Questions les plus fréquentes

Generally it is impossible to have perfect anonymity, even with Tor. Though there are some things you can practice to improve your anonymity while using Tor and offline.

Use Tor Browser and software specifically configured for Tor.

Tor does not protect all of your computer's Internet traffic when you run it. Tor only protects applications that are properly configured to send their Internet traffic through Tor.

Web browsing:

File sharing:

Control what information you provide through web forms.

If you visit a website using Tor Browser, they don't know who you are or your true location. Unfortunately many sites ask for more personal information than they need through web forms. If you sign in to that website, they still don't know your location but they know who you are. Further, if you provide: name, email, address, phone number, or any other personal information, you are no longer anonymous to that website. The best defense is to be vigilant and extremely cautious when filling out web forms.

Don't torrent over Tor

Torrent file-sharing applications have been observed to ignore proxy settings and make direct connections even when they are told to use Tor. Even if your torrent application connects only through Tor, you will often send out your real IP address in the tracker GET request, because that's how torrents work. Not only do you deanonymize your torrent traffic and your other simultaneous Tor web traffic this way, you also slow down the entire Tor network for everyone else.

Don't enable or install browser plugins

Le Navigateur Tor bloquera les greffons tels que Flash, RealPlayer, QuickTime et autres : ils peuvent être manipulés afin de divulguer votre adresse IP. Similarly, we do not recommend installing additional addons or plugins into Tor Browser, as these may bypass Tor or otherwise harm your anonymity and privacy.

Use HTTPS versions of websites

Tor will encrypt your traffic to and within the Tor network, but the encryption of your traffic to the final destination website depends upon on that website. To help ensure private encryption to websites, Tor Browser includes HTTPS Everywhere to force the use of HTTPS encryption with major websites that support it. However, you should still watch the browser URL bar to ensure that websites you provide sensitive information to display a padlock or onion icon in the address bar, include https:// in the URL, and display the proper expected name for the website. Also see EFF's interactive graphic explaining how Tor and HTTPS relate.

Don't open documents downloaded through Tor while online

Tor Browser will warn you before automatically opening documents that are handled by external applications. DO NOT IGNORE THIS WARNING. You should be very careful when downloading documents via Tor (especially DOC and PDF files, unless you use the PDF viewer that's built into Tor Browser) as these documents can contain Internet resources that will be downloaded outside of Tor by the application that opens them. This will reveal your non-Tor IP address. If you must work with files downloaded via Tor, we strongly recommend either using a disconnected computer, or using dangerzone to create safe PDF files that you can open. Under no circumstances is it safe to use BitTorrent and Tor together, however.

Use bridges and/or find company

Tor tries to prevent attackers from learning what destination websites you connect to. However, by default, it does not prevent somebody watching your Internet traffic from learning that you're using Tor. If this matters to you, you can reduce this risk by configuring Tor to use a bridge rather than connecting directly to the Tor network. Ultimately the best protection is a social approach: the more Tor users there are near you and the more diverse their interests, the less dangerous it will be that you are one of them. Convince other people to use Tor, too!

Be smart and learn more. Understand what Tor does and does not offer. This list of pitfalls isn't complete, and we need your help identifying and documenting all the issues.

En général, nous recommandons de ne pas utiliser un RPV avec Tor, à moins que vous ne soyez un utilisateur expérimenté qui sait configurer l’un et l’autre de manière à ne pas compromettre la confidentialité de vos données.

Plus de précisions sur Tor + RPV se trouvent dans notre wiki (page en anglais).

Tor Browser is currently available on Windows, Linux and macOS.

There is a version of Tor Browser for Android and The Guardian Project also provides the Orbot app to route other apps on your Android device over the Tor network.

Il n’y a pas encore de version officielle de Tor pour iOS, bien que nous recommandions le Navigateur Onion (site en anglais, appli en français).

Il est fortement déconseillé d’installer de nouveaux modules complémentaires dans le Navigateur Tor, car ils peuvent compromettre la protection de vos données personnelles et votre sécurité.

L’installation de nouveaux modules complémentaires pourrait affecter le Navigateur Tor de façon imprévue et rendre l’empreinte de votre Navigateur Tor unique. Si l’empreinte de votre exemplaire du Navigateur Tor est unique, l’anonymat de vos activités de navigation peut être levé et vos activités peuvent être suivies à la trace même si vous utilisez le Navigateur Tor.

Essentiellement, les réglages et fonctions de chaque navigateur créent ce que l’on appelle une « empreinte de navigateur ». La plupart des navigateurs créent par inadvertance une empreinte unique pour chaque utilisateur, empreinte qui peut être suivie à la trace sur Internet. Tor Browser is specifically engineered to have a nearly identical (we're not perfect!) fingerprint across its users. Cela signifie que chaque utilisateur du Navigateur Tor ressemble à tous les autres utilisateurs du Navigateur Tor, ce qui complique le suivi à la trace d’un utilisateur particulier.

Il est aussi fort possible qu’un nouveau module complémentaire augmente la surface d’attaque du Navigateur Tor. Cela pourrait permettre une fuite de données délicates et à un assaillant d’infecter le Navigateur Tor. Le module complémentaire même pourrait être conçu de façon malveillante pour vous espionner.

Le Navigateur Tor comprend déjà deux extensions préinstallées HTTPS partout et NoScript (sites en anglais), et ajouter quoi que ce soit d’autre pourrait vous faire perdre votre anonymat.

Want to learn more about browser fingerprinting? Here's an article on The Tor Blog all about it.

Le Navigateur Tor peut tout à fait aider les gens à accéder à votre site Web où il est bloqué. La plupart du temps, il suffit de télécharger le Navigateur Tor et de l’utiliser pour naviguer vers le site bloqué pour y accéder. Là où la censure est forte, de nombreuses options de contournement s’offrent à nous, dont les ​transports enfichables.

Pour plus de précisions, veuillez consulter la rubrique sur la censure du guide d’utilisation du Navigateur Tor.

Le Navigateur Tor empêche autrui de savoir quels sites vous visitez. Certaines entités, comme votre fournisseur d’accès à Internet (FAI), pourraient voir que vous utilisez Tor, mais elles ne pourraient pas connaître les destinations de votre navigation.

À propos de Tor

Le nom « Tor » peut désigner différentes composantes.

Tor est un programme que vous pouvez exécuter sur votre ordinateur et qui contribue à votre sécurité sur Internet. It protects you by bouncing your communications around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection from learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit from learning your physical location. This set of volunteer relays is called the Tor network.

The way most people use Tor is with Tor Browser, which is a version of Firefox that fixes many privacy issues. You can read more about Tor on our about page.

The Tor Project is a non-profit (charity) organization that maintains and develops the Tor software.

Tor is the onion routing network. When we were starting the new next-generation design and implementation of onion routing in 2001-2002, we would tell people we were working on onion routing, and they would say "Neat. Which one?" Even if onion routing has become a standard household term, Tor was born out of the actual onion routing project run by the Naval Research Lab.

(It's also got a fine meaning in German and Turkish.)

Note : Même s’il est provenu d’un acronyme à l’origine, Tor ne s’écrit pas « TOR ». Seule la première lettre est en majuscule. In fact, we can usually spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead learned everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that they spell it wrong.

Non, il ne les supprime pas You need to use a separate program that understands your application and protocol and knows how to clean or "scrub" the data it sends. Tor Browser tries to keep application-level data, like the user-agent string, uniform for all users. Tor Browser can't do anything about the text that you type into forms, though.

A typical proxy provider sets up a server somewhere on the Internet and allows you to use it to relay your traffic. Cela crée une architecture simple et facile à administrer. The users all enter and leave through the same server. The provider may charge for use of the proxy, or fund their costs through advertisements on the server. C’est la configuration la plus simple, vous n’avez rien à installer. You just have to point your browser at their proxy server. Simple proxy providers are fine solutions if you do not want protections for your privacy and anonymity online and you trust the provider to not do bad things. Some simple proxy providers use SSL to secure your connection to them, which protects you against local eavesdroppers, such as those at a cafe with free wifi Internet.

Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure. The provider knows both who you are and what you browse on the Internet. They can see your traffic as it passes through their server. In some cases, they can even see inside your encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce stores. You have to trust the provider isn't watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your traffic stream, or recording your personal details.

Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before sending it on to the destination. Because there's a separate layer of encryption for each of the three relays, somebody watching your Internet connection can't modify, or read, what you are sending into the Tor network. Your traffic is encrypted between the Tor client (on your computer) and where it pops out somewhere else in the world.

Doesn't the first server see who I am?

Possiblement. A bad first of three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer. It still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor. It merely sees "This IP address is using Tor". You are still protected from this node figuring out both who you are and where you are going on the Internet.

Can't the third server see my traffic?

Possiblement. A bad third of three servers can see the traffic you sent into Tor. It won't know who sent this traffic. Si vous utilisez le chiffrement (tel que HTTPS). Il ne connaîtra que la destination. See this visualization of Tor and HTTPS to understand how Tor and HTTPS interact.

Oui.

Les logiciels de Tor sont des logiciels libres (site en anglais). Cela signifie que nous vous accordons les droits de redistribuer les logiciels de Tor modifiés ou non, soit moyennant des frais soit gratuitement. Vous n’avez pas à nous demander de permission particulière.

Cependant, si vous souhaitez redistribuer les logiciels de Tor, vous devez respecter notre LICENCE (page en anglais). Cela signifie essentiellement que vous devez inclure notre fichier « LICENSE » avec toute partie des logiciels de Tor que vous distribuez.

Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just the Tor software, though. They want to distribute the Tor Browser. This includes Firefox Extended Support Release, and the NoScript and HTTPS-Everywhere extensions. You will need to follow the license for those programs as well. Both of those Firefox extensions are distributed under the GNU General Public License, while Firefox ESR is released under the Mozilla Public License. The simplest way to obey their licenses is to include the source code for these programs everywhere you include the bundles themselves.

Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what Tor is, who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide). See our trademark FAQ for details.

Il existe de nombreux autres programmes que vous pouvez utiliser avec Tor, mais nous n’avons pas effectué de recherche assez poussée des problèmes d’anonymat au niveau de l’application sur chacun d’eux pour recommander une configuration sûre. Vous trouverez sur notre wiki une liste d’instructions gérée par la communauté afin de torifier des applications particulières. Please add to this list and help us keep it accurate!

La plupart des gens utilisent le Navigateur Tor, qui comprend tout ce dont vous avez besoin pour parcourir la Toile en toute sécurité en utilisant Tor. Il est dangereux et non recommandé d’utiliser Tor avec d’autres navigateurs.

Il n’y a absolument aucune porte dérobée dans Tor.

Nous connaissons des avocats brillants qui disent qu’il est peu probable que quelqu’un puisse essayer de nous en faire ajouter une dans notre territoire (É.-U.). Si l’on nous le demandait, nous nous battrions et, d’après les avocats, nous gagnerions probablement.

Nous n’ajouterons jamais de porte dérobée dans Tor. Nous pensons qu’aux yeux de nos utilisateurs, il serait terriblement irresponsable d’ajouter une porte dérobée dans Tor, et un mauvais précédent pour les logiciels de sécurité en général. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our security software, it would ruin our professional reputation. Nobody would trust our software ever again - for excellent reasons!

Cela dit, il existe un grand nombre d’attaques subtiles que des personnes pourraient tenter. Quelqu’un pourrait se faire passer pour nous ou s’introduire de force dans nos ordinateurs, ou quelque chose de la sorte. Tor est à code source ouvert et vous devriez toujours vérifier la présence de choses suspectes dans la source (ou au moins les différences depuis la dernière version). If we (or the distributors that gave you Tor) don't give you access to the source code, that's a sure sign something funny might be going on. Vous devriez aussi contrôler les signatures PGP des versions afin de vous assurer que personne n’a altéré les sites de distribution.

De plus, des bogues accidentels dans Tor pourraient affecter votre anonymat. Nous trouvons et corrigeons régulièrement des bogues relatifs à l’anonymat. Aussi, assurez-vous de toujours garder vos versions de Tor à jour.

Navigateur Tor

WARNING: Do NOT follow random advice instructing you to edit your torrc! Doing so can allow an attacker to compromise your security and anonymity through malicious configuration of your torrc.

Tor uses a text file called torrc that contains configuration instructions for how Tor should behave. The default configuration should work fine for most Tor users (hence the warning above.)

To find your Tor Browser torrc, follow the instructions for your operating system below.

Sur Windows ou Linux :

  • The torrc is in the Tor Browser Data directory at Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor inside your Tor Browser directory.

Sur macOS :

  • The torrc is in the Tor Browser Data directory at ~/Library/Application Support/TorBrowser-Data/Tor.
  • Notez que le dossier Bibliothèque est caché sur les versions les plus récentes de macOS. Pour naviguer vers ce dossier dans Finder, sélectionnez « Aller au dossier… » dans le menu « Aller ».
  • Then type "~/Library/Application Support/" in the window and click Go.

Close Tor Browser before you edit your torrc, otherwise Tor Browser may erase your modifications. Some options will have no effect as Tor Browser overrides them with command line options when it starts Tor.

Have a look at the sample torrc file for hints on common configurations. For other configuration options you can use, see the Tor manual page. Remember, all lines beginning with # in torrc are treated as comments and have no effect on Tor's configuration.

While the names may imply otherwise, 'Incognito mode' and 'private tabs' do not make you anonymous on the Internet. They erase all the information on your machine relating to the browsing session after they are closed, but have no measures in place to hide your activity or digital fingerprint online. Cela signifie qu’un observateur peut capter votre trafic aussi facilement que n’importe quel navigateur ordinaire.

Tor Browser offers all the amnesic features of private tabs while also hiding the source IP, browsing habits and details about a device that can be used to fingerprint activity across the web, allowing for a truly private browsing session that's fully obfuscated from end-to-end.

For more information regarding the limitations of Incognito mode and private tabs, see Mozilla's article on Common Myths about Private Browsing.

Nous recommandons fortement de ne pas utiliser Tor avec un navigateur autre que le Navigateur Tor. Utiliser Tor avec un autre navigateur pourrait vous rendre vulnérable, sans la confidentialité ni la protection des données personnelles offertes par le Navigateur Tor.

Le Navigateur Tor peut tout à fait aider les gens à accéder à votre site Web où il est bloqué. La plupart du temps, il suffit de télécharger le Navigateur Tor et de l’utiliser pour naviguer vers le site bloqué pour y accéder. Là où la censure est forte, de nombreuses options de contournement s’offrent à nous, dont les ​transports enfichables.

Pour plus de précisions, veuillez consulter la rubrique sur la censure du guide d’utilisation du Navigateur Tor.

Les sites Web bloqueront parfois les utilisateurs de Tor parce qu’ils ne peuvent pas faire la différence entre l’utilisateur de Tor moyen et le trafic automatisé. Les meilleurs résultats pour débloquer l’accès des utilisateurs de Tor à un site donné ont été obtenus en demandant aux utilisateurs de contacter directement les administrateurs du site en question. Ce qui suit pourrait suffire :

« Bonjour ! J’ai essayé d’accéder à votre site xyz.com en utilisant le Navigateur Tor et j’ai découvert que vous ne permettez pas aux utilisateurs de Tor d’y accéder. Je vous prie instamment de reconsidérer votre décision ; dans le monde entier, des personnes utilisent Tor pour protéger leur vie privée et leurs données personnelles, mais aussi pour combattre la censure. En bloquant les utilisateurs de Tor, vous bloquez vraisemblablement des personnes situées dans des pays où règne la répression et qui souhaitent utiliser un Internet libre, des journalistes et des chercheurs qui ne veulent pas être découverts, des lanceurs d’alerte, des activistes et des personnes ordinaires qui ne veulent pas être suivis à la trace par des tiers invasifs. Veuillez adopter une position forte qui privilégie la confidentialité numérique, la protection des données personnelles et la liberté sur Internet, et permettre aux utilisateurs de Tor d’accéder à xyz.com. Merci. »

Dans le cas de banques ou autres sites Web sensibles, il est aussi habituel de constater un blocage d’après la position géographique (si une banque sait que vous accédez habituellement à ses services à partir d’un pays et que vous vous connectez soudainement à partir d’un relais de sortie situé de l’autre côté de la planète, votre compte pourrait être verrouillé ou suspendu).

If you are unable to connect to an onion service, please see I cannot reach X.onion!.

Vous pouvez assurément utiliser un autre navigateur alors que vous utilisez aussi le Navigateur Tor. Néanmoins, sachez que les propriétés de confidentialité et de protection des données personnelles du Navigateur Tor ne seront pas présentes dans l’autre navigateur. Soyez prudent en basculant entre Tor et un navigateur moins sûr, car vous pourriez accidentellement utiliser l’autre navigateur pour quelque chose que vous pensiez faire en utilisant Tor.

You can set Proxy IP address, port, and authentication information in Tor Browser's Network Settings. If you're using Tor another way, check out the HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy config options in the manual page, and modify your torrc file accordingly. You will need an HTTP proxy for doing GET requests to fetch the Tor directory, and you will need an HTTPS proxy for doing CONNECT requests to get to Tor relays. (It's fine if they're the same proxy.) Tor also recognizes the torrc options Socks4Proxy and Socks5Proxy.

Also, read up on the HTTPProxyAuthenticator and HTTPSProxyAuthenticator options if your proxy requires auth. We only support basic auth currently, but if you need NTLM authentication, you may find this post in the archives useful.

If your proxies only allow you to connect to certain ports, look at the entry on Firewalled clients for how to restrict what ports your Tor will try to access.

Sometimes, after you've used Gmail over Tor, Google presents a pop-up notification that your account may have been compromised. The notification window lists a series of IP addresses and locations throughout the world recently used to access your account.

In general, this is a false alarm: Google saw a bunch of logins from different places, as a result of running the service via Tor, and decided it was a good idea to confirm the account was being accessed by its rightful owner.

Even though this may be a byproduct of using the service via Tor, that doesn't mean you can entirely ignore the warning. It is probably a false positive, but it might not be since it is possible for someone to hijack your Google cookie.

Cookie hijacking is possible by either physical access to your computer or by watching your network traffic. En théorie, seul un accès physique devrait compromettre votre système, car Gmail et les services semblables ne devraient envoyer le témoin que par une connexion SSL. In practice, alas, it's way more complex than that.

And if somebody did steal your google cookie, they might end up logging in from unusual places (though of course they also might not). So the summary is that since you're using Tor Browser, this security measure that Google uses isn't so useful for you, because it's full of false positives. You'll have to use other approaches, like seeing if anything looks weird on the account, or looking at the timestamps for recent logins and wondering if you actually logged in at those times.

More recently, Gmail users can turn on 2-Step Verification on their accounts to add an extra layer of security.

This is a known and intermittent problem; it does not mean that Google considers Tor to be spyware.

When you use Tor, you are sending queries through exit relays that are also shared by thousands of other users. Tor users typically see this message when many Tor users are querying Google in a short period of time. Google interprets the high volume of traffic from a single IP address (the exit relay you happened to pick) as somebody trying to "crawl" their website, so it slows down traffic from that IP address for a short time.

You can try 'change the circuit for this site' to access the website from a different IP address.

An alternate explanation is that Google tries to detect certain kinds of spyware or viruses that send distinctive queries to Google Search. It notes the IP addresses from which those queries are received (not realizing that they are Tor exit relays), and tries to warn any connections coming from those IP addresses that recent queries indicate an infection.

To our knowledge, Google is not doing anything intentionally specifically to deter or block Tor use. The error message about an infected machine should clear up again after a short time.

Google uses "geolocation" to determine where in the world you are, so it can give you a personalized experience. This includes using the language it thinks you prefer, and it also includes giving you different results on your queries.

If you really want to see Google in English you can click the link that provides that. But we consider this a feature with Tor, not a bug --- the Internet is not flat, and it in fact does look different depending on where you are. This feature reminds people of this fact.

Note that Google search URLs take name/value pairs as arguments and one of those names is "hl". If you set "hl" to "en" then Google will return search results in English regardless of what Google server you have been sent to. On a query this looks like:

https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=online%20anonymity&hl=en

Another method is to simply use your country code for accessing Google. This can be google.be, google.de, google.us and so on.

Tor Browser is built using Firefox ESR, so errors regarding Firefox may occur. Veuillez vous assurer qu’un autre Navigateur Tor n’est pas en cours d’exécution et que vous avez extrait le Navigateur Tor dans un emplacement pour lequel votre utilisateur détient les bons droits. If you are running an anti-virus, please see My antivirus/malware protection is blocking me from accessing Tor Browser, it is common for anti-virus / anti-malware software to cause this type of issue.

Avec la parution du Navigateur Tor 6.0.6, DuckDuckGo est devenu le moteur de recherche principal. For a while now, Disconnect, which was formerly used in Tor Browser, has had no access to Google search results. Since Disconnect is more of a meta search engine, which allows users to choose between different search providers, it fell back to delivering Bing search results, which were basically unacceptable quality-wise.

Dans le Navigateur Tor, chaque nouveau domaine obtient son propre circuit. The Design and Implementation of Tor Browser document further explains the thinking behind this design.

Le Navigateur Tor est une version modifiée de Firefox conçue spécifiquement pour être utilisée avec Tor. De grands efforts ont été déployés pour concevoir le Navigateur Tor, dont l’utilisation de correctifs supplémentaires pour améliorer la confidentialité, la protection des données personnelles et la sécurité. Bien qu’il soit techniquement possible d’utiliser Tor avec d’autres navigateurs, vous pourriez vous exposer à des attaques potentielles ou à des fuites de renseignements. Learn more about the design of Tor Browser.

Parfois, les sites Web qui font beaucoup appel à JavaScript peuvent éprouver des problèmes fonctionnels si l’on y accède par le Navigateur Tor. The simplest fix is to click on the Security icon (the small gray shield at the top-right of the screen), then click "Advanced Security Settings..." Réglez votre niveau de sécurité à « Normal ».

Si vous utilisez le Navigateur Tor, personne ne peut voir les sites que vous visitez. Cependant, votre fournisseur de services ou vos administrateurs de réseau pourraient voir que vous vous connectez au réseau Tor, bien qu’ils ne sachent pas ce que vous y faites.

We want everyone to be able to enjoy Tor Browser in their own language. Tor Browser is now available in 30 different languages, and we are working to add more. Want to help us translate? Become a Tor translator!

You can also help us in testing the next languages we will release, by installing and testing Tor Browser Alpha releases.

Nous ne recommandons pas d’exécuter le Navigateur Tor plusieurs fois en même temps, ce qui pourrait, sur plusieurs plateformes, ne pas fonctionner comme souhaité.

Malheureusement, certains sites Web servent des captchas aux utilisateurs de Tor et il nous est impossible de supprimer les captchas des sites Web. La meilleure chose à faire dans ces situations est de contacter les propriétaires des sites Web et de les informer que leurs captchas empêchent les utilisateurs comme vous d’utiliser leurs services.

Nous configurons NoScript pour qu’elle autorise JavaScript par défaut dans le Navigateur Tor, car de nombreux sites Web ne fonctionneraient pas si JavaScript était désactivé. La plupart des utilisateurs abandonneraient complètement Tor si nous désactivions JavaScript par défaut, car cela leur causerait tant de problèmes. Nous voulons fondamentalement rendre le Navigateur Tor aussi sécurisé que possible tout en nous assurant qu’une majorité de personnes peut l’utiliser. Cela signifie donc que pour l’instant JavaScript reste activé par défaut.

For users who want to have JavaScript disabled on all HTTP sites by default, we recommend changing your Tor Browser's "Security Level" option. This can be done by navigating the Security icon (the small gray shield at the top-right of the screen), then clicking "Advanced Security Settings...". The "Standard" level allows JavaScript, but the "Safer" and "Safest" levels both block JavaScript on HTTP sites.

L’utilisation du Navigateur Tor ne vous fait pas agir en tant que relais dans le réseau. Cela signifie que votre ordinateur ne sera pas utilisé pour acheminer le trafic d’autrui. If you'd like to become a relay, please see our Tor Relay Guide.

There are methods for setting Tor Browser as your default browser, but those methods may not work always or in every operating system. Le Navigateur Tor s’efforce de s’isoler du reste de votre système et les étapes pour le rendre navigateur par défaut ne sont pas fiables. This means sometimes a website would load in the Tor Browser, and sometimes it would load in another browser. This type of behavior can be dangerous and break anonymity.

Tor Browser is currently available on Windows, Linux and macOS.

There is a version of Tor Browser for Android and The Guardian Project also provides the Orbot app to route other apps on your Android device over the Tor network.

Il n’y a pas encore de version officielle de Tor pour iOS, bien que nous recommandions le Navigateur Onion (site en anglais, appli en français).

Le Navigateur Tor fait souvent en sorte que votre connexion semble venir d’un endroit complètement différent de la planète. Certains sites Web tels que les banques ou les services de courriel pourraient l’interpréter comme un signe que votre compte a été compromis et, par conséquent, vous bloquer.

La seule manière de résoudre cette situation est de suivre la procédure de récupération du compte recommandée par le site ou d’en contacter les opérateurs et d’expliquer la situation.

Vous pourriez éviter ce scénario si votre fournisseur de services propose l’authentification à deux facteurs, qui est une option de sécurité bien meilleure que les réputations d’après l’adresse IP. Contactez votre fournisseur de services et demandez-lui s’il propose l’A2F.

Le Navigateur Tor empêche autrui de savoir quels sites vous visitez. Certaines entités, comme votre fournisseur d’accès à Internet (FAI), pourraient voir que vous utilisez Tor, mais elles ne pourraient pas connaître les destinations de votre navigation.

Le Navigateur Tor propose deux façons de changer votre circuit de relais : « Nouvelle identité » et « Nouveau circuit Tor pour ce site ». Both options are located in the hamburger menu ("≡"). You can also access the New Circuit option inside the site information menu in the URL bar, and the New Identity option by clicking the small sparky broom icon at the top-right of the screen

Nouvelle Identité

Cette option est utile si vous souhaitez empêcher que votre activité ultérieure de navigation soit associée à ce que vous faisiez auparavant.

Sélectionner cette option fermera tous vos onglets et fenêtres, effacera vos renseignements personnels tels que vos témoins et votre historique de navigation, et utilisera de nouveaux circuits Tor pour toutes vos connexions.

Le Navigateur Tor vous avertira que tous téléchargements et activité seront arrêtés, prenez-le donc en compte avant de cliquer sur « Nouvelle Identité ».

Tor Browser Menu

Nouveau circuit Tor pour ce site

Cette option est utile si le relais de sortie que vous utilisez n’arrive pas à se connecter au site Web que vous demandez ou ne le charge pas correctement. En la sélectionnant, la fenêtre ou l’onglet actif sera rechargé sur un nouveau circuit Tor.

Les autres fenêtres et onglets ouverts du même site Web utiliseront aussi le nouveau circuit une fois qu’ils seront rechargés.

Cette option n’efface aucun renseignement personnel, ni ne dissocie votre activité, ni n’affectera vos connexions actuelles à d’autres sites Web.

New Circuit for this Site

Please see the HTTPS Everywhere FAQ. If you believe this is a Tor Browser issue, please report it on our issue tracker.

Please see the NoScript FAQ. If you believe this is a Tor Browser issue, please report it on our bug tracker.

Please see the DuckDuckGo support portal. If you believe this is a Tor Browser issue, please report it on our issue tracker.

DuckDuckGo is the default search engine in Tor Browser. DuckDuckGo does not track its users nor does it store any data about user searches. Learn more about DuckDuckGo privacy policy.

L’utilisation du Navigateur Tor peut parfois s’avérer plus lente qu’avec d’autres navigateurs. The Tor network has over a million daily users, and just over 6000 relays to route all of their traffic, and the load on each server can sometimes cause latency. And, by design, your traffic is bouncing through volunteers' servers in various parts of the world, and some bottlenecks and network latency will always be present. Vous pouvez aider à améliorer la vitesse du réseau en exécutant votre propre relais ou en encourageant les autres à le faire. For the much more in-depth answer, see Roger's blog post on the topic and Tor's Open Research Topics: 2018 edition about Network Performance. Cela dit, Tor est beaucoup plus rapide qu’auparavant et vous ne remarquerez peut-être aucun ralentissement par rapport aux autres navigateurs.

When you have Tor Browser open, you can navigate to the hamburger menu ("≡"), then click on "Preferences", and finally on "Tor" in the side bar. At the bottom of the page, next to the "View the Tor logs" text, click the button "View Logs...". You should see an option to copy the log to your clipboard, which you will be able to paste it into a text editor or an email client.

L’un des problèmes les plus courants qui entraîne des erreurs de connexion du Navigateur Tor est une horloge système qui n’est pas à l’heure. Veuillez vous assurer que votre horloge système et votre fuseau horaire sont réglés avec précision. Si cela ne corrige pas le problème, consultez la page Dépannage sur le guide d’utilisation du Navigateur Tor.

C’est un comportement normal de Tor. Le premier relais de votre circuit est appelé « garde d’entrée » ou « de garde ». Il s’agit d’un relais rapide et stable qui reste le premier relais de votre circuit pendant 2 à 3 mois afin de vous protéger contre une attaque de rupture d’anonymat connue. Le reste de votre circuit change pour chaque nouveau site Web que vous visitez. Ensemble, ces relais fournissent la protection complète de la vie privée et des données personnelles offerte par Tor. For more information on how guard relays work, see this blog post and paper on entry guards.

Il se peut que vous soyez sur un réseau censuré et vous devriez donc essayer d’utiliser des ponts. Des ponts sont intégrés au Navigateur Tor et vous pouvez les utiliser en choisissant « Configurer » (puis en suivant les indications) dans la fenêtre du Lanceur Tor qui apparaît quand vous ouvrez le Navigateur Tor pour la première fois. Si vous avez besoin d’autres ponts, vous pouvez les obtenir sur notre site Web de ponts. Pour plus de précisions au sujet des ponts, consultez le guide d’utilisation du Navigateur Tor.

Désolé, mais il n’y a actuellement aucune prise en charge officielle pour exécuter le Navigateur Tor sur *BSD. There is something called the TorBSD project, but their Tor Browser is not officially supported.

Si vous utilisez le Navigateur Tor et un autre navigateur en même temps, cela n’affectera ni les performances ni les propriétés de protection de la vie privée et des données personnelles de Tor. Gardez cependant à l’esprit que votre autre navigateur n’assure pas la confidentialité de votre activité, et vous pourriez par accident utiliser cet autre navigateur non confidentiel pour une utilisation que vous destiniez au Navigateur Tor.

Il est fortement déconseillé de changer la façon dont Tor crée ses circuits. You get the best security that Tor can provide when you leave the route selection to Tor; overriding the entry/exit nodes can compromise your anonymity. Si votre objectif est simplement de pouvoir accéder à des ressources qui ne sont proposées que dans un pays, vous pouvez envisager d’utiliser un RPV au lieu de Tor. Veuillez noter que les RPV n’offrent pas les mêmes propriétés de protection de la vie privée et des données personnelles que Tor, mais ils aideront à résoudre certains problèmes de restriction liés à la position géographique.

Nous n’offrons malheureusement pas encore de version du Navigateur Tor pour Chrome OS. You could run Tor Browser for Android on Chrome OS. Note that by using Tor Mobile on Chrome OS, you will view the mobile (not desktop) versions of websites. However, because we have not audited the app in Chrome OS, we don't know if all the privacy features of Tor Browser for Android will work well.

Il est fortement déconseillé d’installer de nouveaux modules complémentaires dans le Navigateur Tor, car ils peuvent compromettre la protection de vos données personnelles et votre sécurité.

L’installation de nouveaux modules complémentaires pourrait affecter le Navigateur Tor de façon imprévue et rendre l’empreinte de votre Navigateur Tor unique. Si l’empreinte de votre exemplaire du Navigateur Tor est unique, l’anonymat de vos activités de navigation peut être levé et vos activités peuvent être suivies à la trace même si vous utilisez le Navigateur Tor.

Essentiellement, les réglages et fonctions de chaque navigateur créent ce que l’on appelle une « empreinte de navigateur ». La plupart des navigateurs créent par inadvertance une empreinte unique pour chaque utilisateur, empreinte qui peut être suivie à la trace sur Internet. Tor Browser is specifically engineered to have a nearly identical (we're not perfect!) fingerprint across its users. Cela signifie que chaque utilisateur du Navigateur Tor ressemble à tous les autres utilisateurs du Navigateur Tor, ce qui complique le suivi à la trace d’un utilisateur particulier.

Il est aussi fort possible qu’un nouveau module complémentaire augmente la surface d’attaque du Navigateur Tor. Cela pourrait permettre une fuite de données délicates et à un assaillant d’infecter le Navigateur Tor. Le module complémentaire même pourrait être conçu de façon malveillante pour vous espionner.

Le Navigateur Tor comprend déjà deux extensions préinstallées HTTPS partout et NoScript (sites en anglais), et ajouter quoi que ce soit d’autre pourrait vous faire perdre votre anonymat.

Want to learn more about browser fingerprinting? Here's an article on The Tor Blog all about it.

Seul le trafic du Navigateur Tor sera acheminé par le réseau Tor. Les connexions de toutes les autres applications sur votre système (dont les autres navigateurs) ne seront pas acheminées par le réseau Tor ni ne seront protégées. Elles doivent être configurées séparément pour utiliser Tor. If you need to be sure that all traffic will go through the Tor network, take a look at the Tails live operating system which you can start on almost any computer from a USB stick or a DVD.

Flash est désactivé dans le Navigateur Tor et nous vous recommandons de ne pas l’activer. Nous pensons qu’il est dangereux d’utiliser Flash dans n’importe quel navigateur. C’est un logiciel très mal sécurisé qui peut aisément compromettre votre vie privée et vos données personnelles ou vous exposer à des programmes malveillants. Heureusement, la plupart des sites Web, appareils et autres navigateurs renoncent à utiliser Flash.

Le fichier que vous téléchargé et exécuté vous demande un dossier de destination. Si vous ne vous souvenez pas de cette destination, il s’agit très probablement de votre dossier Téléchargements ou Bureau.

Le paramètre par défaut du programme d’installation pour Windows crée aussi un raccourci pour vous sur votre bureau, mais il est possible que vous ayez accidentellement décoché l’option pour créer un raccourci.

Si vous ne le trouvez pas dans l’un de ces dossiers, retéléchargez-le et cherchez le message qui vous invite à choisir un répertoire dans lequel le télécharger. Choisissez un répertoire dont vous vous souviendrez facilement, et une fois que le téléchargement sera terminé, vous devriez y voir un dossier « Tor Browser ».

La plupart des antivirus ou des protections contre les programmes malveillants permettent à l’utilisateur de « mettre en liste blanche » certains processus qui seraient autrement bloqués. Veuillez donc ouvrir votre logiciel antivirus ou de protection contre les programmes malveillants et cherchez dans les paramètres une « liste blanche » ou quelque chose de semblable. Excluez ensuite les processus suivants :

  • Pour Windows
    • firefox.exe
    • tor.exe
    • obfs4proxy.exe (si vous utilisez des ponts)
  • Pour macOS
    • TorBrowser
    • tor.real
    • obfs4proxy (si vous utilisez des ponts)

Enfin, redémarrez le Navigateur Tor. Cela devrait résoudre les problèmes que vous rencontrez. Veuillez noter que certains antivirus, tels que Kaspersky, peuvent aussi bloquer Tor au niveau du pare-feu.

Quand nous publions une nouvelle version stable du Navigateur Tor, nous rédigeons un article de blogue qui explique en détail ses nouvelles fonctions et ses problèmes connus. If you started having issues with your Tor Browser after an update, check out blog.torproject.org for a post on the most recent stable Tor Browser to see if your issue is listed. If your issue is not listed there, please check first Tor Browser's issue tracker and create a GitLab issue about what you're experiencing.

Tor Browser in its default mode is starting with a content window rounded to a multiple of 200px x 100px to prevent fingerprinting the screen dimensions. The strategy here is to put all users in a couple of buckets to make it harder to single them out. That works so far until users start to resize their windows (e.g. by maximizing them or going into fullscreen mode). Tor Browser 9 ships with a fingerprinting defense for those scenarios as well, which is called Letterboxing, a technique developed by Mozilla and presented in 2019. It works by adding white margins to a browser window so that the window is as close as possible to the desired size while users are still in a couple of screen size buckets that prevent singling them out with the help of screen dimensions.

In simple words, this technique makes groups of users of certain screen sizes and this makes it harder to single out users on basis of screen size, as many users will have same screen size.

La signature numérique est un processus qui garantit qu’un paquet précis a été généré par ses développeurs et n’a pas été altéré. Ci-dessous, nous expliquons pourquoi cela est important et comment vérifier que le programme Tor que vous téléchargez est bien celui que nous avons créé, et qu’il n’a pas été modifié par un assaillant.

Chaque fichier sur notre page de téléchargement est accompagné d’un fichier qui porte le même nom que le paquet, ainsi que l’extension « .asc ». Ces fichiers .asc sont des signatures OpenPGP. Ils vous permettent de vérifier que le fichier que vous avez téléchargé est exactement celui que nous vous voulions que vous obteniez.

For example, torbrowser-install-win64-9.0_en-US.exe is accompanied by torbrowser-install-win64-9.0_en-US.exe.asc. These are example file names and will not exactly match the file names that you download.

Ci-dessous, nous vous expliquons comment vous pouvez, sur différents systèmes d’exploitation, vérifier la signature numérique du fichier téléchargé. Veuillez noter qu’une signature est datée dès que le paquet a été signé. Par conséquent, chaque fois qu’un nouveau fichier est téléversé, une nouvelle signature est générée avec une date différente. Tant que vous aurez vérifié la signature, vous ne devriez pas vous inquiéter si la date indiquée varie.

Installer de GnuPG

Avant tout, GnuPG doit être installé avant que vous puissiez vérifier les signatures.

Pour les utilisateurs de Windows :

Si vous utilisez Windows, téléchargez Gpg4win (site en anglais) et exécutez son programme d’installation.

Afin de vérifier la signature, vous devrez taper quelques commandes dans la ligne de commande de Windows, cmd.exe.

Pour les utilisateurs de macOS :

If you are using macOS, you can install GPGTools.

Afin de vérifier la signature, vous devrez taper quelques commandes dans le terminal (dans « Applications »).

Pour les utilisateurs de GNU/Linux :

Si vous utilisez GNU/Linux, GnuPG se trouve déjà probablement sur votre système, car il est préinstallé sur la plupart des versions de Linux.

Afin de vérifier la signature, vous devrez taper quelques commandes dans une fenêtre de terminal. La façon de le faire peut varier en fonction de votre version.

Obtenir la clé des développeurs de Tor

L’équipe du Navigateur Tor signe les versions du Navigateur Tor. Importez la clé de signature des développeurs du Navigateur Tor (0xEF6E286DDA85EA2A4BA7DE684E2C6E8793298290) :

gpg --auto-key-locate nodefault,wkd --locate-keys torbrowser@torproject.org

Cela devrait vous afficher quelque chose telle que :

gpg: clef 4E2C6E8793298290 : clef publique « Tor Browser Developers (signing key) <torbrowser@torproject.org> » importée
gpg: Quantité totale traitée : 1
gpg:               importées : 1
pub  rsa4096 2014-12-15 [C] [expire : 2020-08-24]
      EF6E286DDA85EA2A4BA7DE684E2C6E8793298290
uid           [ inconnue] Tor Browser Developers (signing key) <torbrowser@torproject.org>
sub   rsa4096 2018-05-26 [S] [expire : 2020-09-12]

If you get an error message, something has gone wrong and you cannot continue until you've figured out why this didn't work. You might be able to import the key using the Workaround (using a public key) section instead.

Après avoir importé la clé, vous pouvez l’enregistrer dans un fichier (en l’identifiant par son empreinte ici) :

gpg --output ./tor.keyring --export 0xEF6E286DDA85EA2A4BA7DE684E2C6E8793298290

If ./tor.keyring doesn't exist after running this command, something has gone wrong and you cannot continue until you've figured out why this didn't work.

Vérifier la signature

Pour vérifier la signature du paquet que vous avez téléchargé, vous devez télécharger le fichier de signature « .asc » correspondant, ainsi que le fichier du programme d’installation même, et le vérifier à l’aide d’une commande qui demande à GnuPG de contrôler le fichier que vous avez téléchargé.

Les exemples ci-dessous supposent que vous avez téléchargé ces deux fichiers dans votre dossier « Téléchargements ». Note that these commands use example file names and yours will be different: you will have downloaded a different version than 9.0 and you may not have chosen the English (en-US) version.

Pour les utilisateurs de Windows :

gpgv --keyring .\tor.keyring Downloads\torbrowser-install-win64-9.0_en-US.exe.asc Downloads\torbrowser-install-win64-9.0_en-US.exe

Pour les utilisateurs de macOS :

gpgv --keyring ./tor.keyring ~/Downloads/TorBrowser-9.0-osx64_en-US.dmg.asc ~/Downloads/TorBrowser-9.0-osx64_en-US.dmg

Pour les utilisateurs de GNU/Linux (changez 64 en 32 si vous avez le paquet 32 bits) :

gpgv --keyring ./tor.keyring ~/Downloads/tor-browser-linux64-9.0_en-US.tar.xz.asc ~/Downloads/tor-browser-linux64-9.0_en-US.tar.xz

Le résultat de la commande devrait produire quelque chose comme ceci :

gpgv: Signature faite le lun 08 jui 2019 07:06:17 EDT
gpgv:                avec la clef RSA EB774491D9FF06E2
gpgv: Bonne signature de « Tor Browser Developers (signing key) <torbrowser@torproject.org> »

If you get error messages containing 'No such file or directory', either something went wrong with one of the previous steps, or you forgot that these commands use example file names and yours will be a little different.

Workaround (using a public key)

If you encounter errors you cannot fix, feel free to download and use this public key instead. Alternatively, you may use the following command:

curl -s https://openpgpkey.torproject.org/.well-known/openpgpkey/torproject.org/hu/kounek7zrdx745qydx6p59t9mqjpuhdf |gpg --import -

Vous voudrez peut-être aussi en apprendre davantage sur GnuPG (site en anglais).

No, Tor Browser is an open source software and it is free. Any browser forcing you to pay and is claiming to be Tor Browser is fake. To make sure you are downloading the right Tor Browser visit our download page. After downloading, you can make sure that you have the official version of Tor Browser by verifying the signature. If you are not able to access our website, then visit censorship section to get information about alternate way of downloading Tor Browser.

You can report fake Tor Browsers on frontdesk@torproject.org

Bookmarks in the Tor Browser can be exported, imported, backup, restored as well as imported from another browser. In order to manage your bookmarks in Tor Browser, go to:

  • Hamburger menu >> Library >> Bookmarks >> Show All Bookmarks (below the menu)
  • From the toolbar on the Library window, click Import and Backup

If you wish to export bookmarks

  • Choose Export Bookmarks to HTML
  • In the Export Bookmarks File window that opens, choose a location to save the file, which is named bookmarks.html by default. The desktop is usually a good spot, but any place that is easy to remember will work.
  • Click the Save button. The Export Bookmarks File window will close.
  • Close the Library window.

Your bookmarks are now successfully exported from Tor Browser. The bookmarks HTML file you saved is now ready to be imported into another web browser.

If you wish to import bookmarks

  • Choose Import Bookmarks from HTML
  • Within the Import Bookmarks File window that opens, navigate to the bookmarks HTML file you are importing and select the file.
  • Click the Open button. The Import Bookmarks File window will close.
  • Close the Library window.

The bookmarks in the selected HTML file will be added to your Tor Browser within the Bookmarks Menu directory.

If you wish to backup

  • Choose Backup
  • A new window opens and you have to choose the location to save the file. The file has a .json extension.

If you wish to restore

  • Choose Restore and then select the bookmark file you wish to restore.
  • Click okay to the pop up box that appears and hurray, you just restored your backup bookmark.

Import data from another browser

Bookmarks can be transferred from Firefox to Tor Browser. There are two ways to export and import bookmarks in Firefox: HTML file or JSON file. After exporting the data from the browser, follow the above step to import the bookmark file into your Tor Browser.

Some antivirus software will pop up malware and/or vulnerability warnings when Tor Browser is launched. If you downloaded Tor Browser from our main website or used GetTor, and verified it, these are false positives and you have nothing to worry about. Some antiviruses consider that files that have not been seen by a lot of users as suspicious. To make sure that the Tor program you download is the one we have created and has not been modified by some attacker, you can verify Tor Browser's signature. You may also want to whitelist certain processes to prevent antiviruses from blocking access to Tor Browser.

Messagerie Tor

Non. Après onze versions bêta, nous avons cessé le soutien de la Messagerie Tor (page en anglais). Nous croyons toujours que Tor peut être utilisé dans une appli de messagerie, mais nous ne disposons pas des ressources pour le concrétiser pour le moment. Les possédez-vous ? Contactez-nous.

Tor sur appareils mobiles

It will be, soon. In the meantime you can use F-Droid to download Tor Browser for Android by enabling the Guardian Project's Repository.

Learn how to add a repository to F-Droid.

While both Tor Browser for Android and Orbot are great, they serve different purposes. Tor Browser for Android is like the desktop Tor Browser, but on your mobile device. It is a one stop browser that uses the Tor network and tries to be as anonymous as possible. Orbot on the other hand is a proxy that will enable you to send the data from your other applications (E-Mail clients, instant messaging apps, etc.) through the tor network; a version of Orbot is also inside of the Tor Browser for Android, and is what enables it to connect to the Tor network. That version, however, does not enable you to send other apps outside of the Tor Browser for Android through it. Depending on how you want to use the tor network, either one or both of these could be a great option.

Il n’existe actuellement aucun moyen pris en charge pour utiliser Tor sur Windows Phone.

Nous recommandons une appli pour iOS appelée Navigateur Onion, qui est à code source ouvert, utilise le routage de Tor et développée par quelqu’un qui collabore étroitement avec le Projet Tor. Cependant, Apple exige que sur iOS, les navigateurs utilisent quelque chose appelé « Webkit » qui empêche au Navigateur Onion de proposer la même protection de la confidentialité et des données personnelles que le Navigateur Tor.

Apprenez-en davantage sur le Navigateur Onion (page en anglais). Téléchargez le Navigateur Onion sur l’App Store.

The Guardian Project maintains Orbot (and other privacy applications) on Android. More info can be found on the Guardian Project's website.

Yes, there is a version of Tor Browser available specifically for Android. Installing Tor Browser for Android is all you need to run Tor on your Android device.

The Guardian Project provides the app Orbot which can be used to route other apps on your Android device over the Tor network, however only Tor Browser for Android is needed to browse the web with Tor.

GetTor

Si vous ne pouvez pas télécharger le Navigateur Tor à partir de notre site Web, GetTor. peut vous en livrer un exemplaire. GetTor est un service qui répond automatiquement aux messages par des liens vers la dernière version du Navigateur Tor, hébergée en divers endroits qui risquent moins d’être censurés, tels que les services nuagiques Dropbox et Google Drive, ou sur GitHub. You can also download Tor Browser from https://tor.eff.org or from https://tor.ccc.de. For more geographically specific links visit Tor: Mirrors

Envoyez un courriel à gettor@torproject.org. Indiquez votre système d’exploitation (tel que Windows, macOS ou Linux) dans le corps de votre message et envoyez-le. GetTor répondra par un courriel qui contient des liens à partir desquels vous pourrez télécharger le Navigateur Tor, la signature cryptographique (nécessaire pour vérifier le téléchargement), l’empreinte de la clé utilisée pour créer la signature, ainsi que la somme de contrôle du paquet. Selon le modèle d’ordinateur que vous utilisez, le choix entre un logiciel 32 bits ou 64 bits vous sera proposé ; consultez la documentation de votre ordinateur pour plus de précisions.

GetTor via Twitter is currently under maintenance. Please use the email instead.

Pour obtenir des liens pour télécharger le Navigateur Tor, envoyez un message à gettor@torproject.org en incluant l’un des codes suivants :

  • Linux
  • macOS (OS X)
  • Windows

Connexion à Tor

Si vous n’arrivez pas à accéder au service onion que vous souhaitez, assurez-vous d’avoir saisi correctement l’adresse onion de 16 caractères ou le nouveau format de 56 caractères. Même une seule petite erreur empêchera le Navigateur Tor d’accéder au site. Si vous ne parvenez toujours pas à vous connecter au service onion, veuillez réessayer ultérieurement. Il pourrait y avoir un problème temporaire de connexion ou les opérateurs du site pourraient avoir permis qu’il soit hors ligne, sans avertissement.

You can also ensure that you're able to access other onion services by connecting to DuckDuckGo's onion service.

If you’re having trouble connecting, an error message may appear and you can select the option to "copy Tor log to clipboard". Collez ensuite le journal Tor dans un fichier texte ou dans un autre document.

Alternatively, if you don't see this option and you have Tor Browser open, you can navigate to the hamburger menu ("≡"), then click on "Preferences", and finally on "Tor" in the side bar. At the bottom of the page, next to the "View the Tor logs" text, click the button "View Logs...".

Vous devriez voir l’une de ces erreurs de journal courantes (cherchez les lignes suivantes dans votre journal Tor) :

Common log error #1: Proxy connection failure
2017-10-29 09:23:40.800 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
2017-10-29 09:23:47.900 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory server
2017-10-29 09:23:47.900 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server
2017-10-29 09:24:08.900 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to xx..xxx..xxx.xx:xxxxx ("general SOCKS server failure")

Si vous trouvez de telles lignes dans votre journal Tor, cela signifie que vous n’arrivez pas à vous connecter à un mandataire SOCKS. Si un mandataire SOCKS est exigé pour votre configuration réseau, veuillez alors vous assurer d’avoir bien saisi les renseignements concernant le mandataire. Si un mandataire SOCKS n’est pas exigé ou si vous n’êtes pas certain, veuillez essayer de vous connecter au réseau Tor sans mandataire SOCKS.

Erreur de journal courante no 2 : impossible d’atteindre les relais de garde
11/1/2017 21:11:43 PM.500 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
11/1/2017 21:11:44 PM.300 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network
11/1/2017 21:11:44 PM.300 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path. Discarding this circuit.
11/1/2017 21:11:44 PM.500 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop
11/1/2017 21:11:45 PM.300 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path. Discarding this circuit.

Si vous trouvez de telles lignes dans votre journal Tor, cela signifie que vous n’arrivez pas à vous connecter au premier nœud du circuit Tor. Cela pourrait signifier que vous êtes sur un réseau qui est censuré.

Tentez de vous connecter avec des ponts, ce qui devrait corriger le problème.

Erreur de journal courante no 3 : échec d’établissement d’une connexion TLS
13-11-17 19:52:24.300 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server. (DONE; DONE; count 10; recommendation warn; host [host] at xxx.xxx.xxx.xx:xxx) 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN] 10 connections have failed: 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN]  9 connections died in state handshaking (TLS) with SSL state SSLv2/v3 read server hello A in HANDSHAKE 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN]  1 connections died in state connect()ing with SSL state (No SSL object)

Si vous trouvez de telles lignes dans votre journal Tor, cela signifie que Tor n’est pas parvenu à établir une connexion TLS avec les autorités d’annuaire. Utiliser des ponts réglera probablement ce problème.

Erreur de journal courante no 4 : décalage de l’horloge
19.11.2017 00:04:47.400 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150 
19.11.2017 00:04:48.000 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory server 
19.11.2017 00:04:48.200 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server 
19.11.2017 00:04:48.800 [WARN] Received NETINFO cell with skewed time (OR:xxx.xx.x.xx:xxxx): It seems that our clock is behind by 1 days, 0 hours, 1 minutes, or that theirs is ahead. Tor requires an accurate clock to work: please check your time, timezone, and date settings.

Si vous trouvez de telles lignes dans votre journal Tor, cela signifie que votre horloge système n’est pas à l’heure. Veuillez vous assurer que votre horloge est réglée avec précision et que le fuseau horaire est le bon, puis redémarrez Tor.

L’un des problèmes les plus courants qui entraîne des erreurs de connexion du Navigateur Tor est une horloge système qui n’est pas à l’heure. Veuillez vous assurer que votre horloge système et votre fuseau horaire sont réglés avec précision. Si cela ne corrige pas le problème, consultez la page Dépannage sur le guide d’utilisation du Navigateur Tor.

Censure

Les relais ponts sont des relais Tor qui ne sont pas listés dans l’annuaire public de Tor.

Cela signifie que des FAI ou des gouvernements qui tentent de bloquer l’accès au réseau Tor ne peuvent juste pas bloquer tous les ponts. Les ponts sont utiles pour les utilisateurs de Tor sous le joug de régimes oppressifs, et pour ceux qui veulent une couche supplémentaire de sécurité parce qu’ils s’inquiètent que quelqu’un puisse découvrir qu’ils contactent l’adresse IP d’un relais Tor public.

Un pont n’est qu’un relais normal avec une configuration légèrement différente. See How do I run a bridge for instructions.

Plusieurs pays, dont la Chine et l’Iran, ont trouvé des manières de détecter et de bloquer les connexions vers les ponts Tor. Obfsproxy bridges address this by adding another layer of obfuscation. La mise en place d’un pont obfsproxy exige un paquet logiciel et une configuration supplémentaires. See our page on pluggable transports for more info.

If you’re having trouble connecting, an error message may appear and you can select the option to "copy Tor log to clipboard". Collez ensuite le journal Tor dans un fichier texte ou dans un autre document.

Alternatively, if you don't see this option and you have Tor Browser open, you can navigate to the hamburger menu ("≡"), then click on "Preferences", and finally on "Tor" in the side bar. At the bottom of the page, next to the "View the Tor logs" text, click the button "View Logs...".

Vous devriez voir l’une de ces erreurs de journal courantes (cherchez les lignes suivantes dans votre journal Tor) :

Common log error #1: Proxy connection failure
2017-10-29 09:23:40.800 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
2017-10-29 09:23:47.900 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory server
2017-10-29 09:23:47.900 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server
2017-10-29 09:24:08.900 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to xx..xxx..xxx.xx:xxxxx ("general SOCKS server failure")

Si vous trouvez de telles lignes dans votre journal Tor, cela signifie que vous n’arrivez pas à vous connecter à un mandataire SOCKS. Si un mandataire SOCKS est exigé pour votre configuration réseau, veuillez alors vous assurer d’avoir bien saisi les renseignements concernant le mandataire. Si un mandataire SOCKS n’est pas exigé ou si vous n’êtes pas certain, veuillez essayer de vous connecter au réseau Tor sans mandataire SOCKS.

Erreur de journal courante no 2 : impossible d’atteindre les relais de garde
11/1/2017 21:11:43 PM.500 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
11/1/2017 21:11:44 PM.300 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network
11/1/2017 21:11:44 PM.300 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path. Discarding this circuit.
11/1/2017 21:11:44 PM.500 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop
11/1/2017 21:11:45 PM.300 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path. Discarding this circuit.

Si vous trouvez de telles lignes dans votre journal Tor, cela signifie que vous n’arrivez pas à vous connecter au premier nœud du circuit Tor. Cela pourrait signifier que vous êtes sur un réseau qui est censuré.

Tentez de vous connecter avec des ponts, ce qui devrait corriger le problème.

Erreur de journal courante no 3 : échec d’établissement d’une connexion TLS
13-11-17 19:52:24.300 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server. (DONE; DONE; count 10; recommendation warn; host [host] at xxx.xxx.xxx.xx:xxx) 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN] 10 connections have failed: 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN]  9 connections died in state handshaking (TLS) with SSL state SSLv2/v3 read server hello A in HANDSHAKE 
13-11-17 19:53:49.300 [WARN]  1 connections died in state connect()ing with SSL state (No SSL object)

Si vous trouvez de telles lignes dans votre journal Tor, cela signifie que Tor n’est pas parvenu à établir une connexion TLS avec les autorités d’annuaire. Utiliser des ponts réglera probablement ce problème.

Erreur de journal courante no 4 : décalage de l’horloge
19.11.2017 00:04:47.400 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150 
19.11.2017 00:04:48.000 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory server 
19.11.2017 00:04:48.200 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server 
19.11.2017 00:04:48.800 [WARN] Received NETINFO cell with skewed time (OR:xxx.xx.x.xx:xxxx): It seems that our clock is behind by 1 days, 0 hours, 1 minutes, or that theirs is ahead. Tor requires an accurate clock to work: please check your time, timezone, and date settings.

Si vous trouvez de telles lignes dans votre journal Tor, cela signifie que votre horloge système n’est pas à l’heure. Veuillez vous assurer que votre horloge est réglée avec précision et que le fuseau horaire est le bon, puis redémarrez Tor.

Il se peut que vous soyez sur un réseau censuré et vous devriez donc essayer d’utiliser des ponts. Des ponts sont intégrés au Navigateur Tor et vous pouvez les utiliser en choisissant « Configurer » (puis en suivant les indications) dans la fenêtre du Lanceur Tor qui apparaît quand vous ouvrez le Navigateur Tor pour la première fois. Si vous avez besoin d’autres ponts, vous pouvez les obtenir sur notre site Web de ponts. Pour plus de précisions au sujet des ponts, consultez le guide d’utilisation du Navigateur Tor.

Si vous ne pouvez pas télécharger le Navigateur Tor à partir de notre site Web, GetTor. peut vous en livrer un exemplaire. GetTor est un service qui répond automatiquement aux messages par des liens vers la dernière version du Navigateur Tor, hébergée en divers endroits qui risquent moins d’être censurés, tels que les services nuagiques Dropbox et Google Drive, ou sur GitHub. You can also download Tor Browser from https://tor.eff.org or from https://tor.ccc.de. For more geographically specific links visit Tor: Mirrors

Les sites Web bloqueront parfois les utilisateurs de Tor parce qu’ils ne peuvent pas faire la différence entre l’utilisateur de Tor moyen et le trafic automatisé. Les meilleurs résultats pour débloquer l’accès des utilisateurs de Tor à un site donné ont été obtenus en demandant aux utilisateurs de contacter directement les administrateurs du site en question. Ce qui suit pourrait suffire :

« Bonjour ! J’ai essayé d’accéder à votre site xyz.com en utilisant le Navigateur Tor et j’ai découvert que vous ne permettez pas aux utilisateurs de Tor d’y accéder. Je vous prie instamment de reconsidérer votre décision ; dans le monde entier, des personnes utilisent Tor pour protéger leur vie privée et leurs données personnelles, mais aussi pour combattre la censure. En bloquant les utilisateurs de Tor, vous bloquez vraisemblablement des personnes situées dans des pays où règne la répression et qui souhaitent utiliser un Internet libre, des journalistes et des chercheurs qui ne veulent pas être découverts, des lanceurs d’alerte, des activistes et des personnes ordinaires qui ne veulent pas être suivis à la trace par des tiers invasifs. Veuillez adopter une position forte qui privilégie la confidentialité numérique, la protection des données personnelles et la liberté sur Internet, et permettre aux utilisateurs de Tor d’accéder à xyz.com. Merci. »

Dans le cas de banques ou autres sites Web sensibles, il est aussi habituel de constater un blocage d’après la position géographique (si une banque sait que vous accédez habituellement à ses services à partir d’un pays et que vous vous connectez soudainement à partir d’un relais de sortie situé de l’autre côté de la planète, votre compte pourrait être verrouillé ou suspendu).

If you are unable to connect to an onion service, please see I cannot reach X.onion!.

Le Navigateur Tor peut tout à fait aider les gens à accéder à votre site Web où il est bloqué. La plupart du temps, il suffit de télécharger le Navigateur Tor et de l’utiliser pour naviguer vers le site bloqué pour y accéder. Là où la censure est forte, de nombreuses options de contournement s’offrent à nous, dont les ​transports enfichables.

Pour plus de précisions, veuillez consulter la rubrique sur la censure du guide d’utilisation du Navigateur Tor.

HTTPS

The short answer is: Yes, you can browse normal HTTPS Sites using Tor.

HTTPS Connections are used to secure communications over computer networks. You can read more about HTTPS here. Tor Browser has the HTTPS Everywhere plugin which automatically switches thousands of sites from unencrypted "HTTP" to more private "HTTPS".

Tor empêche aux systèmes d’écoute de découvrir quels sites vous visitez. Cependant, les renseignements envoyés par Internet sans chiffrement en utilisant une simple connexion HTTP peuvent encore être interceptés par les opérateurs de relais de sortie ou par quiconque observe le trafic entre votre relais de sortie et votre site Web de destination. Si le site que vous visitez utilise HTTPS, le trafic sera alors chiffré avant de quitter votre relais de sortie et invisible aux systèmes d’écoute.

Cette visualisation montre quels renseignements sont visibles pour les systèmes d’écoute avec et sans le Navigateur Tor ni le chiffrement HTTPS :

La visualisation suivante montre quels renseignements sont visibles pour les systèmes d’écoute avec et sans le Navigateur Tor ni le chiffrement HTTPS :

  • Cliquez sur le bouton « Tor » pour voir quelles données les observateurs peuvent voir quand vous utilisez Tor. Le bouton deviendra vert pour indiquer que Tor est activé.
  • Cliquez sur le bouton « HTTPS » pour voir quelles données les observateurs peuvent voir quand vous utilisez HTTPS. Le bouton deviendra vert pour indiquer que HTTPS est activé.
  • Quand les deux boutons sont verts, vous voyez les données visibles pour les observateurs quand vous utilisez les deux outils.
  • Quand les deux boutons sont gris, vous voyez les données visibles pour les observateurs quand vous n’utilisez aucun des deux outils.



DONNÉES POTENTIELLEMENT VISIBLES
Site.com
Le site que vous visitez.
utilisat./mdp
Le nom d’utilisateur et le mot de passe utilisés pour l’authentification.
données
Les données transmises.
emplacement
L’emplacement sur le réseau de l’ordinateur utilisé pour visiter le site Web (l’adresse IP publique).
Tor
Si Tor est utilisé ou non.

Opérateurs

Tor guesses its IP address by asking the computer for its hostname, and then resolving that hostname. Often people have old entries in their /etc/hosts file that point to old IP addresses.

If that doesn't fix it, you should use the "Address" config option to specify the IP you want it to pick. If your computer is behind a NAT and it only has an internal IP address, see the following Support entry on dynamic IP addresses.

Also, if you have many addresses, you might also want to set "OutboundBindAddress" so external connections come from the IP you intend to present to the world.

If your relay is relatively new then give it time. Tor decides which relays it uses heuristically based on reports from Bandwidth Authorities. These authorities take measurements of your relay's capacity and, over time, directs more traffic there until it reaches an optimal load. The lifecycle of a new relay is explained in more depth in this blog post. If you've been running a relay for a while and still having issues then try asking on the tor-relays list.

If you allow exit connections, some services that people connect to from your relay will connect back to collect more information about you. For example, some IRC servers connect back to your identd port to record which user made the connection. (This doesn't really work for them, because Tor doesn't know this information, but they try anyway.) Also, users exiting from you might attract the attention of other users on the IRC server, website, etc. who want to know more about the host they're relaying through.

Another reason is that groups who scan for open proxies on the Internet have learned that sometimes Tor relays expose their socks port to the world. We recommend that you bind your socksport to local networks only.

In any case, you need to keep up to date with your security. See this article on security for Tor relays for more suggestions.

  • The exit relay is the most needed relay type but it also comes with the highest legal exposure and risk (and you should NOT run them from your home).
  • If you are looking to run a relay with minimal effort, fast guard relays are also very useful
  • Followed by bridges.

When an exit is misconfigured or malicious it's assigned the BadExit flag. This tells Tor to avoid exiting through that relay. In effect, relays with this flag become non-exits. If you got this flag then we either discovered a problem or suspicious activity when routing traffic through your exit and weren't able to contact you. Please reach out to the bad-relays team so we can sort out the issue.

When upgrading your Tor relay, or moving it on a different computer, the important part is to keep the same identity keys (stored in "keys/ed25519_master_id_secret_key" and "keys/secret_id_key" in your DataDirectory). Keeping backups of the identity keys so you can restore a relay in the future is the recommended way to ensure the reputation of the relay won't be wasted.

This means that if you're upgrading your Tor relay and you keep the same torrc and the same DataDirectory, then the upgrade should just work and your relay will keep using the same key. If you need to pick a new DataDirectory, be sure to copy your old keys/ed25519_master_id_secret_key and keys/secret_id_key over.

Note: As of Tor 0.2.7 we are using new generation identities for relays based on ed25519 elliptic curve cryptography. Eventually they will replace the old RSA identities, but that will happen in time, to ensure compatibility with older versions. Until then, each relay will have both an ed25519 identity (identity key file: keys/ed25519_master_id_secret_key) and a RSA identity (identity key file: keys/secret_id_key). You need to copy / backup both of them in order to restore your relay, change your DataDirectory or migrate the relay on a new computer.

We're looking for people with reasonably reliable Internet connections, that have at least 10 Mbit/s (Mbps) available bandwidth each way. If that's you, please consider running a Tor relay.

Even if you do not have at least 10 Mbit/s of available bandwidth you can still help the Tor network by running a Tor bridge with obfs4 support. In that case you should have at least 1 MBit/s of available bandwidth.

You're right, for the most part a byte into your Tor relay means a byte out, and vice versa. But there are a few exceptions:

If you open your DirPort, then Tor clients will ask you for a copy of the directory. The request they make (an HTTP GET) is quite small, and the response is sometimes quite large. This probably accounts for most of the difference between your "write" byte count and your "read" byte count.

Another minor exception shows up when you operate as an exit node, and you read a few bytes from an exit connection (for example, an instant messaging or ssh connection) and wrap it up into an entire 512 byte cell for transport through the Tor network.

If your Tor relay is using more memory than you'd like, here are some tips for reducing its footprint:

  • If you're on Linux, you may be encountering memory fragmentation bugs in glibc's malloc implementation. That is, when Tor releases memory back to the system, the pieces of memory are fragmented so they're hard to reuse. The Tor tarball ships with OpenBSD's malloc implementation, which doesn't have as many fragmentation bugs (but the tradeoff is higher CPU load). You can tell Tor to use this malloc implementation instead: ./configure --enable-openbsd-malloc.
  • If you're running a fast relay, meaning you have many TLS connections open, you are probably losing a lot of memory to OpenSSL's internal buffers (38KB+ per socket). We've patched OpenSSL to release unused buffer memory more aggressively. If you update to OpenSSL 1.0.0 or newer, Tor's build process will automatically recognize and use this feature.
  • If you still can't handle the memory load, consider reducing the amount of bandwidth your relay advertises. Advertising less bandwidth means you will attract fewer users, so your relay shouldn't grow as large. See the MaxAdvertisedBandwidth option in the man page.

All of this said, fast Tor relays do use a lot of ram. It is not unusual for a fast exit relay to use 500-1000 MB of memory.

We aim to make setting up a Tor relay easy and convenient:

  • It's fine if the relay goes offline sometimes. The directories notice this quickly and stop advertising the relay. Just try to make sure it's not too often, since connections using the relay when it disconnects will break.
  • Each Tor relay has an exit policy that specifies what sort of outbound connections are allowed or refused from that relay. If you are uncomfortable allowing people to exit from your relay, you can set it up to only allow connections to other Tor relays.
  • Your relay will passively estimate and advertise its recent bandwidth capacity, so high-bandwidth relays will attract more users than low-bandwidth ones. Therefore, having low-bandwidth relays is useful too.

If you're using Debian or Ubuntu especially, there are a number of benefits to installing Tor from the Tor Project's repository.

  • Your ulimit -n gets set to 32768 high enough for Tor to keep open all the connections it needs.
  • A user profile is created just for Tor, so Tor doesn't need to run as root.
  • An init script is included so that Tor runs at boot.
  • Tor runs with --verify-config, so that most problems with your config file get caught.
  • Tor can bind to low level ports, then drop privileges.

All outgoing connections must be allowed, so that each relay can communicate with every other relay.

In many jurisdictions, Tor relay operators are legally protected by the same common carrier regulations that prevent internet service providers from being held liable for third-party content that passes through their network. Exit relays that filter some traffic would likely forfeit those protections.

Tor promotes free network access without interference. Exit relays must not filter the traffic that passes through them to the internet. Exit relays found to be filtering traffic will get the BadExit flag once detected.

Non. Si un organisme d’application de la loi commence à s’intéresser au trafic de votre relais de sortie, il est possible que des représentants de cet organisme saisissent votre ordinateur. C’est pourquoi il est préférable de ne pas faire fonctionner votre relais de sortie chez vous ou en utilisant votre connexion résidentielle à Internet.

Envisagez plutôt de faire fonctionner votre relais de sortie dans un centre informatique commercial favorable à Tor. Utilisez une adresse IP séparée pour votre relais de sortie et n’acheminez pas votre propre trafic par ce relais. Bien entendu, vous devriez éviter de garder des renseignements personnels ou délicats sur l’ordinateur qui héberge votre relais de sortie.

  • N’utilisez pas les paquets dans les dépôts d’Ubuntu. Ils ne sont pas mis à jours de façon fiable. Si vous les utilisez, vous manquerez d’importants correctifs de stabilité et de sécurité.
  • Déterminez votre version d’Ubuntu en exécutant la commande suivante :
     $ lsb_release -c
    
  • En tant que superutilisateur, ajoutez les lignes suivantes au fichier /etc/apt/sources.list. Remplacez « version » par la version que vous avez trouvée à l’étape précédente.
     $ deb https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org version main
     $ deb-src https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org version main
    
  • Ajoutez la clé gpg utilisée pour signer les paquets en exécutant les commandes suivantes :
     $ curl https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89.asc | sudo apt-key add -
    
  • Exécutez les commandes suivantes pour installer tor et vérifier ses signatures :
     $ sudo apt-get update
     $ sudo apt-get install tor deb.torproject.org-keyring
    

In simple words, it works like this:

  • There is a master ed25519 identity secret key file named "ed25519_master_id_secret_key". This is the most important one, so make sure you keep a backup in a secure place - the file is sensitive and should be protected. Tor could encrypt it for you if you generate it manually and enter a password when asked.
  • A medium term signing key named "ed25519_signing_secret_key" is generated for Tor to use. Also, a certificate is generated named "ed25519_signing_cert" which is signed by the master identity secret key and confirms that the medium term signing key is valid for a certain period of time. The default validity is 30 days, but this can be customized by setting "SigningKeyLifetime N days|weeks|months" in torrc.
  • There is also a master public key named "ed25519_master_id_public_key, which is the actual identity of the relay advertised in the network. This one is not sensitive and can be easily computed from "ed5519_master_id_secret_key".

Tor will only need access to the medium term signing key and certificate as long as they are valid, so the master identity secret key can be kept outside DataDirectory/keys, on a storage media or a different computer. You'll have to manually renew the medium term signing key and certificate before they expire otherwise the Tor process on the relay will exit upon expiration.

This feature is optional, you don't need to use it unless you want to. If you want your relay to run unattended for longer time without having to manually do the medium term signing key renewal on regular basis, best to leave the master identity secret key in DataDirectory/keys, just make a backup in case you'll need to reinstall it. If you want to use this feature, you can consult our more detailed guide on the topic.

Since it's now a guard, clients are using it less in other positions, but not many clients have rotated their existing guards out to use it as a guard yet. Read more details in this blog post or in Changing of the Guards: A Framework for Understanding and Improving Entry Guard Selection in Tor.

Great. If you want to run several relays to donate more to the network, we're happy with that. But please don't run more than a few dozen on the same network, since part of the goal of the Tor network is dispersal and diversity.

If you do decide to run more than one relay, please set the "MyFamily" config option in the torrc of each relay, listing all the relays (comma-separated) that are under your control:

MyFamily $fingerprint1,$fingerprint2,$fingerprint3

where each fingerprint is the 40 character identity fingerprint (without spaces).

That way, Tor clients will know to avoid using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. You should set MyFamily if you have administrative control of the computers or of their network, even if they're not all in the same geographic location.

The accounting options in the torrc file allow you to specify the maximum amount of bytes your relay uses for a time period.

    AccountingStart day week month [day] HH:MM

This specifies when the accounting should reset. For instance, to setup a total amount of bytes served for a week (that resets every Wednesday at 10:00am), you would use:

    AccountingStart week 3 10:00
    AccountingMax 500 GBytes

This specifies the maximum amount of data your relay will send during an accounting period, and the maximum amount of data your relay will receive during an account period. When the accounting period resets (from AccountingStart), then the counters for AccountingMax are reset to 0.

Example: Let's say you want to allow 50 GB of traffic every day in each direction and the accounting should reset at noon each day:

    AccountingStart day 12:00
    AccountingMax 50 GBytes

Note that your relay won't wake up exactly at the beginning of each accounting period. It will keep track of how quickly it used its quota in the last period, and choose a random point in the new interval to wake up. This way we avoid having hundreds of relays working at the beginning of each month but none still up by the end.

If you have only a small amount of bandwidth to donate compared to your connection speed, we recommend you use daily accounting, so you don't end up using your entire monthly quota in the first day. Just divide your monthly amount by 30. You might also consider rate limiting to spread your usefulness over more of the day: if you want to offer X GB in each direction, you could set your RelayBandwidthRate to 20*X KBytes. For example, if you have 50 GB to offer each way, you might set your RelayBandwidthRate to 1000 KBytes: this way your relay will always be useful for at least half of each day.

    AccountingStart day 0:00
    AccountingMax 50 GBytes
    RelayBandwidthRate 1000 KBytes
    RelayBandwidthBurst 5000 KBytes # allow higher bursts but maintain average

Tor has partial support for IPv6 and we encourage every relay operator to enable IPv6 functionality in their torrc configuration files when IPv6 connectivity is available. For the time being Tor will require IPv4 addresses on relays, you can not run a Tor relay on a host with IPv6 addresses only.

The parameters assigned in the AccountingMax and BandwidthRate apply to both client and relay functions of the Tor process. Thus you may find that you are unable to browse as soon as your Tor goes into hibernation, signaled by this entry in the log:

Bandwidth soft limit reached; commencing hibernation.
No new connections will be accepted

The solution is to run two Tor processes - one relay and one client, each with its own config. One way to do this (if you are starting from a working relay setup) is as follows:

  • In the relay Tor torrc file, simply set the SocksPort to 0.
  • Create a new client torrc file from the torrc.sample and ensure it uses a different log file from the relay. One naming convention may be torrc.client and torrc.relay.
  • Modify the Tor client and relay startup scripts to include -f /path/to/correct/torrc.
  • In Linux/BSD/Mac OS X, changing the startup scripts to Tor.client and Tor.relay may make separation of configs easier.

Great. That's exactly why we implemented exit policies.

Each Tor relay has an exit policy that specifies what sort of outbound connections are allowed or refused from that relay. The exit policies are propagated to Tor clients via the directory, so clients will automatically avoid picking exit relays that would refuse to exit to their intended destination. This way each relay can decide the services, hosts, and networks it wants to allow connections to, based on abuse potential and its own situation. Read the Support entry on issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy, and then read Mike Perry's tips for running an exit node with minimal harassment.

The default exit policy allows access to many popular services (e.g. web browsing), but restricts some due to abuse potential (e.g. mail) and some since the Tor network can't handle the load (e.g. default file-sharing ports). You can change your exit policy by editing your torrc file. If you want to avoid most if not all abuse potential, set it to "reject :". This setting means that your relay will be used for relaying traffic inside the Tor network, but not for connections to external websites or other services.

If you do allow any exit connections, make sure name resolution works (that is, your computer can resolve Internet addresses correctly). If there are any resources that your computer can't reach (for example, you are behind a restrictive firewall or content filter), please explicitly reject them in your exit policy otherwise Tor users will be impacted too.

Tor can handle relays with dynamic IP addresses just fine. Just leave the "Address" line in your torrc blank, and Tor will guess.

Oui, vous obtiendrez un meilleur anonymat contre certaines attaques.

The simplest example is an attacker who owns a small number of Tor relays. They will see a connection from you, but they won't be able to know whether the connection originated at your computer or was relayed from somebody else.

There are some cases where it doesn't seem to help: if an attacker can watch all of your incoming and outgoing traffic, then it's easy for them to learn which connections were relayed and which started at you. (In this case they still don't know your destinations unless they are watching them too, but you're no better off than if you were an ordinary client.)

There are also some downsides to running a Tor relay. First, while we only have a few hundred relays, the fact that you're running one might signal to an attacker that you place a high value on your anonymity. Second, there are some more esoteric attacks that are not as well-understood or well-tested that involve making use of the knowledge that you're running a relay -- for example, an attacker may be able to "observe" whether you're sending traffic even if they can't actually watch your network, by relaying traffic through your Tor relay and noticing changes in traffic timing.

It is an open research question whether the benefits outweigh the risks. A lot of that depends on the attacks you are most worried about. For most users, we think it's a smart move.

See portforward.com for directions on how to port forward with your NAT/router device.

If your relay is running on a internal net, you need to setup port forwarding. Forwarding TCP connections is system dependent but the firewalled-clients FAQ entry offers some examples on how to do this.

Also, here's an example of how you would do this on GNU/Linux if you're using iptables:

/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp --destination-port 9001 -j ACCEPT

You may have to change "eth0" if you have a different external interface (the one connected to the Internet). Chances are you have only one (except the loopback) so it shouldn't be too hard to figure out.

There are two options you can add to your torrc file:

BandwidthRate is the maximum long-term bandwidth allowed (bytes per second). For example, you might want to choose "BandwidthRate 10 MBytes" for 10 megabytes per second (a fast connection), or "BandwidthRate 500 KBytes" for 500 kilobytes per second (a decent cable connection). The minimum BandwidthRate setting is 75 kilobytes per second.

BandwidthBurst is a pool of bytes used to fulfill requests during short periods of traffic above BandwidthRate but still keeps the average over a long period to BandwidthRate. A low Rate but a high Burst enforces a long-term average while still allowing more traffic during peak times if the average hasn't been reached lately. For example, if you choose "BandwidthBurst 500 KBytes" and also use that for your BandwidthRate, then you will never use more than 500 kilobytes per second; but if you choose a higher BandwidthBurst (like 5 MBytes), it will allow more bytes through until the pool is empty.

If you have an asymmetric connection (upload less than download) such as a cable modem, you should set BandwidthRate to less than your smaller bandwidth (Usually that's the upload bandwidth). Otherwise, you could drop many packets during periods of maximum bandwidth usage - you may need to experiment with which values make your connection comfortable. Then set BandwidthBurst to the same as BandwidthRate.

Linux-based Tor nodes have another option at their disposal: they can prioritize Tor traffic below other traffic on their machine, so that their own personal traffic is not impacted by Tor load. A script to do this can be found in the Tor source distribution's contrib directory.

Additionally, there are hibernation options where you can tell Tor to only serve a certain amount of bandwidth per time period (such as 100 GB per month). These are covered in the hibernation entry below.

Note that BandwidthRate and BandwidthBurst are in Bytes, not Bits.

Services onion

When browsing an Onion Service, Tor Browser displays different onion icons in the address bar indicating the security of the current webpage.

Image of an onion An onion means:

  • The Onion Service is served over HTTP, or HTTPS with a CA-Issued certificate.
  • The Onion Service is served over HTTPS with a Self-Signed certificate.

Image of an onion with a red slash An onion with a red slash means:

  • The Onion Service is served with a script from an insecure URL.

Image of an onion with a caution sign An onion with caution sign means:

  • The Onion Service is served over HTTPS with an expired Certificate
  • The Onion Service is served over HTTPS with a wrong Domain
  • The Onion Service is served with a mixed form over an insecure URL

Si vous n’arrivez pas à accéder au service onion que vous souhaitez, assurez-vous d’avoir saisi correctement l’adresse onion de 16 caractères ou le nouveau format de 56 caractères. Même une seule petite erreur empêchera le Navigateur Tor d’accéder au site. Si vous ne parvenez toujours pas à vous connecter au service onion, veuillez réessayer ultérieurement. Il pourrait y avoir un problème temporaire de connexion ou les opérateurs du site pourraient avoir permis qu’il soit hors ligne, sans avertissement.

You can also ensure that you're able to access other onion services by connecting to DuckDuckGo's onion service.

Les services onion permettent aux gens de naviguer et aussi de publier dans l’anonymat, même de publier des sites Web anonymes.

Onion services are also relied on for metadata-free chat and file sharing, safer interaction between journalists and their sources like with SecureDrop or OnionShare, safer software updates, and more secure ways to reach popular websites like Facebook.

Ces services utilisent le domaine de premier niveau à usage spécial .onion (au lieu de .com, .net, .org, etc…) et ne sont accessibles que par le réseau Tor.

When accessing a website that uses an onion service, Tor Browser will show at the URL bar an icon of an onion displaying the state of your connection: secure and using an onion service.

Onion icon

Les sites Web qui ne sont accessibles que par Tor sont appelés « onions » et se terminent par le domaine de premier niveau .onion. For example, the DuckDuckGo onion is https://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion. Vous pouvez accéder à ces sites Web en utilisant le Navigateur Tor. L’adresse doit être partagée avec vous par l’hôte du site Web, car les onions ne sont pas indexés dans les moteurs de recherche de façon habituelle, comme les sites Web ordinaires le sont.

Onion-Location is a new HTTP header that web sites can use to advertise their onion counterpart. If the web site that you're visiting has an onion site available, a purple suggestion pill will prompt at the URL bar saying ".onion available". When you click on ".onion available", the web site will be reloaded and redirected to its onion counterpart. At the moment, Onion-Location is available for Tor Browser desktop (Windows, macOS and GNU/Linux). You can learn more about Onion-Location in the Tor Browser Manual. If you're an onion service operator, learn how to configure Onion-Location in your onion site.

An authenticated onion service is an onion service that requires you to provide an authentication token (in this case, a private key) before accessing the service. The private key is not transmitted to the service, and it's only used to decrypt its descriptor locally. You can get the access credentials from the onion service operator. Reach out to the operator and request access. Learn more about how to use onion authentication in Tor Browser. If you want to create an onion service with client authentication, please see the Client Authorization in the Community portal.

Divers

Vidalia n’est plus entretenue ni ne reçoit de soutien. Une grande partie des fonctions qu’offrait Vidalia a maintenant été intégrée dans le Navigateur Tor même.

Tor ne conserve aucun journal qui pourrait identifier un utilisateur particulier. We do take some safe measurements of how the network functions, which you can check out at Tor Metrics.

Nous sommes vraiment désolés, mais vous avez été infecté par un programme malveillant, un rançongiciel. Le Projet Tor n’a pas créé ce programme malveillant. Les auteurs du programme malveillant vous demandent de télécharger le Navigateur Tor pour probablement les contacter de manière anonyme, avec la rançon qu’ils exigent de vous.

Si c’est la première fois que vous entendez parler du Navigateur Tor, nous comprenons que vous pensez que nous sommes des personnes mal intentionnées qui ouvrent la porte à des personnes encore pires.

Mais veuillez prendre en considération que nos logiciels sont utilisés tous les jours à des fins les plus diverses par des défenseurs des droits de la personne, des journalistes, des survivants de violence familiale, des lanceurs d’alerte, des représentants des forces de l’ordre et bien d’autres. Malheureusement, la protection que nos logiciels peuvent fournir à ces groupes de personnes peut aussi être détournée par des criminels et des auteurs de programmes malveillants. Le Projet Tor n’appuie ni ne cautionne l’utilisation de nos logiciels à des fins malveillantes.

Nous ne recommandons pas d’utiliser Tor avec BitTorrent. For further details, please see our blog post on the subject.

Tor est financé par un certain nombre de commanditaires différents, dont des organismes fédéraux étatsuniens, des fondations privées et des donateurs particuliers. Check out a list of all our sponsors and a series of blog posts on our financial reports.

Nous estimons que parler ouvertement de nos commanditaires et de notre modèle de financement est la meilleure façon de maintenir un rapport de confiance avec notre communauté. Nous cherchons toujours à diversifier nos sources de financement, particulièrement de fondations et de particuliers.

Tor est conçu pour défendre les droits de la personne et les droits à la vie privée en empêchant quiconque de censurer quoi que ce soit, ce qui s’applique aussi à nous. Nous détestons que certaines personnes utilisent Tor pour faire des choses horribles, mais nous ne pouvons rien faire pour nous en débarrasser sans aussi porter atteinte aux défenseurs des droits de la personne, aux journalistes, aux survivants de violence et autres personnes qui utilisent Tor à des fins louables. Si nous voulions empêcher certaines personnes d’utiliser Tor, nous ajouterions essentiellement une porte dérobée au logiciel, ce qui exposerait aux attaques de régimes condamnables et autres adversaires nos utilisateurs vulnérables.

Nous vous remercions de votre soutien ! You can find more information about donating on our donor FAQ.

For sharing files over Tor, OnionShare is a good option. OnionShare is an open source tool for securely and anonymously sending and receiving files using Tor onion services. It works by starting a web server directly on your computer and making it accessible as an unguessable Tor web address that others can load in Tor Browser to download files from you, or upload files to you. It doesn't require setting up a separate server, using a third party file-sharing service, or even logging into an account.

Unlike services like email, Google Drive, DropBox, WeTransfer, or nearly any other way people typically send files to each other, when you use OnionShare you don't give any companies access to the files that you're sharing. So long as you share the unguessable web address in a secure way (like pasting it in an encrypted messaging app), no one but you and the person you're sharing with can access the files.

OnionShare is developed by Micah Lee.

De nombreux nœuds de sortie sont configurés pour bloquer certains types de trafic de partage de fichiers tels que BitTorrent. BitTorrent in particular is not anonymous over Tor.

La longueur du chemin est actuellement figée à 3 dans le code, plus le nombre de nœuds « sensibles » dans votre chemin. C’est-à-dire que pour les cas normaux c’est 3, mais possiblement plus si, par exemple, vous accédez à un service onion ou à une adresse « .exit ».

Nous ne voulons pas encourager l’utilisation de chemins plus longs, car cela augmente la charge du réseau sans (d’après ce que nous pouvons voir) fournir une sécurité accrue. Also, using paths longer than 3 could harm anonymity, first because it makes denial of security attacks easier, and second because it could act as an identifier if only a small number of users have the same path length as you.

Non, le Projet Tor n’offre pas de service d’hébergement.

Les développeurs de Tor ne peuvent rien faire pour suivre les utilisateurs de Tor à la trace. Les mêmes protections qui empêchent les personnes mal intentionnées de percer l’anonymat de Tor nous empêchent aussi de suivre les utilisateurs à la trace.

Tor compte sur le soutien d’utilisateurs et de bénévoles du monde entier pour nous aider à améliorer nos logiciels et nos ressources. C’est pourquoi vos rétroactions sont inestimables pour nous (et pour tous les utilisateurs de Tor).

Feedback template

When sending us feedback or reporting a bug, please include as many of these as possible:

  • Operating System you are using
  • Version du Navigateur Tor
  • Step by step of how you got to the issue, so we can reproduce it (e.g. I opened the browser, typed a url, clicked on (i) icon, then my browser crashed)
  • A screenshot of the problem
  • Le journal

How to Reach Us

There are several ways to reach us, so please use what works best for you.

GitLab

First, check if the bug is already known. You can search and read all the issues at https://gitlab.torproject.org/. To create a new issue, please request a new account to access Tor Project's GitLab instance and find the right repository to report your issue. We track all Tor Browser related issues at Tor Browser issue tracker. Issues related to our websites should be filed under the Web issue tracker.

Email

Send us an email to frontdesk@torproject.org

In the subject line of your email, please tell us what you're reporting. The more specific your subject line is (e.g. "Connection failure", "feedback on website", "feedback on Tor Browser, "I need a bridge"), the easier it will be for us to understand and follow up. Sometimes when we receive emails without subject lines, they're marked as spam and we don't see them.

For the fastest response, please write in English, Spanish, and/or Portuguese if you can. If none of these languages works for you, please write in any language you feel comfortable with, but keep in mind it will take us a bit longer to answer as we will need help with translation to understand it.

Blog post comments

You can always leave comments on the blog post related to the issue or feedback you want to report. If there is not a blog post related to your issue, please contact us another way.

IRC

You can find us in the #tor channel on OFTC to give us feedback or report bugs/issues. We may not respond right away, but we do check the backlog and will get back to you when we can.

Learn how to connect to OFTC servers.

Email Lists

For reporting issues or feedback using email lists, we recommend that you do so on the one that is related to what you would like to report.

For feedback or issues related to Tor Browser, Tor network or other projects developed by Tor: tor-talk

For feedback or issues related to our websites: ux

For feedback or issues related to running a Tor relay: tor-relays

For feedback on content related to Tor Browser Manual or Support website: tor-community-team

Report a security issue

If you've found a security issue in one of our projects or in our infrastructure, please email tor-security@lists.torproject.org. If you've found a security bug in Tor or Tor Browser, feel free to submit it for our bug bounty program. Si vous souhaitez chiffrer votre courriel, vous pouvez obtenir la clé publique GPG de la liste en contactant tor-security-sendkey@lists.torproject.org ou sur pool.sks-keyservers.net. En voici l’empreinte numérique :

  gpg --fingerprint tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  pub 4096R/1A7BF184 2017-03-13
  Fingerprint=8B90 4624 C5A2 8654 E453 9BC2 E135 A8B4 1A7B F184
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  sub 4096R/C00942E4 2017-03-13

Communiquer avec nous

The #tor-project channel is where Tor people discuss and coordinate daily Tor work. It has fewer members than #tor and is more focused on the work at hand. You are also welcome to join this channel. To access #tor-project, your nickname (nick) must be registered and verified.

Here's how to reach #tor-project and other registered channels.

Register your nickname

  1. Log onto #tor. See How can I chat with Tor Project teams?

  2. Then, click on the word "Status" at the top left of the screen.

  3. In the window at the bottom of the page, type: /msg nickserv REGISTER yournewpassword youremailaddress

  4. Hit enter.

If all goes well, you will receive a message that you are registered.

The system may register you as your nick_ instead of your nick.

If so, just go with it but remember you are user_ and not user.

Every time you log on to IRC, to identify your registered nick, type:

/nick yournick

/msg nickserv IDENTIFY YourPassWord

How to verify your nickname

Then, to complete the registration and ultimately gain access to the #tor-project channel, your nickname must be verified.

  1. To verify your nick, open a new browser window and go to https://webchat.oftc.net/?channels=tor.

  2. Log in with your IRC nickname and password.

  3. Look for the word verify and log in there. It may appear that nothing has happened. Look at the top of the page, and there will be a column called Account.

  4. Click on Account.

  5. Click on the small sentence at the bottom of the square that says: Verify account.

  6. Fill out the CAPTCHA that pops up, and click ok.

  7. A tiny message will appear: "Your NickServ account has been verified."

  8. Go back to the IRC webpage where you are logged in and type:

    /msg nickserv checkverify

  9. Click ENTER.

  10. If all is well, you will receive a message that says:

*!NickServ*checkverify

Usermodechange: +R

!NickServ- Successfully set +R on your nick.
`

Your nick is verified!

Now, to join #tor-project, you can just type:

/join #tor-project and hit enter.

You will be allowed into the channel. If so, Congratulations!

However, if you get stuck, you can ask for help in the #tor channel.

You can toggle back and forth between channels by clicking on the different channel names at the top left of the IRC window.

Here is how you can get onto IRC and start to chat with Tor contributors in real time:

  1. Enter in OFTC webchat.

  2. Fill in the blanks:

    NICKNAME: Anything you want, but choose the same nickname (nick) every time you use IRC to talk to people on Tor. If your nick is already being used, you will get a message from the system and you should choose another nick.

    CHANNEL: #tor

  3. Click Enter

Congratulations! You're on IRC.

After a few seconds, you will automatically enter #tor, which is a chatroom with Tor developers, relay operators and other community members. There are some random people in #tor as well.

You can ask questions in the empty bar at the bottom of the screen. Please, don't ask to ask, just ask your question.

People may be able to answer right away, or there may be a bit of a delay (some people are listed on the channel but are away from their keyboards and record channel activities to read later).

If you want to chat with someone specific, start your comment with their nick and they will typically receive a notification that someone is trying to contact them.

OFTC often doesn't allow people to use their webchat over Tor. For this reason, and because many people end up preferring it anyway, you should also consider using an IRC client.

Tor compte sur le soutien d’utilisateurs et de bénévoles du monde entier pour nous aider à améliorer nos logiciels et nos ressources. C’est pourquoi vos rétroactions sont inestimables pour nous (et pour tous les utilisateurs de Tor).

Feedback template

When sending us feedback or reporting a bug, please include as many of these as possible:

  • Operating System you are using
  • Version du Navigateur Tor
  • Step by step of how you got to the issue, so we can reproduce it (e.g. I opened the browser, typed a url, clicked on (i) icon, then my browser crashed)
  • A screenshot of the problem
  • Le journal

How to Reach Us

There are several ways to reach us, so please use what works best for you.

GitLab

First, check if the bug is already known. You can search and read all the issues at https://gitlab.torproject.org/. To create a new issue, please request a new account to access Tor Project's GitLab instance and find the right repository to report your issue. We track all Tor Browser related issues at Tor Browser issue tracker. Issues related to our websites should be filed under the Web issue tracker.

Email

Send us an email to frontdesk@torproject.org

In the subject line of your email, please tell us what you're reporting. The more specific your subject line is (e.g. "Connection failure", "feedback on website", "feedback on Tor Browser, "I need a bridge"), the easier it will be for us to understand and follow up. Sometimes when we receive emails without subject lines, they're marked as spam and we don't see them.

For the fastest response, please write in English, Spanish, and/or Portuguese if you can. If none of these languages works for you, please write in any language you feel comfortable with, but keep in mind it will take us a bit longer to answer as we will need help with translation to understand it.

Blog post comments

You can always leave comments on the blog post related to the issue or feedback you want to report. If there is not a blog post related to your issue, please contact us another way.

IRC

You can find us in the #tor channel on OFTC to give us feedback or report bugs/issues. We may not respond right away, but we do check the backlog and will get back to you when we can.

Learn how to connect to OFTC servers.

Email Lists

For reporting issues or feedback using email lists, we recommend that you do so on the one that is related to what you would like to report.

For feedback or issues related to Tor Browser, Tor network or other projects developed by Tor: tor-talk

For feedback or issues related to our websites: ux

For feedback or issues related to running a Tor relay: tor-relays

For feedback on content related to Tor Browser Manual or Support website: tor-community-team

Report a security issue

If you've found a security issue in one of our projects or in our infrastructure, please email tor-security@lists.torproject.org. If you've found a security bug in Tor or Tor Browser, feel free to submit it for our bug bounty program. Si vous souhaitez chiffrer votre courriel, vous pouvez obtenir la clé publique GPG de la liste en contactant tor-security-sendkey@lists.torproject.org ou sur pool.sks-keyservers.net. En voici l’empreinte numérique :

  gpg --fingerprint tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  pub 4096R/1A7BF184 2017-03-13
  Fingerprint=8B90 4624 C5A2 8654 E453 9BC2 E135 A8B4 1A7B F184
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  sub 4096R/C00942E4 2017-03-13

Dépôt Debian

Yes, deb.torproject.org is also served through via an Onion Service: http://sdscoq7snqtznauu.onion/

Note: The symbol # refers to running the code as root. This means you should have access to a user account with system administration privileges, e.g your user should be in the sudo group.

To use Apt over Tor, the apt transport needs to be installed:

   # apt install apt-transport-tor

Then you need to add the following entries to /etc/apt/sources.list or a new file in /etc/apt/sources.list.d/:

   # For the stable version.
   deb tor://sdscoq7snqtznauu.onion/torproject.org <DISTRIBUTION> main

   # For the unstable version.
   deb tor://sdscoq7snqtznauu.onion/torproject.org tor-nightly-master-<DISTRIBUTION> main

Replace <DISTRIBUTION> with your Operating System codename. Run lsb_release -c or cat /etc/debian_version to check the Operating System version.

Now refresh your sources and try to install tor again:

   # apt update
   # apt install tor

No. Do not use the packages in Ubuntu's universe. In the past they have not been reliably updated. That means you could be missing stability and security fixes. Instead, please use Tor Debian repository.

The Tor Project maintains its own Debian package repository. Since Debian provides the LTS version of Tor, this might not always give you the latest stable Tor version. Therefore, it's recommended to install tor from our repository.

Here's how you can enable Tor Package Repository in Debian based distributions:

Note: The symbol # refers to running the code as root. This means you should have access to a user account with system administration privileges, e.g your user should be in the sudo group.

1. Install apt-transport-https

To enable all package managers using the libapt-pkg library to access metadata and packages available in sources accessible over https (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure).

   # apt install apt-transport-https

2. Add the following entries to /etc/apt/sources.list or a new file in /etc/apt/sources.list.d/

   deb https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org <DISTRIBUTION> main
   deb-src https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org <DISTRIBUTION> main

Si vous souhaitez essayer les paquets expérimentaux :

   deb https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-experimental-0.3.4.x-<DISTRIBUTION> main
   deb-src https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-experimental-0.3.4.x-<DISTRIBUTION> main

Ou les versions quotidiennes :

   deb https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-nightly-master-<DISTRIBUTION> main
   deb-src https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-nightly-master-<DISTRIBUTION> main

Replace <DISTRIBUTION> with your Operating System codename. Run lsb_release -c or cat /etc/debian_version to check the Operating System version.

3. Then add the gpg key used to sign the packages by running the following commands at your command prompt

   # wget -qO- https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89.asc | gpg --import
   # gpg --export A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89 | apt-key add -

4. Install tor and tor debian keyring

We provide a Debian package to help you keep our signing key current. It is recommended you use it. Install it with the following commands:

   # apt update
   # apt install tor deb.torproject.org-keyring

Tor rpm packages

The Tor Project maintains its own RPM package repository for CentOS and RHEL and Fedora.

Note: The symbol # refers to be running the code as root. That means you should have access to a user account with system administration privileges, e.g your user should be in the sudo group.

Here's how you can enable Tor Package Repository for both CentOS and RHEL and Fedora:

1. Enable epel repository (only for CentOS and RHEL)

# dnf install epel-release -y

2. Add the following to /etc/yum.repos.d/tor.repo

For CentOS or RHEL:

[tor]
name=Tor for Enterprise Linux $releasever - $basearch
baseurl=https://rpm.torproject.org/centos/$releasever/$basearch
enabled=1
gpgcheck=1
gpgkey=https://rpm.torproject.org/centos/public_gpg.key
cost=100

Pour Fedora :

[tor]
name=Tor for Fedora $releasever - $basearch
baseurl=https://rpm.torproject.org/fedora/$releasever/$basearch
enabled=1
gpgcheck=1
gpgkey=https://rpm.torproject.org/fedora/public_gpg.key
cost=100

3. Install the Tor package

Then you can install the latest Tor package.

# dnf install tor -y

Using it for the first time, you will have to import the GPG public key.

Importing GPG key 0x3621CD35:
Userid     : "Kushal Das (RPM Signing key) <kushal@torproject.org>"
Fingerprint: 999E C8E3 14BC 8D46 022D 6C7D E217 C30C 3621 CD35
From       : https://rpm.torproject.org/fedora/public_gpg.key
Is this ok [y/N]: y

Abuse FAQ

Great. That's exactly why we implemented exit policies.

Each Tor relay has an exit policy that specifies what sort of outbound connections are allowed or refused from that relay. The exit policies are propagated to Tor clients via the directory, so clients will automatically avoid picking exit relays that would refuse to exit to their intended destination. This way each relay can decide the services, hosts, and networks it wants to allow connections to, based on abuse potential and its own situation. Read the Support entry on issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy, and then read Mike Perry's tips for running an exit node with minimal harassment.

The default exit policy allows access to many popular services (e.g. web browsing), but restricts some due to abuse potential (e.g. mail) and some since the Tor network can't handle the load (e.g. default file-sharing ports). You can change your exit policy by editing your torrc file. If you want to avoid most if not all abuse potential, set it to "reject :". This setting means that your relay will be used for relaying traffic inside the Tor network, but not for connections to external websites or other services.

If you do allow any exit connections, make sure name resolution works (that is, your computer can resolve Internet addresses correctly). If there are any resources that your computer can't reach (for example, you are behind a restrictive firewall or content filter), please explicitly reject them in your exit policy otherwise Tor users will be impacted too.

Criminals can already do bad things. Since they're willing to break laws, they already have lots of options available that provide better privacy than Tor provides. They can steal cell phones, use them, and throw them in a ditch; they can crack into computers in Korea or Brazil and use them to launch abusive activities; they can use spyware, viruses, and other techniques to take control of literally millions of Windows machines around the world.

Tor aims to provide protection for ordinary people who want to follow the law. Only criminals have privacy right now, and we need to fix that.

Some advocates of anonymity explain that it's just a tradeoff — accepting the bad uses for the good ones — but there's more to it than that. Criminals and other bad people have the motivation to learn how to get good anonymity, and many have the motivation to pay well to achieve it. Being able to steal and reuse the identities of innocent victims (identity theft) makes it even easier. Normal people, on the other hand, don't have the time or money to spend figuring out how to get privacy online. This is the worst of all possible worlds.

So yes, criminals can use Tor, but they already have better options, and it seems unlikely that taking Tor away from the world will stop them from doing their bad things. At the same time, Tor and other privacy measures can fight identity theft, physical crimes like stalking, and so on.

Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks typically rely on having a group of thousands of computers all sending floods of traffic to a victim. Since the goal is to overpower the bandwidth of the victim, they typically send UDP packets since those don't require handshakes or coordination.

But because Tor only transports correctly formed TCP streams, not all IP packets, you cannot send UDP packets over Tor. (You can't do specialized forms of this attack like SYN flooding either.) So ordinary DDoS attacks are not possible over Tor. Tor also doesn't allow bandwidth amplification attacks against external sites: you need to send in a byte for every byte that the Tor network will send to your destination. So in general, attackers who control enough bandwidth to launch an effective DDoS attack can do it just fine without Tor.

First of all, the default Tor exit policy rejects all outgoing port 25 (SMTP) traffic. So sending spam mail through Tor isn't going to work by default. It's possible that some relay operators will enable port 25 on their particular exit node, in which case that computer will allow outgoing mails; but that individual could just set up an open mail relay too, independent of Tor. In short, Tor isn't useful for spamming, because nearly all Tor relays refuse to deliver the mail.

Of course, it's not all about delivering the mail. Spammers can use Tor to connect to open HTTP proxies (and from there to SMTP servers); to connect to badly written mail-sending CGI scripts; and to control their botnets — that is, to covertly communicate with armies of compromised computers that deliver the spam.

This is a shame, but notice that spammers are already doing great without Tor. Also, remember that many of their more subtle communication mechanisms (like spoofed UDP packets) can't be used over Tor, because it only transports correctly-formed TCP connections.

Not much, in the grand scheme of things. The network has been running since October 2003, and it's only generated a handful of complaints. Of course, like all privacy-oriented networks on the net, it attracts its share of jerks. Tor's exit policies help separate the role of "willing to donate resources to the network" from the role of "willing to deal with exit abuse complaints," so we hope our network is more sustainable than past attempts at anonymity networks.

Since Tor has many good uses as well, we feel that we're doing pretty well at striking a balance currently.

If you run a Tor relay that allows exit connections (such as the default exit policy), it's probably safe to say that you will eventually hear from somebody. Abuse complaints may come in a variety of forms. For example:

  • Somebody connects to Hotmail, and sends a ransom note to a company. The FBI sends you a polite email, you explain that you run a Tor relay, and they say "oh well" and leave you alone. [Port 80]
  • Somebody tries to get you shut down by using Tor to connect to Google groups and post spam to Usenet, and then sends an angry mail to your ISP about how you're destroying the world. [Port 80]
  • Somebody connects to an IRC network and makes a nuisance of himself. Your ISP gets polite mail about how your computer has been compromised; and/or your computer gets DDoSed. [Port 6667]
  • Somebody uses Tor to download a Vin Diesel movie, and your ISP gets a DMCA takedown notice. See EFF's Tor DMCA Response Template, which explains why your ISP can probably ignore the notice without any liability. [Arbitrary ports]

Some hosting providers are friendlier than others when it comes to Tor exits. For a listing see the good and bad ISPs wiki.

For a complete set of template responses to different abuse complaint types, see the collection of templates. You can also proactively reduce the amount of abuse you get by following these tips for running an exit node with minimal harassment and running a reduced exit policy.

You might also find that your Tor relay's IP is blocked from accessing some Internet sites/services. This might happen regardless of your exit policy, because some groups don't seem to know or care that Tor has exit policies. (If you have a spare IP not used for other activities, you might consider running your Tor relay on it.) In general, it's advisable not to use your home internet connection to provide a Tor relay.

Sometimes jerks make use of Tor to troll IRC channels. This abuse results in IP-specific temporary bans ("klines" in IRC lingo), as the network operators try to keep the troll off of their network.

This response underscores a fundamental flaw in IRC's security model: they assume that IP addresses equate to humans, and by banning the IP address they can ban the human. In reality, this is not the case — many such trolls routinely make use of the literally millions of open proxies and compromised computers around the Internet. The IRC networks are fighting a losing battle of trying to block all these nodes, and an entire cottage industry of blacklists and counter-trolls has sprung up based on this flawed security model (not unlike the antivirus industry). The Tor network is just a drop in the bucket here.

On the other hand, from the viewpoint of IRC server operators, security is not an all-or-nothing thing. By responding quickly to trolls or any other social attack, it may be possible to make the attack scenario less attractive to the attacker. And most individual IP addresses do equate to individual humans, on any given IRC network at any given time. The exceptions include NAT gateways which may be allocated access as special cases. While it's a losing battle to try to stop the use of open proxies, it's not generally a losing battle to keep klining a single ill-behaved IRC user until that user gets bored and goes away.

But the real answer is to implement application-level auth systems, to let in well-behaving users and keep out badly-behaving users. This needs to be based on some property of the human (such as a password they know), not some property of the way their packets are transported.

Of course, not all IRC networks are trying to ban Tor nodes. After all, quite a few people use Tor to IRC in privacy in order to carry on legitimate communications without tying them to their real-world identity. Each IRC network needs to decide for itself if blocking a few more of the millions of IPs that bad people can use is worth losing the contributions from the well-behaved Tor users.

If you're being blocked, have a discussion with the network operators and explain the issues to them. They may not be aware of the existence of Tor at all, or they may not be aware that the hostnames they're klining are Tor exit nodes. If you explain the problem, and they conclude that Tor ought to be blocked, you may want to consider moving to a network that is more open to free speech. Maybe inviting them to #tor on irc.oftc.net will help show them that we are not all evil people.

Finally, if you become aware of an IRC network that seems to be blocking Tor, or a single Tor exit node, please put that information on The Tor IRC block tracker so that others can share. At least one IRC network consults that page to unblock exit nodes that have been blocked inadvertently.

Even though Tor isn't useful for spamming, some over-zealous blacklisters seem to think that all open networks like Tor are evil — they attempt to strong-arm network administrators on policy, service, and routing issues, and then extract ransoms from victims.

If your server administrators decide to make use of these blacklists to refuse incoming mail, you should have a conversation with them and explain about Tor and Tor's exit policies.

We're sorry to hear that. There are some situations where it makes sense to block anonymous users for an Internet service. But in many cases, there are easier solutions that can solve your problem while still allowing users to access your website securely.

First, ask yourself if there's a way to do application-level decisions to separate the legitimate users from the jerks. For example, you might have certain areas of the site, or certain privileges like posting, available only to people who are registered. It's easy to build an up-to-date list of Tor IP addresses that allow connections to your service, so you could set up this distinction only for Tor users. This way you can have multi-tiered access and not have to ban every aspect of your service.

For example, the Freenode IRC network had a problem with a coordinated group of abusers joining channels and subtly taking over the conversation; but when they labeled all users coming from Tor nodes as "anonymous users," removing the ability of the abusers to blend in, the abusers moved back to using their open proxies and bot networks.

Second, consider that hundreds of thousands of people use Tor every day simply for good data hygiene — for example, to protect against data-gathering advertising companies while going about their normal activities. Others use Tor because it's their only way to get past restrictive local firewalls. Some Tor users may be legitimately connecting to your service right now to carry on normal activities. You need to decide whether banning the Tor network is worth losing the contributions of these users, as well as potential future legitimate users. (Often people don't have a good measure of how many polite Tor users are connecting to their service — you never notice them until there's an impolite one.)

At this point, you should also ask yourself what you do about other services that aggregate many users behind a few IP addresses. Tor is not so different from AOL in this respect.

Lastly, please remember that Tor relays have individual exit policies. Many Tor relays do not allow exiting connections at all. Many of those that do allow some exit connections might already disallow connections to your service. When you go about banning nodes, you should parse the exit policies and only block the ones that allow these connections; and you should keep in mind that exit policies can change (as well as the overall list of nodes in the network).

If you really want to do this, we provide a Tor exit relay list or a DNS-based list you can query.

(Some system administrators block ranges of IP addresses because of official policy or some abuse pattern, but some have also asked about whitelisting Tor exit relays because they want to permit access to their systems only using Tor. These scripts are usable for whitelisting as well.)

Les développeurs de Tor ne peuvent rien faire pour suivre les utilisateurs de Tor à la trace. The same protections that keep bad people from breaking Tor's anonymity also prevent us from figuring out what's going on.

Some fans have suggested that we redesign Tor to include a backdoor. There are two problems with this idea. First, it technically weakens the system too far. Having a central way to link users to their activities is a gaping hole for all sorts of attackers; and the policy mechanisms needed to ensure correct handling of this responsibility are enormous and unsolved. Second, the bad people aren't going to get caught by this anyway, since they will use other means to ensure their anonymity (identity theft, compromising computers and using them as bounce points, etc).

This ultimately means that it is the responsibility of site owners to protect themselves against compromise and security issues that can come from anywhere. This is just part of signing up for the benefits of the Internet. You must be prepared to secure yourself against the bad elements, wherever they may come from. Tracking and increased surveillance are not the answer to preventing abuse.

But remember that this doesn't mean that Tor is invulnerable. Traditional police techniques can still be very effective against Tor, such as investigating means, motive, and opportunity, interviewing suspects, writing style analysis, technical analysis of the content itself, sting operations, keyboard taps, and other physical investigations. The Tor Project is also happy to work with everyone including law enforcement groups to train them how to use the Tor software to safely conduct investigations or anonymized activities online.

The Tor Project does not host, control, nor have the ability to discover the owner or location of a .onion address. The .onion address is an address from an onion service. The name you see ending in .onion is an onion service descriptor. It's an automatically generated name which can be located on any Tor relay or client anywhere on the Internet. Onion services are designed to protect both the user and service provider from discovering who they are and where they are from. The design of onion services means the owner and location of the .onion site is hidden even from us.

But remember that this doesn't mean that onion services are invulnerable. Traditional police techniques can still be very effective against them, such as interviewing suspects, writing style analysis, technical analysis of the content itself, sting operations, keyboard taps, and other physical investigations.

If you have a complaint about child abuse materials, you may wish to report it to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which serves as a national coordination point for investigation of child pornography: http://www.missingkids.com/. We do not view links you report.

We take abuse seriously. Activists and law enforcement use Tor to investigate abuse and help support survivors. We work with them to help them understand how Tor can help their work. In some cases, technological mistakes are being made and we help to correct them. Because some people in survivors' communities embrace stigma instead of compassion, seeking support from fellow victims requires privacy-preserving technology.

Our refusal to build backdoors and censorship into Tor is not because of a lack of concern. We refuse to weaken Tor because it would harm efforts to combat child abuse and human trafficking in the physical world, while removing safe spaces for victims online. Meanwhile, criminals would still have access to botnets, stolen phones, hacked hosting accounts, the postal system, couriers, corrupt officials, and whatever technology emerges to trade content. They are early adopters of technology. In the face of this, it is dangerous for policymakers to assume that blocking and filtering is sufficient. We are more interested in helping efforts to halt and prevent child abuse than helping politicians score points with constituents by hiding it. The role of corruption is especially troubling; see this United Nations report on The Role of Corruption in Trafficking in Persons.

Finally, it is important to consider the world that children will encounter as adults when enacting policy in their name. Will they thank us if they are unable to voice their opinions safely as adults? What if they are trying to expose a failure of the state to protect other children?

Mesures de Tor

We actually don't count users, but we count requests to the directories that clients make periodically to update their list of relays and estimate user numbers indirectly from there.

No, but we can see what fraction of directories reported them, and then we can extrapolate the total number in the network.

We put in the assumption that the average client makes 10 such requests per day. A tor client that is connected 24/7 makes about 15 requests per day, but not all clients are connected 24/7, so we picked the number 10 for the average client. We simply divide directory requests by 10 and consider the result as the number of users. Another way of looking at it, is that we assume that each request represents a client that stays online for one tenth of a day, so 2 hours and 24 minutes.

Average number of concurrent users, estimated from data collected over a day. We can't say how many distinct users there are.

No, the relays that report these statistics aggregate requests by country of origin and over a period of 24 hours. The statistics we would need to gather for the number of users per hour would be too detailed and might put users at risk.

Then we count those users as one. We really count clients, but it's more intuitive for most people to think of users, that's why we say users and not clients.

No, because that user updates their list of relays as often as a user that doesn't change IP address over the day.

The directories resolve IP addresses to country codes and report these numbers in aggregate form. This is one of the reasons why tor ships with a GeoIP database.

Very few bridges report data on transports or IP versions yet, and by default we consider requests to use the default OR protocol and IPv4. Once more bridges report these data, the numbers will become more accurate.

Relays and bridges report some of the data in 24-hour intervals which may end at any time of the day.
And after such an interval is over relays and bridges might take another 18 hours to report the data.
We cut off the last two days from the graphs, because we want to avoid that the last data point in a graph indicates a recent trend change which is in fact just an artifact of the algorithm.

The reason is that we publish user numbers once we're confident enough that they won't change significantly anymore. But it's always possible that a directory reports data a few hours after we were confident enough, but which then slightly changed the graph.

We do have descriptor archives from before that time, but those descriptors didn't contain all the data we use to estimate user numbers. Please find the following tarball for more details:

Tarball

For direct users, we include all directories which we didn't do in the old approach. We also use histories that only contain bytes written to answer directory requests, which is more precise than using general byte histories.

Oh, that's a whole different story. We wrote a 13 page long technical report explaining the reasons for retiring the old approach.
tl;dr: in the old approach we measured the wrong thing, and now we measure the right thing.

We run an anomaly-based censorship-detection system that looks at estimated user numbers over a series of days and predicts the user number in the next days. If the actual number is higher or lower, this might indicate a possible censorship event or release of censorship. For more details, see our technical report.