月,用来抵挡破解匿名攻击。 其余的中继会在你每次访问新网站时改变,这三个 Tor 中继会一起提供完整的隐私保护。 想了解更多关于安全中继站如何工作的信息,请参阅 entry guard 上的这篇博客文章和这篇论文

你所用的网络可能存在封锁,因此你应该试试使用桥。 有一些网桥是 Tor 浏览器内置的,在第一次启动 Tor 浏览器时你可以通过点击 Tor Launcher 中的“设置”(并遵循提示)来使用这些网桥。 如果您需要其他的桥接,你可以从桥接网站 上查询。 关于网桥的更多信息请参阅 Tor 浏览器用户手册

抱歉,我们没有官方支持 *BSD 系统上的 Tor 浏览器。 有一个项目叫 Tor BSD 项目,但它们的 Tor 浏览器并没有受到官方支持。

如果您同时使用 Tor 浏览器和其他浏览器,这不会影响 Tor 的安全性和私密性。 但请注意,其他浏览器不能让您的活动保持私密,您可能会错误地使用非私密浏览器来执行您在 Tor 浏览器中的操作。

强烈不推荐自行修改 Tor 线路。 让 Tor 选择路由会给你带来最高的安全性,修改中继节点可能会破坏你的匿名性。 如果你只想访问只在某些国家或地区提供的服务,你可能更应该去使用 VPN 而不是 Tor。 请注意,VPN 和 Tor 在隐私属性上是有区别的,但是 VPN 可以解决一些区域限制问题。

很不幸,我们目前还没有 Chrome OS 版本的 Tor。 你可以在 Chrome 操作系统上运行 Tor 浏览器安卓版本。 请注意:如果您在 Chrome 操作系统上使用 Tor 移动版,那么您只能浏览网站的移动版(而不是桌面版)。 然而,因为我们没有将软件针对 Chrome 操作系统进行修改,我们不能确定是否所有 Tor 浏览器安卓版的隐私保护功能会运行良好。

强烈建议不要在 Tor 浏览器上安装新的附加组件,因为这可能会损害你的隐私和安全。

安装新的拓展可能会意外影响 Tor 浏览器,并使得您的 Tor 浏览器的浏览器指纹变得独一无二。 如果您的 Tor 浏览器副本拥有独特标记,您的浏览活动可以被反匿名并被追踪,即使您正在使用 Tor 浏览器。

简单来说,所有浏览器的设置与特性都会创造一个叫“浏览器指纹”的东西。 大多数浏览器不经意间为每一个用户创建独一无二的浏览器指纹,那可以被用来在全网追踪该用户。 Tor 浏览器经过专门设计,使其用户之间的指纹几乎相同(我们并不完美!)。 这意味着每一个 Tor 浏览器用户看起来都跟其他 Tor 浏览器用户一样,使得追踪一个单独的用户变得困难。

新的插件也有可能增加Tor 浏览器遭到攻击的几率。 这可能会允许敏感信息被泄露或允许攻击者感染 Tor 浏览器。 插件本身可能就被恶意设计用于监控您。

Tor 浏览器已经预先安装了两个拓展插件——HTTPS EverywhereNoScript——并且安装其他插件可能使您失去匿名状态。

想要了解更多关于浏览痕迹的信息?在 Tor 的博客里有一篇文章介绍了有关它的全部信息。

只有 Tor 浏览器的流量会通过 Tor 网络传输。 你操作系统上的其他程序(包括其他的浏览器)的连接不会使用 Tor 网络,也不会被保护。 需要单独配置来使用 Tor。 如果您想确保所有的通信都通过 Tor 的网络进行,请使用 Tail 实时操作系统。您只要用 USB 或是 DVD 就可以在几乎任意电脑上启动它。

Flash在Tor 浏览器中被关闭,并且我们推荐您不要打开它。 我们认为 Flash 在任何浏览器上都是是极不安全的 —— 它可以轻易盗取你的个人信息或者给你安装恶意软件。 幸运的是,大多数网站、设备,还有其它浏览器都正在淘汰 Flash。

你下载或运行的文件会提示你选择一个目标位置。 如果您忘记了它位于哪里,那么最大的可能性它会位于桌面或者下载文件夹。

Windows 安装包中的默认设置也会为您在您的桌面上创建一个快捷方式,但请注意,您可能无意中取消了创建快捷方式的选项。

如果你在文件夹中找不到,请再次下载并注意询问你下载位置的提示。 选择一个你能简单记住的目录,下载完成后你能在选择的目录中看到 Tor 浏览器文件夹。

大多数防病毒软件允许你将某些进程添加到白名单中。 请打开你的防病毒软件(或反恶意软件工具)中的设置,寻找白名单或类似的选项。 接下来,执行以下步骤:

  • Windows
    • firefox.exe
    • tor.exe
    • obfs4proxy.exe (如果你使用网桥)

*对于 macOS

  • Tor 浏览器
  • tor.real
  • obfs4proxy (如果你使用网桥)

最后,重新启动 Tor 浏览器。 这应该能解决你遇到的问题。 请注意,卡巴斯基之类的防病毒软件可能会在防火墙层面封锁 Tor。

当新的 Tor 浏览器稳定版本发布时,我们将会写一篇包括新的特性与已知问题的博文。 如果您在升级了 Tor 浏览器后遇到了问题,请在blog.torproject.org查阅有关最新稳定版本的Tor 浏览器的博客,您的问题可能被包含在其中。 如果您的问题不在列表里,请发送一个故障报告来告知我们您的问题。

默认模式下 Tor 浏览器大致用200px x 100px的倍数来打开一个新的窗口以避免屏幕尺寸留下的指纹。 这里的策略是将所有的用户都放入一个桶中并使得分辨出其中的单独一个变得很困难。 这种方式将一直有效,直到用户重新设定窗口的尺寸(例如最大化窗口或进入全屏模式)。 Tor 浏览器9在那些情景下也有着指纹保护措施,这项技术叫黑边,是由Mozilla公司开发并于今年早些时候发布的。 它通过向浏览器窗口添加白色边缘来使窗口大小尽量与用户需求一样。与此同时,它还可以让所有用户只在几个屏幕尺寸桶量里,防止他们因此被排外。

简单来说,这项技术给予了不同的用户某种特定的屏幕尺寸,许多用户会拥有同样的屏幕大小,从而令用户不会被屏幕尺寸问题所困扰。

数字签名是一个确保某个包由其开发人员生成并且未被篡改的过程。 下面我们解释为什么它很重要,以及如何验证您下载的 Tor 程序是我们创建的,并且未被某些攻击者修改过的程序。

我们下载页面上的每个文件都附带一个与包名称相同的文件和扩展名“.asc”。这些.asc文件就是 OpenGPG 签名。 它们允许你验证你下载的文件正是我们希望你获取的文件。

例如: torbrowser-install-win64-9.0_en-US.exe 是与 torbrowser-install-win64-9.0_en-US.exe.asc一起的。

我们现在展示如何在不同的操作系统上验证下载文件的数字签名。 请注意数字签名是标注该包被签名的时间。 因此,每个新文件上传时,都会生成具有不同日期的新签名。 只要您验证了签名,就不必担心报告的日期可能有所不同。

正在安装 GnuPG

首先你需要安装GnuPG才能验证签名。

对于 Windows 的用户:

如果您使用 Windows, 下载 Gpg4win并运行其安装包。

为了验证签名,您需要在 Windows 命令行(“cmd.exe")中输入一些命令。

对于 macOS 的用户:

如果您正在使用 macOS,您可以安装 GPGTools

为了验证签名,您需要在(“应用程序”下的)终端中输入一些命令

对于 GNU/Linux 的用户:

如果你使用 GNU/Linux,那么可能在你的系统中已经安装了 GnuPG,因为大多数 Linux 发行版都预装了它。

为了验证签名,您需要在终端窗口中输入一些命令。如何进行此操作将取决于您的发行版。

正在提取 Tor 开发者密钥

Tor 浏览器团队为 Tor 浏览器发行版签名。 导入Tor 浏览器开发者登录密钥(0xEF6E286DDA85EA2A4BA7DE684E2C6E8793298290):

gpg --auto-key-locate nodefault,wkd --locate-keys torbrowser@torproject.org

这会向您展示像这样的内容:

gpg: key 4E2C6E8793298290: public key "Tor Browser Developers (signing key) <torbrowser@torproject.org>" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:               imported: 1
pub rsa4096 2014-12-15 [C] [expires: 2020-08-24]
      EF6E286DDA85EA2A4BA7DE684E2C6E8793298290
uid           [ unknown] Tor Browser Developers (signing key) <torbrowser@torproject.org>
sub rsa4096 2018-05-26 [S] [expires: 2020-09-12]

在导入密钥完成后,您可以将其另存为一个文件(通过指纹来鉴定它):

gpg --output ./tor.keyring --export 0xEF6E286DDA85EA2A4BA7DE684E2C6E8793298290

验证签名

为了验证你下载的包的签名,除了安装文件本身,你还需要下载相应的“.asc”签名文件,并用一个命令让 GnuPG 验证你下载的文件。

下面的例子假设你已经下载了这样的两个文件到你的"下载"文件夹。

对于 Windows 的用户:

gpgv --keyring .\tor.keyring Downloads\torbrowser-install-win64-9.0_en-US.exe.asc Downloads\torbrowser-install-win64-9.0_en-US.exe

对于 macOS 的用户:

gpgv --keyring ./tor.keyring ~/Downloads/TorBrowser-9.0-osx64_en-US.dmg{.asc,}

对于 GNU/Linux 的用户(如果您有32位的安装包,请将64转为32)

gpgv --keyring ./tor.keyring ~/Downloads/tor-browser-linux64-9.0_en-US.tar.xz{.asc,}

命令的结果应该与以下输出相似的内容:

gpgv: Signature made 07/08/19 04:03:49 Pacific Daylight Time
gpgv: using RSA key EB774491D9FF06E2
gpgv: Good signature from "Tor Browser Developers (signing key) <torbrowser@torproject.org>"

更多操作(使用公钥)

如果您遇到了无法解决的问题,不妨下载并使用这个公钥来代替。或者,您还可以使用以下指令:

curl -s https://openpgpkey.torproject.org/.well-known/openpgpkey/torproject.org/hu/kounek7zrdx745qydx6p59t9mqjpuhdf |gpg --import -

你也许会想了解更多关于GnuPG

一些杀毒软件在 Tor 浏览器启动时会提示有恶意软件。 如果你是从我们的官网下载了Tor 浏览器,或是用 Get Tor 下载并验证签名,那么这些提示都是误报,还请不必担心。 一些杀毒程序会将没有被大量用户浏览过的文档认定为可疑文件。 为了确保您下载的 Tor 项目是由我们编写的,且没有被人恶意篡改过,您可以验证 Tor 浏览器的签名。 您也许还想将某些程序放入白名单以确保杀毒软件不会阻止您使用 Tor 浏览器。

Tor Messenger

不,在几次 beta 版之后,我们终止了 Tor Messenger 的支持。 即使现在没有那么多资源进行这项工作,我们依旧相信 Tor 可以和即时消息结合。 你也相信吗?联系我们

在移动设备上使用 Tor

它将会,_很快_可用。 同时,您还可以启用守卫计划的第三方库,来使用 F-Droid 下载安卓的 Tor 浏览器。

学习如何向 F-Droid 添加第三方库

尽管Tor 浏览器安卓版和Orbot都很棒,他们有着不同的用途。 Tor 浏览器安卓版就像是桌面版的Tor 浏览器一样,但是它运行在您的移动设备上。他是一款使用Tor 网络并试图尽可能匿名的一站式浏览器。 另一方面,Orbot 也是一个代理服务器,它使你能够通过 Tor 的网络,用其他应用( 电子邮件、即时短信等等 )发送数据;安卓的 Tor 浏览器里还内置了一个版本的 Orbot,使得其能够接入Tor 的网络。 然而您不能使用这个版本来用除 Tor 浏览器以外的其他应用发送数据。 取决于您想如何使用Tor 网络,这其中之一或两个都可以是很棒的选择。

目前没有在 Windows Phone 上运行 Tor 的方法。

在 iOS 上我们推荐 Onion Browser,它是开放源代码软件,使用 Tor 线路,而且由和 Tor Project 关系密切的人开发。 但是,苹果要求所有在 iOS 运行的浏览器使用 Webkit ,这会使 Onion Browser 不能提供和 Tor 浏览器相同的隐私保护。

了解更多有关Onion Browser。 在[App Store]中下载Onion Browser。(https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/onion-browser/id519296448)。

守卫计划对 Orbot(以及其他隐私保护的软件)的安卓版本进行维护。您可以在守卫计划官网上获得更多详细信息。

没错,这是一个特地为安卓设计的 Tor 浏览器版本。您只需要安装安卓版本的 Tor 浏览器就可以在您的安卓设备上运行Tor了。

守卫计划提供了一个叫 Orbot 的应用,帮助您在安卓设备上用 Tor 的网络路由其他应用。然而如果您只需要用 Tor 来浏览网络的话,那么安装一个安卓版本的 Tor 浏览器就足够了。

GetTor

如果你无法通过我们的 网站下载 Tor Browser,你可以通过 GetTor 获取一份 Tor Browser 的拷贝。 GetTor 是一项通过不同方式自动回复最新版 Tor 浏览器下载链接的服务。这些链接由不同处所托管,例如 Dropbox 、Google Drive 和 GitHub. 您也可以从https://tor.eff.org或是https://tor.ccc.de下载Tor 浏览器。 想要更多明确的地理链接,请访问 Tor:镜像

给 gettor@torproject.org 发送一封电子邮件。 在信息的正文中写下您的操作系统(如 Windows、macOS 或 Linux)并发送。 GetTor 将会给你自动回复一封电子邮件给,信中会带有 Tor 浏览器的下载链接、数字签名(用于验证下载)、签名的指纹和文件的散列值。 你也许需要选择“32 位”或“64 位”版本:这和你的电脑有关,你可能需要查阅你电脑的说明书或是和制造商联系来了解更多信息。

通过推特的GetTor服务目前正在维护当中。请使用电子邮件

要获得 Tor 浏览器的下载链接,你可以向 gettor@torproject.org 发送带有下面信息的电子邮件:

  • Linux
  • macOS(OS X)
  • Windows

连接 Tor

如果无法访问您想访问的洋葱服务,请检查是否正确输入了洋葱地址的16个字符(或者新版地址的56个字符)。只要有一点点错误,Tor 浏览器就无法连接到网站。 如果你仍然无法访问这个洋葱服务,请稍后重试。 有可能是网络连接有出现暂时性阻碍,或者是该网站的管理员在没有提示的情况下关闭了网站。

您可以通过连接至 [DuckDuck 的洋葱服务器](http://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion来确保您可以访问其他洋葱服务器。

如果您的连接出现问题,一则错误信息会弹出,您可以选择“将 Tor 日志复制到剪切板上”选项。 然后粘贴 Tor 日志到文本文件或者其他文档格式中。

或者,如果您没看到这个选项,并且正运行着 Tor 浏览器,那么您可以找到“菜单”(在浏览器右上角,URL条的右侧),然后点击“偏好”,最后在边栏点击“Tor"。 在此页面的底部,“查看 Tor 日志”字样旁边,点击“查看日志”按钮。

您应该能够在 Tor 日志中发现这些常见问题(请在 Tor 日志里寻找如下所示的错误):

常见日志错误#1:代理连接失败
2017-10-29 09:23:40.800 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
2017-10-29 09:23:47.900 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory server
2017-10-29 09:23:47.900 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server
2017-10-29 09:24:08.900 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to xx..xxx..xxx.xx:xxxxx ("general SOCKS server failure")

如果您看见这些提示出现在您的日志里面,这意味着您连接 SOCKS 代理失败了。 如果您的网络连接需要设置 SOCKS 代理,请确认您代理服务器的信息正确。 如果您的系统不需要代理,或者您不敢肯定,请尝试直接连接 Tor 网络。

常见错误 #2: 无法连接到中继
11/1/2017 21:11:43 PM.500 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
11/1/2017 21:11:44 PM.300 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network
11/1/2017 21:11:44 PM.300 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path. Discarding this circuit.
11/1/2017 21:11:44 PM.500 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop
11/1/2017 21:11:45 PM.300 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path. Discarding this circuit.

如果您看见这些提示出现在您的日志里面,这意味着您的 Tor 无法连接到 Tor 网络中的第一个节点。 这可能意味着您处于有审查的网络中。

请尝试通过网桥连接,这应该能解决问题。

常见错误 #3:无法完成 TLS 握手
13-11-17 19:52:24.300 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with direc Tor y server 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server. (DONE; DONE; count 10; recommendation warn; host [host] at xxx.xxx.xxx.xx:xxx) 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN] 10 connections have failed: 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN]  9 connections died in state handshaking (TLS) with SSL state SSLv2/v3 read server hello A in HANDSHAKE 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN]  1 connections died in state connect()ing with SSL state (No SSL object)

如果你在 Tor 日志里看见这句话,这意味着 Tor 和目录服务器无法完成 TLS 握手。 使用网桥可能会解决这个问题。

常见错误 #4:时钟偏差
19.11.2017 00:04:47.400 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150 
19.11.2017 00:04:48.000 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to direc Tor y server 
19.11.2017 00:04:48.200 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server 
19.11.2017 00:04:48.800 [WARN] Received NETINFO cell with skewed time (OR:xxx.xx.x.xx:xxxx): It seems that our clock is behind by 1 days, 0 hours, 1 minutes, or that theirs is ahead. Tor requires an accurate clock to work: please check your time, timezone, and date settings.

如果您看见这些提示出现在您的日志里面,这意味着您的系统时间设置错误。 请确认您的时间设置是正确的,包括正确的时区。然后重新启动 Tor。

造成 Tor 浏览器连接失败的最常见的问题之一是系统时间设置错误。 请确认你的时钟,日期和时区设置正确。 如果这个问题还没有被解决,请查看位于 Tor 浏览器用户手册 的故障排查界面。

审查

网桥是不在 Tor 公共目录里列出的中继节点。

这意味着政府或 ISP 阻止 Tor 网络的尝试不能简单的封锁所有网桥。 如果你处于某个压迫政权中,或是担心被发现自己正在和 Tor 中继的 IP 地址连接,你可能需要使用网桥。

网桥就是有些许不同的中继。 查看我该如何运行网桥以获得指南。

一些国家,包括中国和伊朗,已经发现了检测和屏蔽 Tor 网桥的方法。 Obfs 代理服务器网桥通过增加一层混淆来解决这个问题。 需要一些额外软件和设置来运行 obfsproxy 网桥。 请前往我们在可拔插传输上的页面以获取更多信息。

如果您的连接出现问题,一则错误信息会弹出,您可以选择“将 Tor 日志复制到剪切板上”选项。 然后粘贴 Tor 日志到文本文件或者其他文档格式中。

或者,如果您没看到这个选项,并且正运行着 Tor 浏览器,那么您可以找到“菜单”(在浏览器右上角,URL条的右侧),然后点击“偏好”,最后在边栏点击“Tor"。 在此页面的底部,“查看 Tor 日志”字样旁边,点击“查看日志”按钮。

您应该能够在 Tor 日志中发现这些常见问题(请在 Tor 日志里寻找如下所示的错误):

常见日志错误#1:代理连接失败
2017-10-29 09:23:40.800 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
2017-10-29 09:23:47.900 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory server
2017-10-29 09:23:47.900 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server
2017-10-29 09:24:08.900 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to xx..xxx..xxx.xx:xxxxx ("general SOCKS server failure")

如果您看见这些提示出现在您的日志里面,这意味着您连接 SOCKS 代理失败了。 如果您的网络连接需要设置 SOCKS 代理,请确认您代理服务器的信息正确。 如果您的系统不需要代理,或者您不敢肯定,请尝试直接连接 Tor 网络。

常见错误 #2: 无法连接到中继
11/1/2017 21:11:43 PM.500 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
11/1/2017 21:11:44 PM.300 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network
11/1/2017 21:11:44 PM.300 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path. Discarding this circuit.
11/1/2017 21:11:44 PM.500 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop
11/1/2017 21:11:45 PM.300 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path. Discarding this circuit.

如果您看见这些提示出现在您的日志里面,这意味着您的 Tor 无法连接到 Tor 网络中的第一个节点。 这可能意味着您处于有审查的网络中。

请尝试通过网桥连接,这应该能解决问题。

常见错误 #3:无法完成 TLS 握手
13-11-17 19:52:24.300 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with direc Tor y server 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server. (DONE; DONE; count 10; recommendation warn; host [host] at xxx.xxx.xxx.xx:xxx) 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN] 10 connections have failed: 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN]  9 connections died in state handshaking (TLS) with SSL state SSLv2/v3 read server hello A in HANDSHAKE 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN]  1 connections died in state connect()ing with SSL state (No SSL object)

如果你在 Tor 日志里看见这句话,这意味着 Tor 和目录服务器无法完成 TLS 握手。 使用网桥可能会解决这个问题。

常见错误 #4:时钟偏差
19.11.2017 00:04:47.400 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150 
19.11.2017 00:04:48.000 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to direc Tor y server 
19.11.2017 00:04:48.200 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server 
19.11.2017 00:04:48.800 [WARN] Received NETINFO cell with skewed time (OR:xxx.xx.x.xx:xxxx): It seems that our clock is behind by 1 days, 0 hours, 1 minutes, or that theirs is ahead. Tor requires an accurate clock to work: please check your time, timezone, and date settings.

如果您看见这些提示出现在您的日志里面,这意味着您的系统时间设置错误。 请确认您的时间设置是正确的,包括正确的时区。然后重新启动 Tor。

你所用的网络可能存在封锁,因此你应该试试使用桥。 有一些网桥是 Tor 浏览器内置的,在第一次启动 Tor 浏览器时你可以通过点击 Tor Launcher 中的“设置”(并遵循提示)来使用这些网桥。 如果您需要其他的桥接,你可以从桥接网站 上查询。 关于网桥的更多信息请参阅 Tor 浏览器用户手册

如果你无法通过我们的 网站下载 Tor Browser,你可以通过 GetTor 获取一份 Tor Browser 的拷贝。 GetTor 是一项通过不同方式自动回复最新版 Tor 浏览器下载链接的服务。这些链接由不同处所托管,例如 Dropbox 、Google Drive 和 GitHub. 您也可以从https://tor.eff.org或是https://tor.ccc.de下载Tor 浏览器。 想要更多明确的地理链接,请访问 Tor:镜像

有些网站因为他们无法分辨出普通 Tor 用户和机器人的区别而屏蔽了 Tor 用户的访问。 我们能让网站解封 Tor 用户的最成功的手段是让用户直接联系网站管理员。 这么做也许能解决你的问题:

“嗨!我正在使用 Tor 浏览器访问 xyz.com ,不过似乎你们并没有允许 Tor 用户访问。 我建议您重新考虑这个决定;Tor 被世界各地的人用来保护隐私和对抗审查。 封锁 Tor 用户意味着也可能封锁了希望在专制国家自由的浏览互联网的用户,希望隐藏自己避免被发现的研究人员、记者、举报人和社会活动家,或只是希望不被第三方跟踪的普通人。 请采取强硬立场支持数字隐私和互联网自由,以及允许 Tor 用户访问 xyz.com,谢谢。”

另外,银行等比较敏感的网站经常进行地区范围的屏蔽(例如如果你平时只在某个特定的国家使用他们的服务,从其他国家进行访问时你的账号可能就会被冻结)。

如果您不能连接到洋葱服务器,请查阅我不能连接到 X.onion 了!

Tor 浏览器可以帮助人们访问所在地区被封锁的网站。 大多数时候,只需下载 Tor 浏览器,您就可以使用它去访问被屏蔽的网站。 在被严重监视的地区,我们提供许多规避监管的选项,譬如 可插拔传输

参阅 Tor 浏览器用户手册 关于 审查 的章节获得更多信息。

HTTPS

简单来说是:“可以,你可以使用Tor访问普通的HTTPS站点。”

HTTPS连接被用于确保电脑网络中的通讯安全。 您可以在这里阅读更多有关HTTPS的信息。 Tor 浏览器内置 HTTPS Everywhere 插件,它将自动将数千个不受加密保护的 HTTP 站点切换至更加安全隐私的 HTTPS 站点。

Tor 浏览器防止窃听者获知您访问过的网站。 不过,出口节点和出口节点与目标网站之间的监听者能看到通过 HTTP 协议传输的未加密的内容。 如果你访问的网站使用了 HTTPS,你的流量在离开出口节点时是加密的,不会被窃听者看到。

这个可视化展示说明了窃听者在有或没有 Tor 浏览器和 HTTPS 加密的情况下,能够看到哪些信息。

下方的展示呈现了有使用以及没有使用 Tor 浏览器与 HTTPS 加密连接时,网络监听者可以拦截窃取到的数据种类:

  • 点击“Tor”按钮可以查看当您未使用洋葱路由时,有哪些数据可以让网络监听者直接拦截获取,当此按钮呈现绿色状态时,表示洋葱路由功能已经启动。
  • 您可以点击“HTTPS”功能按钮来查看当 HTTPS 启用时,有哪些数据仍然可能被网络监听者拦截窃取。而当此按钮呈现绿色状态时,表示 HTTPS 功能已经启动。
  • 当两个按钮都为绿色状态时,您可以看到在这两个功能都同时启动的状态下,网络监听者依能够窃取到的数据有哪些。
  • 而当这两个按钮都呈现灰色时,您则可以查看当这两个功能都在关闭的状态下时,网络监听者能够拦截窃取到的数据有哪些。



潜在可视数据
site.com
被访问的网站。
用户名/密码
用于身份验证的用户名和密码。
数据
被传输的数据。
所处位置
访问网站的计算机的网络位置(公网IP地址)。
Tor
是否使用了 Tor。

中继操作者

Tor guesses its IP address by asking the computer for its hostname, and then resolving that hostname. Often people have old entries in their /etc/hosts file that point to old IP addresses.

If that doesn't fix it, you should use the "Address" config option to specify the IP you want it to pick. If your computer is behind a NAT and it only has an internal IP address, see the following Support entry on dynamic IP addresses.

Also, if you have many addresses, you might also want to set "OutboundBindAddress" so external connections come from the IP you intend to present to the world.

如果您的中继才刚刚开始运行,请给它一些时间。 Tor decides which relays it uses heuristically based on reports from Bandwidth Authorities. These authorities take measurements of your relay's capacity and, over time, directs more traffic there until it reaches an optimal load. The lifecycle of a new relay is explained in more depth in this blog post. If you've been running a relay for a while and still having issues then try asking on the tor-relays list.

If you allow exit connections, some services that people connect to from your relay will connect back to collect more information about you. For example, some IRC servers connect back to your identd port to record which user made the connection. (This doesn't really work for them, because Tor doesn't know this information, but they try anyway.) Also, users exiting from you might attract the attention of other users on the IRC server, website, etc. who want to know more about the host they're relaying through.

Another reason is that groups who scan for open proxies on the Internet have learned that sometimes Tor relays expose their socks port to the world. We recommend that you bind your socksport to local networks only.

In any case, you need to keep up to date with your security. See this article on security for Tor relays for more suggestions.

  • The exit relay is the most needed relay type but it also comes with the highest legal exposure and risk (and you should NOT run them from your home).
  • 如果您正想要运行一个最简单的中继,快速守卫中继也十分有用。
  • Followed by bridges.

When an exit is misconfigured or malicious it's assigned the BadExit flag. This tells Tor to avoid exiting through that relay. In effect, relays with this flag become non-exits. If you got this flag then we either discovered a problem or suspicious activity when routing traffic through your exit and weren't able to contact you. Please reach out to the bad-relays team so we can sort out the issue.

When upgrading your Tor relay, or moving it on a different computer, the important part is to keep the same identity keys (stored in "keys/ed25519_master_id_secret_key" and "keys/secret_id_key" in your DataDirectory). Keeping backups of the identity keys so you can restore a relay in the future is the recommended way to ensure the reputation of the relay won't be wasted.

This means that if you're upgrading your Tor relay and you keep the same torrc and the same DataDirectory, then the upgrade should just work and your relay will keep using the same key. If you need to pick a new DataDirectory, be sure to copy your old keys/ed25519_master_id_secret_key and keys/secret_id_key over.

Note: As of Tor 0.2.7 we are using new generation identities for relays based on ed25519 elliptic curve cryptography. Eventually they will replace the old RSA identities, but that will happen in time, to ensure compatibility with older versions. Until then, each relay will have both an ed25519 identity (identity key file: keys/ed25519_master_id_secret_key) and a RSA identity (identity key file: keys/secret_id_key). You need to copy / backup both of them in order to restore your relay, change your DataDirectory or migrate the relay on a new computer.

We're looking for people with reasonably reliable Internet connections, that have at least 10 Mbit/s (Mbps) available bandwidth each way. If that's you, please consider running a Tor relay.

Even if you do not have at least 10 Mbit/s of available bandwidth you can still help the Tor network by running a Tor bridge with obfs4 support. In that case you should have at least 1 MBit/s of available bandwidth.

You're right, for the most part a byte into your Tor relay means a byte out, and vice versa. But there are a few exceptions:

If you open your DirPort, then Tor clients will ask you for a copy of the directory. The request they make (an HTTP GET) is quite small, and the response is sometimes quite large. This probably accounts for most of the difference between your "write" byte count and your "read" byte count.

Another minor exception shows up when you operate as an exit node, and you read a few bytes from an exit connection (for example, an instant messaging or ssh connection) and wrap it up into an entire 512 byte cell for transport through the Tor network.

If your Tor relay is using more memory than you'd like, here are some tips for reducing its footprint:

  • If you're on Linux, you may be encountering memory fragmentation bugs in glibc's malloc implementation. That is, when Tor releases memory back to the system, the pieces of memory are fragmented so they're hard to reuse. The Tor tarball ships with OpenBSD's malloc implementation, which doesn't have as many fragmentation bugs (but the tradeoff is higher CPU load). You can tell Tor to use this malloc implementation instead: ./configure --enable-openbsd-malloc.
  • If you're running a fast relay, meaning you have many TLS connections open, you are probably losing a lot of memory to OpenSSL's internal buffers (38KB+ per socket). We've patched OpenSSL to release unused buffer memory more aggressively. If you update to OpenSSL 1.0.0 or newer, Tor's build process will automatically recognize and use this feature.
  • If you still can't handle the memory load, consider reducing the amount of bandwidth your relay advertises. Advertising less bandwidth means you will attract fewer users, so your relay shouldn't grow as large. 请查阅主页中的MaxAdvertisedBandwidth选项。

所有这些都说明,Tor高速中继确实需要大量内存。高速出口节点占用500-1000 MB内存是不正常的。

我们旨在让搭建一个Tor 中继简单而又边界:

  • 如果中继有时下线,这并没有关系。 目录系统会迅速注意到这一点,并停止发布该中继。 但请试图确保这并不会太频繁地发生,因为当中继断连时,正在使用该中继进行的连接也会断开。
  • Each Tor relay has an exit policy that specifies what sort of outbound connections are allowed or refused from that relay. 如果你不喜欢允许别人的流量经由你的中继出口,你可以设置成仅允许从其他Tor中继的连接。
  • Your relay will passively estimate and advertise its recent bandwidth capacity, so high-bandwidth relays will attract more users than low-bandwidth ones. Therefore, having low-bandwidth relays is useful too.

If you're using Debian or Ubuntu especially, there are a number of benefits to installing Tor from the Tor Project's repository.

  • Your ulimit -n gets set to 32768 high enough for Tor to keep open all the connections it needs.
  • A user profile is created just for Tor, so Tor doesn't need to run as root.
  • An init script is included so that Tor runs at boot.
  • Tor runs with --verify-config, so that most problems with your config file get caught.
  • Tor can bind to low level ports, then drop privileges.

所有的传出连接必须被允许,这样每一个中继才可以与其他中继互相通讯。

In many jurisdictions, Tor relay operators are legally protected by the same common carrier regulations that prevent internet service providers from being held liable for third-party content that passes through their network. 过滤某些流量的出口节点将丧失那些保护。

Tor促进了免费无干扰的网络访问。 出口中继不得过滤通过中继的互联网流量。 被检测到过滤流量的出口节点会被打上劣质出口 的标签。

不要这么做。 如果司法部门察觉了你出口节点的数据流量,他们可能会没收你的电子设备。 出于这些原因,最好不要在你的家中或使用你家里的网络运行出口节点。

推荐在支持 Tor 的商业实体(例如某些 VPS 服务商 —— 译者注)上搭建 Tor 的出口节点。 你的出口节点有一个独立的 IP 地址,而且不会传输你的流量。 当然,你应该避免在你运行出口节点的电脑上存储任何敏感或与你有关的信息。

  • 不要使用 Ubuntu 仓库中的包,它们未得到可靠更新。 如果您使用它们,您可能会错过重要的稳定性和安全性修复。
  • 运行下面的命令确定你 Ubuntu 的版本
     $ lsb_release -c
    
  • 以 root 用户身份把下面的行添加到 /etc/apt/sources.list 中。用前一步你获得的版本号代替'version'。
     $ deb https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org version main
     $ deb-src https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org version main
    
  • 运行下面的命令来添加签名软件包的 gpg 公钥:
     $ curl https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89.asc | sudo apt-key add -
    
  • 运行下面的命令来检查签名并安装 tor:
     $ sudo apt-get update
     $ sudo apt-get install tor deb.torproject.org-keyring
    

For the most in-depth resource on running a relay, see the Relay Setup Guide.

简而言之,它这样工作:

  • There is a master ed25519 identity secret key file named "ed25519_master_id_secret_key". This is the most important one, so make sure you keep a backup in a secure place - the file is sensitive and should be protected. Tor could encrypt it for you if you generate it manually and enter a password when asked.
  • A medium term signing key named "ed25519_signing_secret_key" is generated for Tor to use. Also, a certificate is generated named "ed25519_signing_cert" which is signed by the master identity secret key and confirms that the medium term signing key is valid for a certain period of time. The default validity is 30 days, but this can be customized by setting "SigningKeyLifetime N days|weeks|months" in torrc.
  • There is also a master public key named "ed25519_master_id_public_key, which is the actual identity of the relay advertised in the network. This one is not sensitive and can be easily computed from "ed5519_master_id_secret_key".

Tor will only need access to the medium term signing key and certificate as long as they are valid, so the master identity secret key can be kept outside DataDirectory/keys, on a storage media or a different computer. You'll have to manually renew the medium term signing key and certificate before they expire otherwise the Tor process on the relay will exit upon expiration.

这个功能是可选的,您不需要使用它除非您想这么做。 If you want your relay to run unattended for longer time without having to manually do the medium term signing key renewal on regular basis, best to leave the master identity secret key in DataDirectory/keys, just make a backup in case you'll need to reinstall it. If you want to use this feature, you can consult our more detailed guide on the topic.

Since it's now a guard, clients are using it less in other positions, but not many clients have rotated their existing guards out to use it as a guard yet. Read more details in this blog post or in Changing of the Guards: A Framework for Understanding and Improving Entry Guard Selection in Tor.

棒!如果您想允许几个中继来为网络贡献更多,我们很欢迎这样做。 但请不要在同一个网络上运行太多中继,因为分散与多样性是Tor 网络目标的一部分。

If you do decide to run more than one relay, please set the "MyFamily" config option in the torrc of each relay, listing all the relays (comma-separated) that are under your control:

MyFamily $fingerprint1,$fingerprint2,$fingerprint3

where each fingerprint is the 40 character identity fingerprint (without spaces).

That way, Tor clients will know to avoid using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. You should set MyFamily if you have administrative control of the computers or of their network, even if they're not all in the same geographic location.

The accounting options in the torrc file allow you to specify the maximum amount of bytes your relay uses for a time period.

    AccountingStart day week month [day] HH:MM

This specifies when the accounting should reset. For instance, to setup a total amount of bytes served for a week (that resets every Wednesday at 10:00am), you would use:

    AccountingStart week 3 10:00
    AccountingMax 500 GBytes

This specifies the maximum amount of data your relay will send during an accounting period, and the maximum amount of data your relay will receive during an account period. When the accounting period resets (from AccountingStart), then the counters for AccountingMax are reset to 0.

Example: Let's say you want to allow 50 GB of traffic every day in each direction and the accounting should reset at noon each day:

    AccountingStart day 12:00
    AccountingMax 50 GBytes

Note that your relay won't wake up exactly at the beginning of each accounting period. It will keep track of how quickly it used its quota in the last period, and choose a random point in the new interval to wake up. This way we avoid having hundreds of relays working at the beginning of each month but none still up by the end.

If you have only a small amount of bandwidth to donate compared to your connection speed, we recommend you use daily accounting, so you don't end up using your entire monthly quota in the first day. Just divide your monthly amount by 30. You might also consider rate limiting to spread your usefulness over more of the day: if you want to offer X GB in each direction, you could set your RelayBandwidthRate to 20*X KBytes. For example, if you have 50 GB to offer each way, you might set your RelayBandwidthRate to 1000 KBytes: this way your relay will always be useful for at least half of each day.

    AccountingStart day 0:00
    AccountingMax 50 GBytes
    RelayBandwidthRate 1000 KBytes
    RelayBandwidthBurst 5000 KBytes # 允许更高的短时流量但是保持平均

Tor has partial support for IPv6 and we encourage every relay operator to enable IPv6 functionality in their torrc configuration files when IPv6 connectivity is available. Tor目前需要中继的IPv4地址,您不能在仅有IPv6的主机上运行Tor中继。

The parameters assigned in the AccountingMax and BandwidthRate apply to both client and relay functions of the Tor process. Thus you may find that you are unable to browse as soon as your Tor goes into hibernation, signaled by this entry in the log:

到达了带宽的软件限制;开始休眠。没有新的
    连接会被接受

解决方案是运行两个Tor 进程——一个中继和一个客户端,每一个进程使用自己的配置。 One way to do this (if you are starting from a working relay setup) is as follows:

  • 在中继的Tor torrc文件中,将SocksPort设置为0.
  • Create a new client torrc file from the torrc.sample and ensure it uses a different log file from the relay. 一种命名约定可以是torrc.client和torrc.relay。
  • Modify the Tor client and relay startup scripts to include -f /path/to/correct/torrc.
  • In Linux/BSD/Mac OS X, changing the startup scripts to Tor.client and Tor.relay may make separation of configs easier.

很棒! 这就是我们实施出口政策的原因。

每个Tor中继拥有一条出口规则,用于指定允许或拒绝何种类型的出站连接通过该中继。 The exit policies are propagated to Tor clients via the directory, so clients will automatically avoid picking exit relays that would refuse to exit to their intended destination. This way each relay can decide the services, hosts, and networks it wants to allow connections to, based on abuse potential and its own situation. Read the Support entry on issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy, and then read Mike Perry's tips for running an exit node with minimal harassment.

The default exit policy allows access to many popular services (e.g. web browsing), but restricts some due to abuse potential (e.g. mail) and some since the Tor network can't handle the load (e.g. default file-sharing ports). 您可以通过编辑您的torrc文件来更改您自己的出口策略。 If you want to avoid most if not all abuse potential, set it to "reject :". This setting means that your relay will be used for relaying traffic inside the Tor network, but not for connections to external websites or other services.

如果您确实允许任何出口连接,确保域名解析正常(也就是,您的电脑能正确解析网络地址)。 If there are any resources that your computer can't reach (for example, you are behind a restrictive firewall or content filter), please explicitly reject them in your exit policy otherwise Tor users will be impacted too.

Tor可以很好地处理使用动态IP地址的中继,这没有关系。 您只需要将您的torrc文件中的”Address“留空,然后Tor会猜出它来。

是的,您在一些攻击中确实能获得更好的匿名性。

最简单的例子是一个拥有一些数量Tor 中继的攻击者。 他们会看见一个来自您的连接,但他们不会知道这个连接是来自于您的电脑还是您的中继上的其他人。

有些情况下,它不能帮助我们:如果一个网络入侵者观看了你所有的来来往往的通信,那么他很容易发现哪些连接被转接了,哪些连接从你开始。 (In this case they still don't know your destinations unless they are watching them too, but you're no better off than if you were an ordinary client.)

运行一个Tor中继也有一些坏处。 First, while we only have a few hundred relays, the fact that you're running one might signal to an attacker that you place a high value on your anonymity. Second, there are some more esoteric attacks that are not as well-understood or well-tested that involve making use of the knowledge that you're running a relay -- for example, an attacker may be able to "observe" whether you're sending traffic even if they can't actually watch your network, by relaying traffic through your Tor relay and noticing changes in traffic timing.

收益是否大于风险是一个开放的研究性问题。 很大程度上这取决于您最担心的攻击方式。 对于大多数用户来说,我们认为这是一种明智的举动。

关于如何用您的 NAT/路由设备进行端口转发的指导,参见 portforward.com

如果您的中继在内网运行,您需要设置端口转发。 转发 TCP 连接取决于系统,但是防火墙客户端的常见问题条目提供了一些如何做的例子。

另外,这还有一个说明如何在 GNU/Linux 下使用 iptables 操作的例子。

/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp --destination-port 9001 -j ACCEPT

如果您有不同的(连接到互联网的)外部接口,您可能需要改动"eth0"。 因为您可能只有一个(除了环回接口)所以这应该不难找。

您有两种添加至 torrc 的方法:

带宽率是指条件允许的情况下,最大的长时间传输带宽(字节每秒)。 比如,您也许想要选择“10M带宽率”来获得10兆字节每秒的传输速率(十分快速的连接),或者“500KB带宽率”来获取0.5兆每秒的传输速率(相当于一个不错的有线电缆传输速率)。 最小的BandwidthRate是75kilobytes每秒。

BandwidthBurst是一个字节池,用于满足短期流量高于 BandwidthRate 但长期平均流量低于 BandwidthRate 的需求。 A low Rate but a high Burst enforces a long-term average while still allowing more traffic during peak times if the average hasn't been reached lately. For example, if you choose "BandwidthBurst 500 KBytes" and also use that for your BandwidthRate, then you will never use more than 500 kilobytes per second; but if you choose a higher BandwidthBurst (like 5 MBytes), it will allow more bytes through until the pool is empty.

If you have an asymmetric connection (upload less than download) such as a cable modem, you should set BandwidthRate to less than your smaller bandwidth (Usually that's the upload bandwidth). 否则,你可能会在最大带宽使用时掉包——你可能需要试验一下哪些值使你的连接顺畅。 然后设置BandwidthBurst与BandwidthRate相同。

基于 Linux 系统的 Tor 节点提供了另外一种选择:他们会优先将Tor置于其他运行网络之下,因此他们的私人网络运作不会被 Tor 影响。 A script to do this can be found in the Tor source distribution's contrib directory.

Additionally, there are hibernation options where you can tell Tor to only serve a certain amount of bandwidth per time period (such as 100 GB per month). These are covered in the hibernation entry below.

Note that BandwidthRate and BandwidthBurst are in Bytes, not Bits.

洋葱服务

When browsing an Onion Service, Tor Browser displays different onion icons in the address bar indicating the security of the current webpage.

绿色洋葱标识 一个绿色的洋葱意味着:

  • 洋葱服务通过 HTTP 或带有自签名证书的 HTTPS 提供。

绿色带锁洋葱标识 一个绿色的带锁洋葱意味着:

  • 洋葱服务通过具有 CA 颁发的证书的 HTTPS 提供。

灰色洋葱带红色斜杠标识 带有红色斜线的灰洋葱表示:

  • The Onion Service is served over HTTPS with a self-signed or CA-Issued certificate.
  • The webpage contains subresources served over HTTP.

没错!我们洋葱服务的名单可以在 onion.torproject.org 上找到。

如果无法访问您想访问的洋葱服务,请检查是否正确输入了洋葱地址的16个字符(或者新版地址的56个字符)。只要有一点点错误,Tor 浏览器就无法连接到网站。 如果你仍然无法访问这个洋葱服务,请稍后重试。 有可能是网络连接有出现暂时性阻碍,或者是该网站的管理员在没有提示的情况下关闭了网站。

您可以通过连接至 [DuckDuck 的洋葱服务器](http://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion来确保您可以访问其他洋葱服务器。

洋葱服务允许人们匿名的访问和发表信息,包括架设匿名网站。

Onion services are also relied on for metadata-free chat and file sharing, safer interaction between journalists and their sources like with SecureDrop or OnionShare, safer software updates, and more secure ways to reach popular websites like Facebook.

这些服务使用特殊的顶级域名(TLD) .onion (而不是.com .net .org等)而且这些服务只有在 Tor 网络 里可以连接。

当你浏览洋葱服务网站时,Tor 浏览器会在地址栏左侧以一个绿色的洋葱图标表示(使用洋葱服务的安全连接)。

洋葱图标

并且如果您正在通过 HTTPS 协议访问一个支持洋葱服务的网站,浏览器会显示绿色的洋葱和安全锁的图标。

Green onion with a padlock

只能通过 Tor 访问的网站称作“洋葱服务”,它们以 .onion 结尾。 例如说,DuckDuckGo的洋葱地址是https://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion. 您可以用 Tor 浏览器访问这些网站。 因为洋葱服务并不能像普通的网站一样被索引,所以必须由网站所有者把洋葱服务的地址分享给你。

Tor Metrics

We actually don't count users, but we count requests to the directories that clients make periodically to update their list of relays and estimate user numbers indirectly from there.

Relays and bridges report some of the data in 24-hour intervals which may end at any time of the day.
And after such an interval is over relays and bridges might take another 18 hours to report the data.
We cut off the last two days from the graphs, because we want to avoid that the last data point in a graph indicates a recent trend change which is in fact just an artifact of the algorithm.

No, but we can see what fraction of directories reported them, and then we can extrapolate the total number in the network.

We put in the assumption that the average client makes 10 such requests per day. A tor client that is connected 24/7 makes about 15 requests per day, but not all clients are connected 24/7, so we picked the number 10 for the average client.
We simply divide directory requests by 10 and consider the result as the number of users.
Another way of looking at it, is that we assume that each request represents a client that stays online for one tenth of a day, so 2 hours and 24 minutes.

Average number of concurrent users, estimated from data collected over a day. We can't say how many distinct users there are.

No, the relays that report these statistics aggregate requests by country of origin and over a period of 24 hours.
The statistics we would need to gather for the number of users per hour would be too detailed and might put users at risk.

Then we count those users as one. We really count clients, but it's more intuitive for most people to think of users, that's why we say users and not clients.

No, because that user updates their list of relays as often as a user that doesn't change IP address over the day.

The directories resolve IP addresses to country codes and report these numbers in aggregate form. This is one of the reasons why tor ships with a GeoIP database.

Very few bridges report data on transports or IP versions yet, and by default we consider requests to use the default OR protocol and IPv4. Once more bridges report these data, the numbers will become more accurate.

The reason is that we publish user numbers once we're confident enough that they won't change significantly anymore.
But it's always possible that a directory reports data a few hours after we were confident enough, but which then slightly changed the graph.

We do have descriptor archives from before that time, but those descriptors didn't contain all the data we use to estimate user numbers. Please find the following tarball for more details:

Tarball

For direct users, we include all directories which we didn't do in the old approach.
We also use histories that only contain bytes written to answer directory requests, which is more precise than using general byte histories.

Oh, that's a whole different story. We wrote a 13 page long technical report explaining the reasons for retiring the old approach.
tl;dr: in the old approach we measured the wrong thing, and now we measure the right thing.

We run an anomaly-based censorship-detection system that looks at estimated user numbers over a series of days and predicts the user number in the next days.
If the actual number is higher or lower, this might indicate a possible censorship event or release of censorship. For more details, see our technical report.

其它

Vidalia 已经不再维护和支持。 Vidalia 提供的许多功能已经整合进了 Tor 浏览器中。

不,我们不提供任何在线服务。 A list of all of our software projects can be found on our projects page.

Tor 不会保留能识别用户身份的日志记录。 We do take some safe measurements of how the network functions, which you can check out at Tor Metrics.

我们很抱歉,但这是您被恶意软件感染的现象。 Tor Project 并不是这个恶意软件的作者。不过恶意软件的作者希望你使用 Tor 浏览器来匿名的联系他们来交付赎金。

如果这是你第一次听说 Tor 浏览器,我们知道你可能会认为我们是坏人。

但请考虑我们的软件每天都被人权活动家,记者,国内暴乱幸存者,举报人,执法人员和其他许多人用于各种目的。不幸的是,我们的软件在保护这些人的同时也会被罪犯和恶意软件作者滥用。 Tor Project 没有支持也没有纵容以恶意的方式使用我们的软件。

不推荐将 Tor 和 BitTorrent 一起使用。 For further details, please see our blog post on the subject.

Tor 有不同的资金支持赞助,包括美国中央政府部分机构(译者加:应该是搞笑的,Tor 被列为国家安全局重点监控对象-----因为无法监控),私有募款机构和个人。 Check out a list of all our sponsors and a series of blog posts on our financial reports.

我们认为开诚布公地谈论我们的赞助商和资助模式是与社区保持信任的最佳方式。 我们一直在寻求更多的资金来源,尤其是基金会和个人。

Tor 被设计成通过防止被各种人(甚至是我们)监控和审查来抵御人权和隐私。 我们厌恶用 Tor 做糟糕的事情的人,但是我们并不能在剔除他们的同时,不伤害到人权活动者,记者,虐待后的幸存者们,以及其他用 Tor 做好事的人们。 虽然我们仅需要增加一些软件后门就可以阻止某些人使用 Tor 网络,但是这会导致我们的用户遭更容易受到专制政权和其他组织的攻击。

感谢你的支持! You can find more information about donating on our donor FAQ.

For sharing files over Tor, OnionShare is a good option. OnionShare is an open source tool for securely and anonymously sending and receiving files using Tor onion services. It works by starting a web server directly on your computer and making it accessible as an unguessable Tor web address that others can load in Tor Browser to download files from you, or upload files to you. It doesn't require setting up a separate server, using a third party file-sharing service, or even logging into an account.

Unlike services like email, Google Drive, DropBox, WeTransfer, or nearly any other way people typically send files to each other, when you use OnionShare you don't give any companies access to the files that you're sharing. So long as you share the unguessable web address in a secure way (like pasting it in an encrypted messaging app), no one but you and the person you're sharing with can access the files.

OnionShare由Micah Lee开发。

很多出口节点会设置成阻止 BitTorrent 一类的文件共享服务的流量。 BitTorrent in particular is not anonymous over Tor.

目前路径的长度为 3 加上你的路径中敏感路径的数量。 是的,通常是三个,但如果你访问洋葱服务或是“.exit”地址时会增加。

因为会增加网络的负载而且(据我们所知)不会提供任何额外的安全性,所以我们不鼓励使用比默认设置更长的路径长度。 Also, using paths longer than 3 could harm anonymity, first because it makes denial of security attacks easier, and second because it could act as an identifier if only a small number of users have the same path length as you.

抱歉, Tor Project 不提供虚拟主机服务。

Tor 开发者没有追踪 Tor 用户的手段。 Tor 具有避免恶意用户破坏匿名性的保护措施,这些措施也阻止了我们追踪用户。

Tor 依靠全球用户和志愿者的支持来帮助我们改进我们的软件和资源,因此您的反馈对我们(以及所有 Tor 用户)都非常有价值。

反馈模板

给我们发送反馈或者报告程序问题时,请尽量包含以下信息,越多越好:

  • 您正在使用的操作系统
  • Tor 浏览器版本
  • Step by step of how you got to the issue, so we can reproduce it (e.g. I opened the browser, typed a url, clicked on (i) icon, then my browser crashed)
  • 一张有关该问题的截屏。
  • 日志文件

如何与我们联系

There are several ways to reach us, so please use what works best for you.

Trac

You can file a ticket at https://trac.torproject.org. We track all Tor Browser 9 related issues with the tbb-9.0-issues keyword. Tickets related to our website should be added with the component "Webpages/Website."

电子邮件

给我们发送邮件至frontdesk@torproject.org

In the subject line of your email, please tell us what you're reporting. The more specific your subject line is (e.g. "Connection failure", "feedback on website", "feedback on Tor Browser", "I need a bridge"), the easier it will be for us to understand and follow up. Sometimes when we receive emails without subject lines, they're marked as spam and we don't see them.

For the fastest response, please write in English, Spanish, and/or Portuguese if you can. If none of these languages works for you, please write in any language you feel comfortable with, but keep in mind it will take us a bit longer to answer as we will need help with translation to understand it.

博客文章评论

You can always leave comments on the blog post related to the issue or feedback you want to report. If there is not a blog post related to your issue, please contact us another way.

IRC

You can find us in the #tor channel on OFTC to give us feedback or report bugs/issues. We may not respond right away, but we do check the backlog and will get back to you when we can.

了解如何连接到 OFTC 服务器.

邮件列表

For reporting issues or feedback using email lists, we recommend that you do so on the one that is related to what you would like to report.

For feedback or issues related to Tor Browser, Tor network or other projects developed by Tor: tor-talk

For feedback or issues related to our websites: ux

For feedback or issues related to running a Tor relay: tor-relays

For feedback on content related to Tor Browser Manual or Support website: tor-community-team

Report a security issue

If you've found a security issue in one of our projects or in our infrastructure, please email tor-security@lists.torproject.org. If you've found a security bug in Tor or Tor Browser, feel free to submit it for our bug bounty program. 如果您想要加密您的邮件,可以通过与tor-security-sendkey@lists.torproject.org联系或从pool.sks-keyservers.net获取列表的GPG公钥。 这是指纹:

  gpg --fingerprint tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  pub 4096R/1A7BF184 2017-03-13
  Key fingerprint = 8B90 4624 C5A2 8654 E453 9BC2 E135 A8B4 1A7B F184
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  sub 4096R/C00942E4 2017-03-13

保持联系

The #tor-project channel is where Tor people discuss and coordinate daily Tor work. It has fewer members than #tor and is more focused on the work at hand. You are also welcome to join this channel. To access #tor-project, your nickname (nick) must be registered and verified.

Here's how to reach #tor-project and other registered channels.

注册您的昵称

  1. Log onto #tor. See How can I chat with Tor Project teams?

  2. Then, click on the word "Status" at the top left of the screen.

  3. In the window at the bottom of the page, type: /msg nickserv REGISTER yournewpassword youremailaddress

  4. 点击确定。

If all goes well, you will receive a message that you are registered.

The system may register you as your nick_ instead of your nick.

If so, just go with it but remember you are user_ and not user.

Every time you log on to IRC, to identify your registered nick, type:

/nick yournick

/msg nickserv IDENTIFY YourPassWord

如何验证您的昵称

Then, to complete the registration and ultimately gain access to the #tor-project channel, your nickname must be verified.

  1. To verify your nick, open a new browser window and go to https://webchat.oftc.net/?channels=tor.

  2. 使用您的IRC昵称和密码来登入。

  3. Look for the word verify and log in there. It may appear that nothing has happened. Look at the top of the page, and there will be a column called Account.

  4. 点击账户

  5. Click on the small sentence at the bottom of the square that says: Verify account.

  6. 填入弹出的CAPTCHA验证,然后点击确定。

  7. A tiny message will appear: "Your NickServ account has been verified."

  8. Go back to the IRC webpage where you are logged in and type:

    /msg nickserv checkverify

  9. 点击确定。

  10. 如果一切顺利,您将会收到一条消息,写着:

*!NickServ*checkverify

Usermodechange: +R

!NickServ- Successfully set +R on your nick.
`

您的昵称验证成功!

现在,加入 #tor-project,您可以直接键入:

/join #tor-project 并点击确定。

您将会被允许进入频道。如果成功的话,祝贺您!

然而,如果您在某一步中遇到了问题,您可以在#tor channel中寻求帮助。

You can toggle back and forth between channels by clicking on the different channel names at the top left of the IRC window.

Here is how you can get onto IRC and start to chat with Tor contributors in real time:

  1. 进入OFTC网页聊天。

  2. 在空白处填入:

    NICKNAME: Anything you want, but choose the same nickname (nick) every time you use IRC to talk to people on Tor. If your nick is already being used, you will get a message from the system and you should choose another nick.

    频道: #tor

  3. 点击确定

祝贺!您正在使用IRC。

After a few seconds, you will automatically enter #tor, which is a chatroom with Tor developers, relay operators and other community members. There are some random people in #tor as well.

You can ask questions in the empty bar at the bottom of the screen. Please, don't ask to ask, just ask your question.

People may be able to answer right away, or there may be a bit of a delay (some people are listed on the channel but are away from their keyboards and record channel activities to read later).

If you want to chat with someone specific, start your comment with their nick and they will typically receive a notification that someone is trying to contact them.

OFTC often doesn't allow people to use their webchat over Tor. For this reason, and because many people end up preferring it anyway, you should also consider using an IRC client.

Tor 依靠全球用户和志愿者的支持来帮助我们改进我们的软件和资源,因此您的反馈对我们(以及所有 Tor 用户)都非常有价值。

反馈模板

给我们发送反馈或者报告程序问题时,请尽量包含以下信息,越多越好:

  • 您正在使用的操作系统
  • Tor 浏览器版本
  • Step by step of how you got to the issue, so we can reproduce it (e.g. I opened the browser, typed a url, clicked on (i) icon, then my browser crashed)
  • 一张有关该问题的截屏。
  • 日志文件

如何与我们联系

There are several ways to reach us, so please use what works best for you.

Trac

You can file a ticket at https://trac.torproject.org. We track all Tor Browser 9 related issues with the tbb-9.0-issues keyword. Tickets related to our website should be added with the component "Webpages/Website."

电子邮件

给我们发送邮件至frontdesk@torproject.org

In the subject line of your email, please tell us what you're reporting. The more specific your subject line is (e.g. "Connection failure", "feedback on website", "feedback on Tor Browser", "I need a bridge"), the easier it will be for us to understand and follow up. Sometimes when we receive emails without subject lines, they're marked as spam and we don't see them.

For the fastest response, please write in English, Spanish, and/or Portuguese if you can. If none of these languages works for you, please write in any language you feel comfortable with, but keep in mind it will take us a bit longer to answer as we will need help with translation to understand it.

博客文章评论

You can always leave comments on the blog post related to the issue or feedback you want to report. If there is not a blog post related to your issue, please contact us another way.

IRC

You can find us in the #tor channel on OFTC to give us feedback or report bugs/issues. We may not respond right away, but we do check the backlog and will get back to you when we can.

了解如何连接到 OFTC 服务器.

邮件列表

For reporting issues or feedback using email lists, we recommend that you do so on the one that is related to what you would like to report.

For feedback or issues related to Tor Browser, Tor network or other projects developed by Tor: tor-talk

For feedback or issues related to our websites: ux

For feedback or issues related to running a Tor relay: tor-relays

For feedback on content related to Tor Browser Manual or Support website: tor-community-team

Report a security issue

If you've found a security issue in one of our projects or in our infrastructure, please email tor-security@lists.torproject.org. If you've found a security bug in Tor or Tor Browser, feel free to submit it for our bug bounty program. 如果您想要加密您的邮件,可以通过与tor-security-sendkey@lists.torproject.org联系或从pool.sks-keyservers.net获取列表的GPG公钥。 这是指纹:

  gpg --fingerprint tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  pub 4096R/1A7BF184 2017-03-13
  Key fingerprint = 8B90 4624 C5A2 8654 E453 9BC2 E135 A8B4 1A7B F184
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  sub 4096R/C00942E4 2017-03-13

Debian 资料库

是的,“deb.torproject.org” 也通过一个隐藏服务提供服务: http://sdscoq7snqtznauu.onion/

Note: The symbol # refers to running the code as root. This means you should have access to a user account with system administration privileges, e.g your user should be in the sudo group.

如需通过 Tor 使用apt,需要安装 apt 运载工具。

   # apt install apt-transport-tor

Then replace the address in the lines added before with, for example:

   # 对于稳定版本。
   deb tor://sdscoq7snqtznauu.onion/torproject.org <DISTRIBUTION> main

   # 对于不稳定版本。
   deb tor://sdscoq7snqtznauu.onion/torproject.org tor-nightly-master-<DISTRIBUTION> main

Replace <DISTRIBUTION> with your Operating System codename. Run lsb_release -c or cat /etc/debian_version to check the Operating System version.

Now refresh your sources and try to install tor again:

   # apt update
   # apt install tor

不. 不要使用Ubuntu universe提供的软件包! In the past they have not been reliably updated. That means you could be missing stability and security fixes. Instead, please use Tor Debian repository.

The Tor Project maintains its own Debian package repository. Since Debian provides the LTS version of Tor, this might not always give you the latest stable Tor version. Therefore, it's recommended to install tor from our repository.

如果您需要在您的基于 Debian 的系统中添加 Tor 软件包仓库,请遵循以下指示:

Note: The symbol # refers to running the code as root. This means you should have access to a user account with system administration privileges, e.g your user should be in the sudo group.

1. 安装 apt-transport-https

To enable all package managers using the libapt-pkg library to access metadata and packages available in sources accessible over https (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure).

   # apt install apt-transport-https

2. 将以下条目加到 "/etc/apt/sources.list" 后,或者 “/etc/apt/sources.list.d/” 中的一个新文件中。

   deb https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org <DISTRIBUTION> main
   deb-src https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org <DISTRIBUTION> main

如果您想尝试实验性版本:

   deb https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-experimental-0.3.4.x-<DISTRIBUTION> main
   deb-src https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-experimental-0.3.4.x-<DISTRIBUTION> main

或是每晚构建:

   deb https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-nightly-master-<DISTRIBUTION> main
   deb-src https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-nightly-master-<DISTRIBUTION> main

Replace <DISTRIBUTION> with your Operating System codename. Run lsb_release -c or cat /etc/debian_version to check the Operating System version.

3. 然后,在命令窗口中运行下面的命令来添加用于签名软件包的 gpg 公钥:

   # wget -qO- https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89.asc | gpg --import
   # gpg --export A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89 | apt-key add -

4. 安装 tor 和 tor debian 密钥串

我们提供一个 Debian 软件包,以帮助您保持我们的密钥为最新状态。推荐您使用这个软件包。用下列命令安装它:

   # apt update
   # apt install tor deb.torproject.org-keyring

Tor 的rpm软件包管理器

The Tor Project maintains its own RPM package repository for CentOS and RHEL and Fedora.

Note: The symbol # refers to be running the code as root. That means you should have access to a user account with system administration privileges, e.g your user should be in the sudo group.

Here's how you can enable Tor Package Repository for both CentOS and RHEL and Fedora:

1. Enable epel repository (only for CentOS and RHEL)

# dnf install epel-release -y

2. Add the following to /etc/yum.repos.d/tor.repo

For CentOS or RHEL:

[tor]
name=Tor for Enterprise Linux $releasever - $basearch
baseurl=https://rpm.torproject.org/centos/$releasever/$basearch
enabled=1
gpgcheck=1
gpgkey=https://rpm.torproject.org/centos/public_gpg.key
cost=100

For Fedora:

[tor]
name=Tor for Fedora $releasever - $basearch
baseurl=https://rpm.torproject.org/fedora/$releasever/$basearch
enabled=1
gpgcheck=1
gpgkey=https://rpm.torproject.org/fedora/public_gpg.key
cost=100

3. Install the Tor package

Then you can install the latest Tor package.

# dnf install tor -y

Using it for the first time, you will have to import the GPG public key.

Importing GPG key 0x3621CD35:
Userid     : "Kushal Das (RPM Signing key) <kushal@torproject.org>"
Fingerprint: 999E C8E3 14BC 8D46 022D 6C7D E217 C30C 3621 CD35
From       : https://rpm.torproject.org/fedora/public_gpg.key
Is this ok [y/N]: y

有关滥用的常见问题

Criminals can already do bad things. Since they're willing to break laws, they already have lots of options available that provide better privacy than Tor provides. They can steal cell phones, use them, and throw them in a ditch; they can crack into computers in Korea or Brazil and use them to launch abusive activities; they can use spyware, viruses, and other techniques to take control of literally millions of Windows machines around the world.

Tor aims to provide protection for ordinary people who want to follow the law. Only criminals have privacy right now, and we need to fix that.

Some advocates of anonymity explain that it's just a tradeoff — accepting the bad uses for the good ones — but there's more to it than that. Criminals and other bad people have the motivation to learn how to get good anonymity, and many have the motivation to pay well to achieve it. Being able to steal and reuse the identities of innocent victims (identity theft) makes it even easier. Normal people, on the other hand, don't have the time or money to spend figuring out how to get privacy online. This is the worst of all possible worlds.

So yes, criminals can use Tor, but they already have better options, and it seems unlikely that taking Tor away from the world will stop them from doing their bad things. At the same time, Tor and other privacy measures can fight identity theft, physical crimes like stalking, and so on.

Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks typically rely on having a group of thousands of computers all sending floods of traffic to a victim. Since the goal is to overpower the bandwidth of the victim, they typically send UDP packets since those don't require handshakes or coordination.

But because Tor only transports correctly formed TCP streams, not all IP packets, you cannot send UDP packets over Tor. (You can't do specialized forms of this attack like SYN flooding either.) So ordinary DDoS attacks are not possible over Tor. Tor also doesn't allow bandwidth amplification attacks against external sites: you need to send in a byte for every byte that the Tor network will send to your destination. So in general, attackers who control enough bandwidth to launch an effective DDoS attack can do it just fine without Tor.

First of all, the default Tor exit policy rejects all outgoing port 25 (SMTP) traffic. So sending spam mail through Tor isn't going to work by default. It's possible that some relay operators will enable port 25 on their particular exit node, in which case that computer will allow outgoing mails; but that individual could just set up an open mail relay too, independent of Tor. In short, Tor isn't useful for spamming, because nearly all Tor relays refuse to deliver the mail.

Of course, it's not all about delivering the mail. Spammers can use Tor to connect to open HTTP proxies (and from there to SMTP servers); to connect to badly written mail-sending CGI scripts; and to control their botnets — that is, to covertly communicate with armies of compromised computers that deliver the spam.

This is a shame, but notice that spammers are already doing great without Tor. Also, remember that many of their more subtle communication mechanisms (like spoofed UDP packets) can't be used over Tor, because it only transports correctly-formed TCP connections.

Not much, in the grand scheme of things. The network has been running since October 2003, and it's only generated a handful of complaints. Of course, like all privacy-oriented networks on the net, it attracts its share of jerks. Tor's exit policies help separate the role of "willing to donate resources to the network" from the role of "willing to deal with exit abuse complaints," so we hope our network is more sustainable than past attempts at anonymity networks.

Since Tor has many good uses as well, we feel that we're doing pretty well at striking a balance currently.

If you run a Tor relay that allows exit connections (such as the default exit policy), it's probably safe to say that you will eventually hear from somebody. Abuse complaints may come in a variety of forms. For example:

  • Somebody connects to Hotmail, and sends a ransom note to a company. The FBI sends you a polite email, you explain that you run a Tor relay, and they say "oh well" and leave you alone. [Port 80]
  • Somebody tries to get you shut down by using Tor to connect to Google groups and post spam to Usenet, and then sends an angry mail to your ISP about how you're destroying the world. [Port 80]
  • Somebody connects to an IRC network and makes a nuisance of himself. Your ISP gets polite mail about how your computer has been compromised; and/or your computer gets DDoSed. [Port 6667]
  • Somebody uses Tor to download a Vin Diesel movie, and your ISP gets a DMCA takedown notice. See EFF's Tor DMCA Response Template, which explains why your ISP can probably ignore the notice without any liability. [Arbitrary ports]

Some hosting providers are friendlier than others when it comes to Tor exits. For a listing see the good and bad ISPs wiki.

For a complete set of template responses to different abuse complaint types, see the collection of templates. You can also proactively reduce the amount of abuse you get by following these tips for running an exit node with minimal harassment and running a reduced exit policy.

You might also find that your Tor relay's IP is blocked from accessing some Internet sites/services. This might happen regardless of your exit policy, because some groups don't seem to know or care that Tor has exit policies. (If you have a spare IP not used for other activities, you might consider running your Tor relay on it.) In general, it's advisable not to use your home internet connection to provide a Tor relay.

A collection of templates for successfully responding to ISPs is collected here.

Sometimes jerks make use of Tor to troll IRC channels. This abuse results in IP-specific temporary bans ("klines" in IRC lingo), as the network operators try to keep the troll off of their network.

This response underscores a fundamental flaw in IRC's security model: they assume that IP addresses equate to humans, and by banning the IP address they can ban the human. In reality, this is not the case — many such trolls routinely make use of the literally millions of open proxies and compromised computers around the Internet. The IRC networks are fighting a losing battle of trying to block all these nodes, and an entire cottage industry of blacklists and counter-trolls has sprung up based on this flawed security model (not unlike the antivirus industry). The Tor network is just a drop in the bucket here.

On the other hand, from the viewpoint of IRC server operators, security is not an all-or-nothing thing. By responding quickly to trolls or any other social attack, it may be possible to make the attack scenario less attractive to the attacker. And most individual IP addresses do equate to individual humans, on any given IRC network at any given time. The exceptions include NAT gateways which may be allocated access as special cases. While it's a losing battle to try to stop the use of open proxies, it's not generally a losing battle to keep klining a single ill-behaved IRC user until that user gets bored and goes away.

But the real answer is to implement application-level auth systems, to let in well-behaving users and keep out badly-behaving users. This needs to be based on some property of the human (such as a password they know), not some property of the way their packets are transported.

Of course, not all IRC networks are trying to ban Tor nodes. After all, quite a few people use Tor to IRC in privacy in order to carry on legitimate communications without tying them to their real-world identity. Each IRC network needs to decide for itself if blocking a few more of the millions of IPs that bad people can use is worth losing the contributions from the well-behaved Tor users.

If you're being blocked, have a discussion with the network operators and explain the issues to them. They may not be aware of the existence of Tor at all, or they may not be aware that the hostnames they're klining are Tor exit nodes. If you explain the problem, and they conclude that Tor ought to be blocked, you may want to consider moving to a network that is more open to free speech. Maybe inviting them to #tor on irc.oftc.net will help show them that we are not all evil people.

Finally, if you become aware of an IRC network that seems to be blocking Tor, or a single Tor exit node, please put that information on The Tor IRC block tracker so that others can share. At least one IRC network consults that page to unblock exit nodes that have been blocked inadvertently.

Even though Tor isn't useful for spamming, some over-zealous blacklisters seem to think that all open networks like Tor are evil — they attempt to strong-arm network administrators on policy, service, and routing issues, and then extract ransoms from victims.

If your server administrators decide to make use of these blacklists to refuse incoming mail, you should have a conversation with them and explain about Tor and Tor's exit policies.

We're sorry to hear that. There are some situations where it makes sense to block anonymous users for an Internet service. But in many cases, there are easier solutions that can solve your problem while still allowing users to access your website securely.

First, ask yourself if there's a way to do application-level decisions to separate the legitimate users from the jerks. For example, you might have certain areas of the site, or certain privileges like posting, available only to people who are registered. It's easy to build an up-to-date list of Tor IP addresses that allow connections to your service, so you could set up this distinction only for Tor users. This way you can have multi-tiered access and not have to ban every aspect of your service.

For example, the Freenode IRC network had a problem with a coordinated group of abusers joining channels and subtly taking over the conversation; but when they labeled all users coming from Tor nodes as "anonymous users," removing the ability of the abusers to blend in, the abusers moved back to using their open proxies and bot networks.

Second, consider that hundreds of thousands of people use Tor every day simply for good data hygiene — for example, to protect against data-gathering advertising companies while going about their normal activities. Others use Tor because it's their only way to get past restrictive local firewalls. Some Tor users may be legitimately connecting to your service right now to carry on normal activities. You need to decide whether banning the Tor network is worth losing the contributions of these users, as well as potential future legitimate users. (Often people don't have a good measure of how many polite Tor users are connecting to their service — you never notice them until there's an impolite one.)

At this point, you should also ask yourself what you do about other services that aggregate many users behind a few IP addresses. Tor is not so different from AOL in this respect.

Lastly, please remember that Tor relays have individual exit policies. Many Tor relays do not allow exiting connections at all. Many of those that do allow some exit connections might already disallow connections to your service. When you go about banning nodes, you should parse the exit policies and only block the ones that allow these connections; and you should keep in mind that exit policies can change (as well as the overall list of nodes in the network).

If you really want to do this, we provide a Tor exit relay list or a DNS-based list you can query.

(Some system administrators block ranges of IP addresses because of official policy or some abuse pattern, but some have also asked about whitelisting Tor exit relays because they want to permit access to their systems only using Tor. These scripts are usable for whitelisting as well.)

Tor 开发者没有追踪 Tor 用户的手段。 The same protections that keep bad people from breaking Tor's anonymity also prevent us from figuring out what's going on.

Some fans have suggested that we redesign Tor to include a backdoor. There are two problems with this idea. First, it technically weakens the system too far. Having a central way to link users to their activities is a gaping hole for all sorts of attackers; and the policy mechanisms needed to ensure correct handling of this responsibility are enormous and unsolved. Second, the bad people aren't going to get caught by this anyway, since they will use other means to ensure their anonymity (identity theft, compromising computers and using them as bounce points, etc).

This ultimately means that it is the responsibility of site owners to protect themselves against compromise and security issues that can come from anywhere. This is just part of signing up for the benefits of the Internet. You must be prepared to secure yourself against the bad elements, wherever they may come from. Tracking and increased surveillance are not the answer to preventing abuse.

But remember that this doesn't mean that Tor is invulnerable. Traditional police techniques can still be very effective against Tor, such as investigating means, motive, and opportunity, interviewing suspects, writing style analysis, technical analysis of the content itself, sting operations, keyboard taps, and other physical investigations. The Tor Project is also happy to work with everyone including law enforcement groups to train them how to use the Tor software to safely conduct investigations or anonymized activities online.

The Tor Project does not host, control, nor have the ability to discover the owner or location of a .onion address. The .onion address is an address from an onion service. The name you see ending in .onion is an onion service descriptor. It's an automatically generated name which can be located on any Tor relay or client anywhere on the Internet. Onion services are designed to protect both the user and service provider from discovering who they are and where they are from. The design of onion services means the owner and location of the .onion site is hidden even from us.

But remember that this doesn't mean that onion services are invulnerable. Traditional police techniques can still be very effective against them, such as interviewing suspects, writing style analysis, technical analysis of the content itself, sting operations, keyboard taps, and other physical investigations.

If you have a complaint about child abuse materials, you may wish to report it to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which serves as a national coordination point for investigation of child pornography: http://www.missingkids.com/. We do not view links you report.

We take abuse seriously. Activists and law enforcement use Tor to investigate abuse and help support survivors. We work with them to help them understand how Tor can help their work. In some cases, technological mistakes are being made and we help to correct them. Because some people in survivors' communities embrace stigma instead of compassion, seeking support from fellow victims requires privacy-preserving technology.

Our refusal to build backdoors and censorship into Tor is not because of a lack of concern. We refuse to weaken Tor because it would harm efforts to combat child abuse and human trafficking in the physical world, while removing safe spaces for victims online. Meanwhile, criminals would still have access to botnets, stolen phones, hacked hosting accounts, the postal system, couriers, corrupt officials, and whatever technology emerges to trade content. They are early adopters of technology. In the face of this, it is dangerous for policymakers to assume that blocking and filtering is sufficient. We are more interested in helping efforts to halt and prevent child abuse than helping politicians score points with constituents by hiding it. The role of corruption is especially troubling; see this United Nations report on The Role of Corruption in Trafficking in Persons.

Finally, it is important to consider the world that children will encounter as adults when enacting policy in their name. Will they thank us if they are unable to voice their opinions safely as adults? What if they are trying to expose a failure of the state to protect other children?